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This study has attempted to explain the portfolio behavior of the Pakistani Schedule 
banks and to provide the Pakistan monetary authorities with the best possible model 
through which they can influence the economy. First of all, we have investigated the links 
between monetary policy, the Banking Sector and the (aggregate) real economy in 
Pakistan over a forty year period, which commences in 1964. We have focused here to 
study how banks play a vital role in the monetary transmission mechanism through the 
banking credit channel. This study in chapter three provides the background for the two 
portfolio chapters where particular emphasis has given to the mean-variance form of 
expected utility and safety first Principle. Both static and dynamic versions of these 
models are examined. It is observed that these types of models, generally, perform well in 
terms of the traditional “goodness of fit” measures. Theoretical restriction on the 
properties of the demand/supply equations such as symmetry, homogeneity and joint 
homogeneity and symmetry were tested within each and every alternative model 
specification. For the estimation of the models, we used semi-annual balance sheet data 
of the State Bank of Pakistan for the period 1964:2-2005:1. Our main finding is that 
dynamic model performs better than static model in both expected utility model and 
safety first model and safety first dynamic model marginally perform better than expected 
utility dynamic model in terms of coefficients’ significance of interest rates and general 
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The scheduled commercial banks of Pakistan have gradually grown since the partition 
of India and Pakistan 14 August 1947. Now they are more diverse than ever and play 
a very vital role in the country’s economy. They offer a long range of financial 
services such as leasing, credit card banking, international finance and trade credit. 
This thesis is an attempt to explain the portfolio behavior of Pakistani scheduled 
commercial banks and to provide the Pakistani monetary authorities with the best 
possible model through which they can influence the economy. Therefore, a detailed 
knowledge of scheduled commercial banks’ behavior is important in evaluating and 
enhancing the ability of monetary authorities to influence their behavior. The main 
focus has given to mean-variance form of expected utility maximization and safety 
first principle. We specify and test a number of static as well as dynamic models for 
the portfolio behavior of Pakistani banks. Theoretical restriction on the properties of 
the demand/supply equations such as symmetry, homogeneity and joint homogeneity 
and symmetry were tested within each and every alternative model specification. The 
semi-annual balance sheet data, for the period 1964:2- 2005:1, was used for the 
estimation of these models. For the estimation of the expected utility maximization 
approach and safety first paradigm, we have employed FIML (Full Information 
Maximum likelihood).  
 
The reason for choosing this area of research is because the activities of the banking 
sector are crucial to the growth and development of Pakistan, which wants to evolve 
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into a newly industrializing country, with an export-oriented economy which is 
increasingly diversifying into financial services. There is no considerable empirical/ 
econometric work done on Pakistan banks but what we have done is new in. It is an 
investigation that will throw new light at the SBP (State Bank of Pakistan) on the 
links between the Central Bank instruments of control and the impact of monetary 
policy on the banking sector.  
 
As a background to our portfolio models, we have also investigated the links between 
monetary policy, the Banking Sector and the (aggregate) real economy in Pakistan 
over a forty year period, commencing in 1964. Those links have been articulated in 
many papers over those years, and several possible monetary channels have been 
advanced, some of which are essentially changes of name for existing channels, or 
nested within others, so that the main channels can be summarily defined to be: (1) 
the money or interest rate channel; (2) the bank lending (credit) channel, or “broad 
lending (credit) channel”; (3) the exchange rate channel; and (4) the expectations 
channel. The last two have featured in the literature over recent years due to the 
floating of exchange rates, foreign exchange crises, and the influence on markets and 
on the information/actions of Central Banks, of “the rational expectations” revolution. 
To examine the effects of a monetary policy shock on balance sheets and economic 
variables, we have employed as our econometric methodology standard semi-
structural VARs, VECs and examine the existence of Cointegrating relationship. 
 
The summary of our three empirical chapters are given below: 
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1. The State Bank of Pakistan considers treasury bills rate as its policy indicator and, 
therefore, we have used treasury bills’ short term interest rate as an appropriate choice 
in the test VARs. In effect, the tighter monetary policy stance (such a reduction in the 
monetary base), which has produced an increase in the short term interest rate, makes 
a substantial contribution to the variation in output, but a correspondingly small 
impact on the variation in inflation. We have identified long–run cointegrating 
relationships between loans and deposits in both models, as these variables are 
considered to have the long-run influences on the banking sector. According to our 
model (1), the long-run relationships between the short-term interest rate, output, the 
price level and deposits are all positive. The second long-run relationship is between 
total bank loans, total deposits, the price level, aggregate output and the relatively 
riskless banking sector asset, government securities. All associations are positive. On 
the other hand, in model (2) the first relationship: “private sector” loans are positively 
related to total deposits and to GDP, and negatively associated with the rate of interest 
and the price level. From the second relationship, public sector loans, we note: the 
positive link with total deposits, GDP and also with government securities. 
 
2. To investigate the portfolio behaviour of scheduled commercial banks of Pakistan, 
we have estimated various disaggregated expected utility static and dynamic models. 
We have chosen the best dynamic unrestricted model among all potential models to 
explain the banking portfolio of Pakistani commercial banks. We have also estimated 
various dynamic aggregated expected utility models in which we have aggregated all 
loans. The basic idea is to see if there is a loss of information in explaining the items 
in the portfolio, and hence the total portfolio, in aggregating all loans, implying that 
they are perfect substitutes for the banks. We have also compared the best expected 
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utility disaggregated and aggregated models within the sample period and out of the 
sample period. The comparison shows that the disaggregated model wins over 
aggregated model.  
 
3. For further investigation to the portfolio behaviour of commercial banks in 
Pakistan, we have estimated various disaggregated static and dynamic safety first 
models. We have chosen the best safety first dynamic model with symmetry 
restriction to explain the banking portfolio of Pakistan. We have also estimated 
various dynamic aggregated safety first and compared the best safety first 
disaggregated model within the sample period and out of the sample period. The 
comparison shows that the disaggregated model wins over aggregated model.  
 
4. The best disaggregated safety first dynamic model marginally performs better than 
the best disaggregated expected utility dynamic model in terms of coefficients’ 
significance of interest rates and general stock adjustments. Therefore, it can be said 
that the safety first model does explains better the portfolio behaviour of Pakistani 
Banks.  
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides information on 
banking sector of Pakistan and literature review of portfolio behaviour of banks under 
risk aversion. Chapter 3 investigates money transmission mechanisms and explores 
long-run relationships between the Banking Sector’s balance sheet and the macro 
economy in Pakistan. Chapter 4 describes the methodology of expected utility 
maximization and discusses the results, and provides impact, Interim and total 
multiplier affects. Chapter 5 is devoted to the safety first principle, explains the 
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model, and provides the results for the portfolio behaviour of Pakistan banks and 
Section 6 provides conclusion and a comparative analysis of the empirical veracity of 







BANKING SECTOR OF PAKISTAN 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter we provide background on the banking sector of Pakistan as a 
necessary prelude to the three research chapters of thesis. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the banking sector and 
financial system of Pakistan. Section 2.3 outlines alternative theories of Bank 
Portfolio behaviuor. Section 2.4 provides detail of the balance sheet with time series 
graph including the interest rates. Section 2.5 provides the descriptive statistics of the 
variables that are going to be used in the estimation.  
 
2.2. Banking Background and Financial System of Pakistan 
The State Bank of Pakistan is the main monetary power of the country and it begun 
operating on 1st July1948. Prior to this, the Reserve Bank of India performed all the 
banking functions for Pakistan. As according to the Pakistan Monetary System and 
Reserve Bank order 1947, the Reserve Bank of India was authorized to work as a 
Central Bank of Pakistan up to 30th September 19481.  
 
The important role, apart from the other responsibilities, of the State Bank of Pakistan 
is to make monetary policy that control the inflation through interest rate and 
exchange rate management where as these two channels (interest rate & exchange 
rate) is the most important part of the monetary transmission mechanism through 
                                                          
1  J.Russell Andrus (1958),” Economy of Pakistan” 
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which monetary policy actions affect inflation and output in economy. In interest rate 
channel, a rise (fall) in interest rate tends to decrease(increase) the aggregate demand 
that fall back (increase) inflationary pressures thus results in a tight (easy) monetary 
stance. On the other hand exchange rate channel directly affects the general price 
through changes in imported inputs and output prices and also indirectly affects 
through aggregate demand by changing in the pattern of spending in the economy. 
The effectiveness of exchange rate on inflation depends on many factors such as 
exchange rate pass-through, market structures, and elastic ties of imports, exports, 
consumption and investment with respect to exchange rate2. 
 
Pakistan has a well-developed banking system, which consists of 47 scheduled 
commercial banks, 6 DFIs (Development Finance Institutions), and 2 MFBs 
(Microfinance Banks).Our study for the portfolio behavior of banks is based on the 
scheduled commercial banks of Pakistan. All scheduled commercial banks in Pakistan 
are classified into three main groups. These are; public sector banks, domestic private 
banks and foreign banks. These public sector banks further divided into public sector 
commercial banks and specialized banks. These scheduled commercial banks are 
regulated by the State Bank of Pakistan’s Prudential Regulations, albeit through 
different wings, and are subject to different SBP regulatory requirements such as 
capital and liquidity reserve requirements. 
 
                                                          
2 SBP Working Paper Series------Zulifqar Hyder & Muhammad Mazhar Khan (2006)’ 
“Monetary Conditions Index for Pakistan”. 
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The financial sector3 of Pakistan has developed in response to Government of 
Pakistan planning process that suppressed the growth and innovation, eliminated 
price, product and institutional competition, decreased supervision and enhanced the 
government ownership of the institutions within the sector. Due to this policy, 
financial sector of Pakistan has to bear the losses which have to be borne by the 
taxpayer and depositors.  
 
The major player is the government in the financial sector of Pakistan who is 
controlling Nationalised Commercial Banks (NCBs) and Development Financial 
Institutions (DFIs) which account for more than 60 percent of all loans and around 
half of the sum of all deposits and government borrowing; government bonds that 
used for the deficit of the government . 
 
There are two broad categories in the financial sector of Pakistan. These are banking 
companies and non- bank financial institutions and both of them are being controlled 
by the State Bank of Pakistan. Depending on the nature of institution, they are also 
regulated by the Corporate Law Authority, the Ministry of Finance and the Religious 
Board. We are briefly discussing below the description of these institutions. 
 
Domestic commercial banks were nationalized in 1974 and from 1992; they have 
been in process of being privatized. Private banking sector is also playing vital role in 
the economy of Pakistan but national commercial banks (NCBs) are prominent in 
banking sector as they hold over 60 percent of all deposits. Due to inefficiency in 
national commercial banks (NCBs), the process of privatization has not been slowed 
                                                          
3 Nadeem ul Haq (1997), Hanif (2002), Shamshad (2006), Qayyum (2007) 
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and interest rate spreads are large and deposit rates have been negative in real term 
quite frequently. Even interest rates spread are large, national commercial banks are 
incurring losses. On the other hand, foreign banks are operating successfully in the 
economy due to their superior management skills, better access to international 
financial markets and they are free from political influences. They have the lowest per 
unit cost of deposit and generate profit within the same economy. 
 
Development financial institutions (DFIs) are mainly relied on government funding or 
lines of credit from multi-lateral agencies, guaranteed by government. These are 
providing long term debt and make a small percentage of the total financial asset. 
DFIs are marginalised due to limited availability of further financing and financial 
constraints. There are two large government organisations that provide mutual fund 
services in Pakistan. They remain large institutional investors on the equities market. 
 
Debt market is based on government debt and commercial paper. There are two type 
of government paper are issued. These are federal govt bonds and several saving 
certificates. Federal government bonds are auctioned but government does not allow 
the market to completely determine the interest rate and saving certificates are issued 
at fixed interest. Many savings instruments and investment certificates are issued by 
the state-owned DFIs. 
 
Equity market is very thin in Pakistan and only limited quantity of the potential firms 
are being traded and on other hand price jumps are quite common that leads to 
generate great volatility in the stock prices. Therefore, these stock prices do not reflect 
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the true value of the shares. Due to poor credit practices, the accumulations of non-
performing loans are increased with banks. 
 
The foreign exchange market is being managed by the State Bank of Pakistan. From 
1980 to onward, floating exchange system is operating in Pakistan. State bank of 
Pakistan is also providing forward market activity at a fixed non-market premium. All 
foreign exchange deposits in banks are surrendered to the State Bank of Pakistan and 
the foreign exposure of the SBP has become an important policy matter due to the 
rapid growth of foreign currency.   
 
Insurance business has not developed properly due to nationalisation of life insurance 
in Pakistan. 
 
The Informal financial markets contain three type of  financial activities; parallel 
currency market that intermediates in the pool of workers’ remittances and illegal 
transactions, informal credit market provides system of granting credit within the 
stock market and trading with international future markets that is possible due to 
information technology and it is beyond any regulation and supervision. 
 
 Two important steps have been taken by the monetary authorities of Pakistan in 
1980s: first is to adopt floating exchange rate system and to give up fixed exchange 
rate mechanism, and second step is to start comprehensive financial sector reforms 
with the help of international financial agencies such as (International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank (Ahmed, 2006 and Khan and Khan, 2007). The objectives of these 
reforms were to modernize monetary sector and to utilize the market based instrument 
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of monetary Policy in Pakistan. In 1995, monetary authorities have abandoned CRD 
(Credit Deposit Ratio)4 and OMO (Open Market Operation) has become the only 
option for conducting monetary policy. As a result the State Bank of Pakistan can 
intervene in the secondary market to manage domestic liquidity by purchasing and 
selling government securities. 
 
The major tools for SBP to contain monetary growth and manage market liquidity are 
CRR (Cash Reserve Requirement) and OMO, while the direction of monetary policy 
is indicated by changes in discount rate (Hyder and Khan, 2006). The Central Bank of 
Pakistan presently has made it mandatory to the scheduled banks to keep the balance 
                                                          
4 Banking sector of Pakistan has gone through different credit regimes, Credit Ceilings 
Regime (1973-1992), Credit Deposit Ratio Regime (1992-1995), Indicative Credit 
Target Regime (1995-2001) and Market – Based Credit Regime (2001- Onward). 
Credit Ceilings and Indicative Credit Target regimes are more or less similar to each 
other where banks are advised to limit their credit up to certain level and if they are 
failed to do so, then, they have to pay penalty to the central bank. In Credit Deposit 
Ratio Regime, banks are directed by the State Bank of Pakistan to extend their credit 
to the private sector to a certain percentage of its deposits and that percentage was 
initially 30% for both local and foreign currency and thereafter, the percentage was 
changed accordingly. Last but not least, the Central Bank of Pakistan’s credit policy 
was shifted to the Market-Based credit mechanism in 2001.SBP has liberalized the 
commercial banks to give credit to the private sector according to their own 
judgmental criteria but banks were advised to maintain prudential regulations (i.e, 
client specific and sector specific exposure, etc) and to strengthen their risk 
management framework(Janjua (2005)). 
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with the State Bank of Pakistan as a Cash Reserve requirement of 5% of Time and 
Demand Liabilities on weekly average basis, while minimum daily requirement is of 
4%. Due to the legal requirement of maintaining Cash Reserve with SBP, State Bank 
of Pakistan does not give any profit/interest rate on cash reserves to the scheduled 
Banks. Further more, banks are obligated to maintain Liquidity Requirement 15 
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From 1965 to 1997, banks had kept more liquidity (up to 60%) where as, legally 
requirement was from 18% to 40%. Actually banks made a secured investment during 
that time and enjoyed high returns, as there were high returns (from 8% to 16%) on 
securities i.e Government Bond and T Bills. But after banking reforms in 1997 to 
2001, where the objectives of reforms were to support competitive environment and 
                                                          
5 Liquid assets are defined as cash, gold or government securities. To maintain 
liquidity at all times ensure the State Bank of Pakistan that the funds deposited in the 
banks are not taken out the country, to any substantial extent (See J.Russell Andrus 
,1958) 
6 Statutory Liquidity Reserve is governed under section 29 of the BCO, 1962. 
Presently it is being monitored at 20% of total demand and time liabilities of 
scheduled banks. This 20% is comprised of 5% on account of CRR (Cash Reserve 
Requirement) and 15% on account of Statutory Liquidity Requirement (State Bank of 
Pakistan). 
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complete the process of privatization and liberalization, the returns on securities cut 
down gradually from 12% to 1.5% and encouraged to the banks to issue more 
advances to generate their high returns7.  
 
The SBP has to give commercial banks of Pakistan so-called CAMELS rating, which 
is based on six areas assessed: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. With above information, SBP can enforce 
regulations by taking such formal actions as cease and desist orders to alter the bank’s 
behaviour or may close a bank if its CAMELS rating are very low. These actions are 
taken to mitigate moral hazard by imposing restrictions to the banks from taking on 
too much risk. It does also help reducing adverse selection problem because with less 
opportunity for risk taking, risk-loving entrepreneur will be less likely to be attracted 
to the banking industry. Additionally, The Banking Companies Ordinance had been 
amended in 1997, which empowers the State Bank to prescribe capital requirements 
for banks. In exercise of these powers the State Bank has laid down Minimum Capital 
Requirements for banks based on Basle capital structure. The banks have to maintain 
a Capital Adequacy Ratio in a way that their capital and unencumbered general 
reserves are, at the minimum, 8% of their risk weighted assets, and effective from 1st 
January, 2003 banks are required to maintain a minimum paid up capital level of Rs.1 
                                                          
7  SBP officials explained the behavior of liquidity and told the trend of keeping high 
ratio of liquidity has declined due to the decline in returns on securities in Market-
Based Credit Regime (2001- Onward). 
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Billion. Now implementation of Basel II would also rationales the risk exposures vis –
a viz. capital8. 
 
 In continuation, both of these approaches has benefited the financial system in terms 
of improved stability and resilience, operating efficiencies and also attracted foreign 
investments in this area. A growing asset base, largely financed by the steady deposit 
flows signifies the increasing confidence of the depositors in the stability of the 
banking system. Improved asset quality involves improved risk management, credit 
appraisal and monitoring standards9. In the light of above restrictions under Basel 1, 
Bank has to change its portfolio behaviour according to the Basel 1 accord (minimum 
capital requirement and risk base capital requirement). 
 
2.2.1: Commercial Banks and their Functions: 
Scheduled commercial banks in Pakistan include nationalized, foreign and private 
banks. These banks are operating in accordance with the provision of the banking 
companies Ordinance, 1962. The legislators classified the functions of commercial 
banks in the light of the Ordinance10. 
 
• To develop resources which include accepting deposits in various types of 
account whether they are demand or time deposits. 
                                                          
8 see- the State Bank of Pakistan web site, Frederic S Mishkin(2003) and Saunders 
and Cornett(2006) 
9 See –State Bank of Pakistan web site. 
10 See An article written by National Bank of Pakistan (2008),” Banking in Pakistan”. 
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• To credit and investment operations. Credit operation means loans given to the 
clients of the bank on short and long term. On the other hand, under the 
investment operations the bank should invest in Government Bonds and, 
Treasury Bills. 
• Ancillary operations that include collecting of cheques, handling of negotiable 
instruments, transfer of money from one place to another within or outside the 
country, opening of letter of credit, local or international, and leasing out the 
safe deposit lockers. 
• Other banking operations i.e, accepting deposits, transaction relating to 
transfer of funds, various types of collections, etc. 
Further, the banking operations can be classified into three main groups: commercial 
operations are, again, divided into several divisions, financial operations i.e, long or 
short term investment such as participation in industrial projects, issue of shares, 
debentures and other instruments of companies and service and commission 
operations i.e, Safekeeping and management operations, giving information access to 
the clients and developing a link between the stock exchanges and the customers for 
exchange operation. 
 
2.2.2: The Balance Sheet of Scheduled Commercial Bank of Pakistan 
Following is the balance sheet of scheduled banks of Pakistan.        




3. Fed. Govt. Securities 3.Time Deposit 
4.Treasury Bills 4.Demand Deposit 
5.Provincial Govt. Securities 5.Borrowing from State Banks of Pakistan 
6.Other Assets 6.Other Liabilities 
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A banking company is required the nominal or authorized capital to registered in 
Pakistan. That capital is further divided into paid up and subscribed capital. 
According to the Ordinance 1962, banking company can not carry out its business 
unless it satisfies the following conditions11. 
 
• The subscribed capital of company is not less than one half of the authorized 
capital and the paid capital is not less than one half of the subscribed capital. 
• The capital of the company should consist of ordinary shares only. 
• The voting right of the share holders should be strictly in proportion with 
share holders contributions to the paid up capital of the company. 
 
Banking ordinance 1962 section 21 has made it obligatory for the every banking 
company incorporated in Pakistan to create a reserve fund. The reserve fund is the 
fund which is undivided trading profits set a side for contingencies and it is noted that 
the reserve fund for many banks in Pakistan has exceeded the paid-up capital. 
 
Capital comprises of paid up capital of Pakistani banks. In case of foreign banks, it is 
equivalent rupee amount kept with the State Bank of Pakistan as reserve capital 
required to be maintained under the rules. Where as Reserves include all types of 
reserves maintained by the scheduled banks12. 
 
Ordinance 1962 section 29(1) has made it a legal obligation that every bank operating 
in Pakistan maintains liquid assets. The amount of the liquid assets should at least the 
                                                          
11 See an article written by National Bank of Pakistan (2008),”Banking in Pakistan”. 
12 See State Bank of Pakistan web site. 
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percentage of total demand and time deposit set by the State Bank of Pakistan from 
time to time. As discussed above, the current percentage of liquid assets (cash and 
liquidity requirement) set by the State Bank of Pakistan is 20 % of total deposits. 
These liquid assets should be consist of cash on-hand or cash in till, balances with the 
State bank of Pakistan and securities issued by Federal and Provincial Governments. 
 
The data on deposit is collected and compiled on various dimensions. Deposit 
accounts are classified under five main type’s i.e, current, call, other deposit accounts, 
saving and fixed deposit. The rate of interest is offered by the scheduled banks on 
various types of deposits like foreign currency accounts scheme, over five year 
maturity and unclaimed, over due or matured fixed deposits maintained under 
conventional banking. Rate of return on PLS deposits is, actually, the rate of profit 
given by the scheduled banks on various types of deposits such as call, saving, and 
fixed deposits. The rates are announced after the completion of the period of 
investment usually a half year based on. 
 
In term of Advances are categories by borrowers. Borrowers are classified into 
government, public, private (business), trust, personal and other sectors. The rate of 
interest/return is the cost of using borrowed money by the borrowers expressed as a 
rate, or a percentage of the principal amount for a period of time usually a year. 
 
The banks report their investment in securities with details of holdings of each type of 
securities. The holdings are classified by issuing institution of securities such as 
Federal Government securities, Provincial Government securities and Treasury bills. 
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We have also included dummy in our model in chapter four so as to see the structural 
break due to the effect of Islamisation process of the financial system in Pakistan that 
was started in 1979 when the specialized credit institutions in the public sector 
reoriented their financial activities towards non-interest bearing operations.  
 
2.3: Alternative Theories of Bank Portfolio Behavior: 
Many of theoretical and empirical work have been devoted to the portfolio behavior 
of banks in last four decades. The research has been stimulated by the need analyse 
the effects of alternative regulatory schemes, as well as by the desire to improve 
knowledge about the banking system as the most important link in the transmission 
process of monetary policy. Various approaches exist in the literature to formal study 
the portfolio behaviour of banks. These are the traditional approach, the precautionary 
approach and the portfolio theoretical approach13. 
 
Robinson (1962) analysis provides the traditional bank behavior approach. She points 
out the conflicting problem between profitability and safety and emphasizes that this 
problem should be resolved before investment of bank’s funds, and she listed the 
steps to do so, to be taken sequentially. These are: Legal Reserve Requirement 
imposed by the Central Bank, Safe Investment, and Advances to customers and 
Investment in the open market for income generation.  
 
                                                          
13 For details, please see Hester & Pierce (1975),” Bank Management and Portfolio 
Behavior”, and also research work of Fan (1991), Subeniotis (1991) and Wibowo 
(2005). 
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Reserve requirement is a legal requirement for a bank imposed by the Central Bank of 
the country to enable banks to permit customers to withdraw demand deposits and 
time deposits upon demand. Consequently any bank before using funds, in any shape 
on form, should strictly follow the legal requirement of withdrawal of its deposits on 
demand by the customers. The cash holding for all possible and remote contingencies 
requires a bank to give up earnings needlessly. For such a dual purpose protective 
investment is regarded as the secondary priority. Thereafter, bank has to make loans 
to the potential customers for the business for which it is best fitted. By fulfilling legal 
requirement of reserve, protective investment, making loans to the customers, the 
funds available now can be invested in the open market for income generation. So, in 
above framework safety is the first priority and the interest rates do not affect the 
bank’s choice of portfolio. Further, this framework does not indicate how a bank 
optimize when deciding whether or not to shift funds from one asset to another due to 
the total absence of marginal analysis which in turn arises from the exclusion of 
interest rates from influencing the choice variables. 
 
Above models about traditional banking behavior are not analytical but descriptive. 
Chambers and Charnes (1961) improved upon this descriptive tradition by suggesting 
the application of a linear programming framework. They view the bank’s problem as 
one of constrained profit maximization where the constraints are the “requirements 
laid down by the bank examiners which are interpreted as defining limits within 
which the level of risk associated with the return on portfolio is an acceptable” and 
the balance sheet constraint. In this model, interest rates can be introduced through the 
objective function --- the profit function. The advantage of such a model is that 
marginal analysis can be derived directly from the solutions to the constrained 
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maximization problem. The reliability of the model is low ( as uncertainty is absent 
from the model) by the assumption that the bank knows “the levels that will prevail, at 
various dates in the future, of demand and time deposits, of interest rates and of the 
bank’s net worth”. 
 
Another theory of banking portfolio behaviour is the behaviour of bank under risk 
neutrality, Precautionary Approach that applied, first, by Orr and Mellor (1961) and 
Porter (1961). This theory is based on two basic assumptions: (i) The bank minimizes 
expected loss or maximizes expected return, and (ii) the bank is subject to random 
flows of deposits and knows (estimates) the probability distribution of deposit flows. 
Given the portfolio size the bank’s problem is one of choosing the optimal beginning-
of-period allocation of the funds among reserves and other assets to maximize 
expected profits. Many scholars have worked on this approach in later years 
{Morrison (1966), Pool (1968), Frost (1971), Baltensperger (1971a, 1972b, and 
1980), Pringle (1974), Hester and Pierce (1975), Knobel (1977) and Sprenkle 
(1987)}. 
 
In precautionary models, uncertainty plays a very important role but banks are 
nevertheless viewed as risk neutral. The popular portfolio theory is the theory of bank 
behavior under risk aversion upon which most of the empirical work based. This 
approach is originated from Hicks (1935) who first time introduced the idea of 
mean- variance in his paper. The Hicksian idea were further developed by 
Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) pioneering study of efficient portfolio selection and 
Tobin’s (1958) paper on liquidity preference all making explicit allowance for risk 
aversion. The Portfolio Theoretical Approach predominating assumes that the bank 
),( 2σμ
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maximizes expected utility, whose arguments are usually the expected value and 
variance of return of the portfolio, subject to the balance sheet constraint. The 
maximization of expected utility for a risk averse bank will in general result in the 
selection of a diversified portfolio. Prominent empirical work on commercial bank 
portfolio behaviour can be seen in Kane and Malkiel (1965), Perkin (1970), Parkin, 
Gray and Barrett (1970), Courakis (1974,1975,1980,1988), Klein (1971), 
Pyle(1971),Sharp (1974), White(1975), Bewley (1981),Hart and Jaffee (1974), Sealey 
(1980), Fan (1991), Subeniotis (1991), Arjoon (1994), Kagigi, Ford and Cadle (1994, 
2001) and Wibowo (2005). In fact most of the empirical work on bank portfolio 
behavior is based on this approach. 
 
Pyle (1971) worked on this model by using three assets i.e., riskless asset, advances 
and deposits. His objective was to determine the sufficient conditions for financial 
intermediation. He concludes that the expected return differential between assets and 
liabilities is positive then intermediation will hold for the stochastic independence 
between assets and liability returns. So, there is a positive risk premium on advances 
and a negative risk premium on deposits only then will intermediation exist.  
 
Banks are considered as microeconomic firms that maximize an objective function 
operating within the framework of balance sheet constraints, authoritative control and 
market constraints. Banks have to perform simultaneously on different areas i.e, 
satisfying the depositors, attracting borrowers, maximizing their wealth and fulfilling 
their commitments to the Central Bank. It is noted that the study on the portfolio 
behavior of commercial banks started by the Edgeworth (1888). He points out the 
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importance of random deposit flows that creates uncertainty for determining bank’s 
optimal portfolio. 
 
Both Pyle (1971) & Parkin et al (1970) totally ignored the liquidity problem in their 
models that could arise due to randomness of cash requirements and default risks. 
Kane and Malikiel (1965) have tackled this problem of deposit variation with 
modification of the Tobin and Markowitz portfolio model. They suggest that the 
variation of deposit be based on the relationship with the customers: it will decrease 
when the relationship is good and increase when it is the bad. Sealey (1980) tried to 
accommodate random deposit supply as one of the sources of the uncertainty for a 
bank. He has included random deposit supply in his model via an implicit supply 
function. 
 
The portfolio-theoretical approach provides an explicit allowance for risk aversion 
that can arise either because bank’s objective functions is convex in return or because 
influential depositors whose deposits are the major source of the bank’s funds, or 
banking authorities induce it to act as a risk averter. It can handle constraints and 
supports the diversification.   
 
The portfolio theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of uncertainty over 
future rates of return, uncertainty over future deposit withdrawals, hence uncertainty 
over future liquidation costs. Further, Bank takes care of expected profit and its 
variability in portfolio theoretical models and therefore, banks are considered to be 
risk averse and they maximize expected utility.  
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2.4: The Nature of the Data: 
For the estimation of EU and SF models, we use semi-annual time series data 
(1964:2-2005:1). The major data sources State Bank of Pakistan and IMF. We provide 
below about the nature of the key endogenous and exogenous variables that will be 
used in our econometric work. 
 
2.4.1: Aggregation of Data: 
We assume that the scheduled banks behave identically and have the same 
expectations, the same return’s variance-covariance matrix perceptions and identical 
utility functions. So, aggregation over decision units can easily accommodated on 
theoretical grounds by assuming that the group (all scheduled banks in Pakistan) itself 
is the decision taking-unit. 
 
Following rules should be considered before taking aggregation over different assets 
and over elements of the assets. The aggregation items have to be homogeneous 
(Courakis, 1974, P.187); consequently, they must have the same return and risk 
characteristics so as not to be distinguished by the decision unit as different assets 
(Bailey, Driscoll and Ford, 1980, pp.7-8). However, it is observed that the previous 
research in portfolio behavior theory, different endogenous and exogenous variables 
employed in the estimation would themselves be composed of elements on which the 
aggregation principles may or may not apply. Realizing inconsistencies caused by 
such aggregation but simultaneously being deprived of alternative options as regard 
information and computational facilities, we have to employ the assumption that all 




2.4.2: Endogeniety and Exogeneity of Bank’s Liabilities: 
It is observed in the literature that there is general understanding on whether the 
various deposits should be regarded as endogenous or exogenous variables. As 
Brainard and Tobin (1968, pp.102) have argued”…… banks must be willing to accept 
demand and time deposits at prevailing interest rate in at least as large volume as the 
public wishes to hold”. Given the above, the status of the deposits seems to depend on 
the process of observed interest rate formation. 
 
The State Bank of Pakistan generally, fixes interest rate. So, at the fix interest rate, 
Scheduled banks have to accept the certain volume of deposits demanded by the 
depositors. Therefore, we will take Demand Deposits and Time Deposits as 
exogenous variables. 
 
It is well-established practice in the literature for treating ambiguous items as 
exogenous, Capital and Reserves will also be treated as exogenous (Parkin (1970)). 
Finally, the potential of borrowing of Commercial banks/ Schedule banks from the 
State Bank of Pakistan has to be treated endogenous variable since no valid regulation 
restricts this item. 
 
2.4.3: Endogeniety and Exogeniety of Bank’s Asset: 
There is a general consensus developed in the literature about the treatment of liability 
items, but it does not carry over to consideration of the endogeneity or exogeniety of 
assets. The real nature of assets may depend on regulations of the monetary authority, 
SBP, valid from time to time. In our case, we have checked the data and found that 
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credit ratios do not seem to have constrained on loans. Therefore, we treat all loans 
(Govt Sector, Public Sector, Private Sector, Personal Sector, Trust Sector and Other 
Sectors) as endogenous variables. 
 
Continuation of asset classification, we would treat “Cash” as endogenous asset since 
its observed volumes are held irrespective of and above the reserve ratio regulation. 
Our next step is to examine the status of treasury bills and government bonds. These 
items are presented as a separate account within the balance sheet but they are subject 
to the securities ratio regulation. The ratios change through the years and among 
different kinds of deposits but they always refers to treasury bills, Govt. Securites and 
Public enterprise. As discussed earlier, the scheduled banks have to keep some 
fraction of their assets in the form of cash, Treasury Bills or other approved securities. 
This constrain is called Liquidity Ratio 15% of Time and Demand Liabilities. Their 
main objectives to ensure that bank have sufficient funds in the form of liquid assets. 
In practice, it is observed that scheduled banks would be willing to invest in Treasury 
Bills and Federal Government Securities more than the required volume. They view 
these types of assets are “safer” and more “liquid” than loans. This is the indication 
that scheduled banks of Pakistan showing a high risk averse behaviour to all types of 
loans which have to be guaranteed by some form of collateral security. So, there is 
possibility that scheduled banks preferred investing in Tbills and FGS and in loans. 
Therefore, we treat Tbills, and FGS as endogenous variables. We consider PGS 
(provincial government securities) as an ambiguous item and treat it as an exogenous 
variable (as discussed above about the treatment of ambiguous items) as they have 
ceased to be issued by the State Bank in 1972 will mature in 2008. The classification 
of choice and non-choice assets is given table (2.2.2).Table (2.2.2) provides the 
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composition of each set of assets with the status of the liabilities and details of the 
notation for scalar variables and interest rates/returns. 
 
 
Table 2.2.2:   Choice and Non-choice Assets of the Pakistani Banks 
Notation Status Description 
Panel A : Balance Sheet   
Assets   
GOVTS Endogenous Loans to the Govt.Sector 
PUBS Endogenous Loans to the Public Sector 
PRIVS Endogenous Loans to the Private Sector 
PERS Endogenous Loans to the Personal Sector 
OTHERS Endogenous Loans to the Others Sector 
TRUST Endogenous Loans to the Trust Funds & Non-Profit Org. 
PGS Exogenous  Provincial Govt. Securities 
SUMB Endogenous Borrowing from, SBP 
FGS Endogenous Federal Govt. Securities (Bonds) 
TBILLS Endogenous Treasury Bills 
CASH Endogenous Cash 
Liabilities   
CAPITAL Exogenous Capital 
RESERVE Exogenous Reserve 
CAPRES Exogenous Capital & Reserve 
TTD Exogenous Total Time Deposit 
TDD Exogenous Total Demand deposits 
TDTL Exogenous Total Demand and Time Deposit 
Panel B: Rates of Return on the 
Asset  
  
WAG Exogenous Warra (weighted average rate of return) Govt.    
Sector 
WAP Exogenous Warra Public Sector 
WAPR Exogenous Warra Private Sector 
WAPL Exogenous Warra Personal Sector 
WAOTH Exogenous Warra Other Sector 
WAT Exogenous Warra Trust Funds & Non-Profit Org. 
PGR Exogenous Provincial Govt. Securities Rates 
CMR Exogenous Call Money Rates—proxy for discount rates 
GBYLD Exogenous Govt. Bond Yield 
SIXMTBR Exogenous Six Month Treasury Bills Rates 
INFLN Exogenous Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 
 
The graphic presentation of data for (19964:2-2005:1) endogenous and exogenous 
variables with weighted average rate of interest is given below. 
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2A: Graphic presentation of data for endogenous and exogenous variables: 



















































































































































































































































































2.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
The descriptive statistics of endogenous and exogenous variables provide in Table 
(2.5.2) and Table (2.5.3). Table (2.5.2) shows that the most “active” endogenous 
variable is Othersector, which has relative measure of dispersion of 2.00. 
 
Table 2.5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Endogenous Variable (million/rupees) 
Variables  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. SD/Mean* 
GOVTS 21171.14 9021.01 95077.6 52.32 25592.13 1.21 
PUBS 24361.09 16034 121418 644.52 31063.55 1.28 
PRIVS 209834.5 66008.85 1201391 3812.64 276837.2 1.32 
PERS 29295.74 8301.45 258004.7 278.12 45990.75 1.57 
OTHERS 1369.04 155.99 17571.2 4.61 2744.5 2 
TRUST 2060.93 114.45 14391 3.324602 4047.982 1.96 
SUMB 57775.23 23573.4 220756.2 1222.5 67744.19 1.17 
FGS 55625.38 16251.15 259194.1 1267.3 69872.14 1.26 
TBILLS 67324.98 10185.95 418329.3 5 108291.9 1.61 
CASH 60683.99 17864.75 320122.1 868.1 81482.51 1.34 
*SD/Mean measure relative dispersion 
 
In table (2.5.3), we can see the highest relative measure of dispersion is 0.82 for 
Inflation with value of 0.39 and 0.38 of Gbyld and Sixmtbr are, respectively second 
and third highest. It is also worth mentioning that PGR is constant and has no 
variance. 
Table 2.5.3: Descriptive Statistics on the Main Interest Rates (%) 
Variables  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. SD/Mean* 
WAG 11.53 12.11 18.24 2.94 3.05 0.26 
WAP 10.71 10.91 16.05 4.52 2.77 0.26 
WAPR 11.08 11.2 15.89 5.27 2.71 0.24 
WAPL 9.31 9.41 15.24 4.01 2.57 0.28 
WAOH 9.88 9.56 17.7 4.17 2.88 0.29 
WAT 10.83 10.91 17.52 5.44 3.07 0.28 
PGR 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 0 0 
CMR 7.9 8 15.1 2.16 2.6 0.33 
GBYLD 8.04 8.18 13.77 2.79 3.1 0.39 
SIXMTB 8.43 8.21 16.92 1.51 3.2 0.38 
INFL 0.04 0.03 0.22 -0.01 0.03 0.82 
*SD/Mean measure relative dispersion  
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Table (2.5.4) Shows the most active exogenous variable is Capital with a 1.47 relative 
measure of dispersion. 
 
Table 2.5.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Exogenous Variable (million/rupees) 
Variables  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. SD/Mean* 
PGS 1835.05 1409.4 4170.6 75.1 1261.25 0.69 
CAPRES 33918.49 7273.4 183634.4 333.7 48264.45 1.42 
TTD 225870.2 70426.2 1138439 2998.5 302679.4 1.34 
TDD 199866.7 61528.1 1131465 3851 270663.7 1.35 
CAPITAL 20584.69 4156.7 98086.4 228.6 30213.56 1.47 
RESERVE 13333.79 3294.7 85548 105.1 18570.53 1.39 
TDTL 425499 131954.3 2269904 6849.5 571302 1.34 
*SD/Mean measure relative dispersion  
 
Table (2.5.5) of zero-order correlations shows there are high correlations among 
variables; due to the multicollinearity between many interest rates variables.  
 
Table 2.5.5: Zero-order Correlation among Main Interest Rates (%) 
 
 
Variables WAG WAP WAPR WAPL WAOH WAT CMR GBYLD SIXMTB INFLN 
WAG 1 0.91 0.84 0.44 0.73 0.85 0.69 0.7 0.77 0.09 
WAP 0.91 1 0.94 0.54 0.85 0.91 0.74 0.59 0.82 0.05 
WAPR 0.84 0.94 1 0.72 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.6 0.79 0.07 
WAPL 0.44 0.54 0.72 1 0.61 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.01 
WAOH 0.73 0.85 0.88 0.61 1 0.79 0.61 0.45 0.71 0 
WAT 0.85 0.91 0.84 0.41 0.79 1 0.7 0.54 0.77 0.09 
CMR 0.69 0.74 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.7 1 0.58 0.9 0.17 
GBYLD 0.7 0.59 0.6 0.44 0.45 0.54 0.58 1 0.66 0.15 
SIXMTB 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.46 0.71 0.77 0.9 0.66 1 0.16 










MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND LONG-RUN 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANKING SECTOR’S BALANCE SHEET 
AND THE MACROECONOMY IN PAKISTAN 
 
3.1: Introduction: 
In this chapter we investigate the links between monetary policy, the Banking Sector 
and the (aggregate) real economy in Pakistan over a forty year period, which 
commences in 1964. We have focused here to study how banks play a vital role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism through the banking credit channel. For 
highlighting the role of banking sector in monetary transmission mechanism, we note 
some arguments from the literature. 
 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) have provided evidence that internal finance is 
more preferred than external finance for firms. They have made assumption that 
external finance is more costly than internal finance, because of asymmetric 
information, while generate agency problems, and basically generate financial 
constraint. Further, a premium on external finance is an inverse function of a 
borrowers net worth and variables such as cash flow are very important explanatory 
variables for investment. Therefore, the existence of financial constraints that may 
cause or propagate the business cycle, investment expenditure will be affected. 
  
On the other hand, Modigliani and Miller (1958) have demonstrated that a firm’s 
financial structure is irrelevant to investment. They have supported their statement by 
the argument that a firm can raise any desired level of funds at a prevailing interest 
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rate to finance its investment in a perfect financial market. As external finance is a 
perfect substitute for internal finance, therefore, the firm’s investment is independent 
of its financial structure that is basically dependent on the investment opportunity. 
 
By looking at both arguments, we can see in the case of limited ability of a firm or 
especially in the case of a small firm that can not provide internal finance for 
investment can go to the bank, then restriction on banks, or high interest rates, will 
inhibit their ability to raise finance (Ceccheetti(1999)). Generally, banks have 
important role in transmitting monetary policy to the real economy. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives overview of the 
monetary transmission channels. Section 3.3 describes an econometric methodology: 
VARs, VECs and cointegrating relationships. Section 3.4 provides the estimates of 
VARs, MTMs, impulse responses, variance decompositions and identified long- run 
relationships. Section 3.5 discusses the innovations in the monetary policy indicator 
variables in the 2 models and innovations to exogenous monetary policy instruments 
and section 3.6 provides the summary of the chapter. 
 
3.2: Theoretical Overview of the Monetary Transmission Channel 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism (MTM) is a process through which monetary 
policy is executed to endeavour to effect changes in real GDP and inflation. MTM 
could operate through different channels, e.g. (1) the money or interest rate channel; 
(2) the bank lending (credit) channel, or “broad lending (credit) channel”; (3) the 
exchange rate channel; and (4) the expectations channel. The last two channels are 
included in the literature over recent years due to the floating of exchange rates, 
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foreign exchange crises, and the influence on markets and on the information/actions 
of Central Banks, of “the rational expectations” revolution.  
 
According to the money or interest rate channel, output will be affected by the 
changes in monetary aggregate. This argument is based on the assumption that the 
reduction in money supply will raise the nominal interest rate at a given rate of 
inflation. If the rate of inflation does not increase coincidentally with the hike in 
interest rates; the real rate of interest will increase. That will tend to reduce 
investment in plant and machinery; with subsequent negative multiplier effects on 
aggregate output, future profits and net worth. The money or interest rate channel can 
be explained as follows, 
M↓ → r↑ →I↓ →Y↓ 
 
Monetary tightening (reduction in M) leads to an increase in the real rate of interest 
(r) that will cause to raise the cost of capital which will affect the investment (I) and 
that will eventually decrease aggregate output (Y). Further, a point to be noted here, in 
this transmission channel, there is no bank role and it is the simplest, and most direct, 
transmission from monetary policy to the real sector. 
 
As asymmetric information exists in financial markets and banks are considered to be 
better handler of such information issues than other lenders, therefore, the role of 
banks is central in bank lending (credit) channel. The basic view of the transmission 
mechanism of the bank lending (credit) channel can be presented as follows, 
 
M↓ → Deposits↓→ Loans↓ →I↓ →Y↓ 
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According to the above presentation, monetary contraction (M) leads to decrease in 
bank deposits and reserves that will ultimately decrease the bank loans, which will 
create negative affect on Investment (I) and output (Y) subsequently.  
 
The bank lending (credit) channel can, further, be divided into two channels i.e, the 
balance sheet channel and bank lending channel. The purpose of the balance sheet 
channel is to study the impact of monetary contraction on borrower’s assets and 
profit. This impact can be seen in the following: 
  
M↓ → r↑ → Cost of Servicing Outstanding↑→ Profit↓ → Asset Value ↓→ 
Collaterals↓ →Net Cash Flow ↓→I↓ →Y↓ 
 
Monetary contraction (M) leads to an increase in the real rate of interest (r), due to 
which banks will raise the risk premium on the cost of loans to firms that will have 
negative impacts on a firm’s profit, asset value, collateral, net cash flow, and 
therefore, the firm will be able to borrow less: ceteris paribus, investment and 
subsequently, aggregate output, will fall. Moreover, the ability of firms to gain access 
to external finance is impaired by the increase in asymmetric information and moral 
hazard engendered by the increase in interest rates, which weakens their balance 
sheets. 
 
The second interpretation of the banking/lending channel considers the sources of 
borrowed funds that are available to businesses. Small firms, with limited net worth, 
might only be able to raise external funds form banks, accordingly, when monetary 
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policy is tightened, for the kind of reasons adduced above, they will be credit-
constrained. This is also a possibility, of course, for “large” firms: but they might 
have access to alternative sources of finance, such as corporate bond or equity 
markets. In rudimentary capital markets that will not be possible and so this could 
increase the dependency on the banks: aggravating the reduction in capital 
investment.1 We can explain these in the following: 
 
M↓ → r↑ → Deposit↓ → Assets ↑ →Loans ↓→I↓ →Y↓ 
 
Monetary contraction decreases bank reserves and at the given reserve requirements 
(CRR: cash reserve requirement and LRR: liquidity reserve requirement), banks’ 
deposits fall. On the other hand, this monetary contraction increases the interest rates 
including the interest rates of risk-free assets i.e Treasury Bills and Government 
Bonds. Due to the reserve requirements imposed by the central bank, banks are not in 
position to increase their deposit rates; therefore, investors take out and invest them in 
more lucrative assets. Firms find no difference between borrowing from the banks or 
issuing debt in the market, as bank lending rates should not be increased more than 
corporate or equity market rates. But on the other hand, all firms are not able to issue 
                                                 
1 These two channels and their subdivisions (of the kind pointed out above) have been 
surveyed in many excellent papers. We just note, for example, Bernanke (1993), 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Hubbard (1995), Bernanke, 




debt on the market. This will further aggravate to decline in bank loans, subsequently 
further decreasing investment and output.  
 
In regard to the foreign exchange rate channel, the foreign exchange rate can simply 
be regarded as an additional intermediary between interest rate changes and output in 
the two main channels. Thus: 
 
M↓ → r↑ → E ↓ → Domestic Currency ↑ →Y↓ 
 
Thus, as the interest rate increases due to a monetary contraction it reduces output 
both directly and indirectly (through the exchange rate) shall the market expect further 
depreciations, with consequences for exports, imports and so for aggregate output. 
Obviously, any overall impact on the latter will depend upon many inter-dependent 
factors, such as: the type of exchange rate regime; the impact of the exchange rate on 
exports, which will be dependent upon imports, and on imports; and, the relationships 
between output, exports and imports.  
 
The expectation channel is also one that can be incorporated into the two main 
channels. Its main thesis is that expectations of inflation (which can obviously be 
determined by the exchange rate as well as the rate of interest) and the general state of 
the economy play a crucial in the monetary transmission mechanism, as monetary 
policy and economic development affect the formation of expected inflation which in 
turn influences the behaviour of economic agents. Any changes in economic 
behaviour translate into investment and consumption decisions which lead to changes 
in aggregate demand and inflation.  For example, in the case of a financial crisis, 
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possible expectations of a further decline in economic activity and inflation could 
reduce the time-path of the expenditure of households and businesses as they strive to 
strengthen their liquidity positions: thereby helping to generate the expected outcome.  
In this study we focus on the two main channels. The possible role of the exchange 
rate has to be ignored because we use data from the time post-Second World War 
when the most reliable data are available for Pakistan on the major variables claimed 
to be involved in the monetary transmission mechanism. This is 1964: and the long 
run of observations is used in order to assess the possibility of discovering long-run 
cointegrating relationship between monetary policy, the banking sector and the real 
economy. The consequence is that we cannot obtain reliable data (except from around 
1990) on the exchange rate, and so on the real effective exchange rate. Expectations 
are also omitted: in any event, those that might be significant are those regarding the 
foreign exchange rate.  
 
3.3: MTMs: Econometric methodology: VARs, VECs and cointegrating 
relationships 
3.3.1: VARs 
By far the dominant methodology used in the literature for investigating the monetary 
transmissions mechanisms is the VAR, consequent to the pioneering work of Sims 
(1980). The impulse responses functions and variance decompositions that it 
generates, makes it possible to identify which, if any,  MTM appears to be operating 
in a given economy, and enables an assessment of its short- and long- term effects. 
Following on from the subsequent developments on multivariate unit roots by 
Johansen (for example, 1988(a), 1988(b), 1995, and 1996), it is possible also if, say, 
all the variables in a particular VAR are not I(0),  to evaluate the possibility that the 
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variables are cointegrated, with the consequent possibility that long-term relationships 
between the monetary/banking sectors and the real economy can be uncovered and 
then identified.2   
 
A by now familiar approach to the specification of a VAR for analysis of monetary 
transmission channels, is the semi-structural form, adopted by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992).  That can be formulated as:  
nyEyLASy ttttt ×==+= 1;0)(:)( εε                                                                      (1) 




21)(                                                                                     (2) 
Any structural contemporaneous parameters on the endogenous variables are, of 
course, contained in the matrix S. Following the literature on MTMs, we assume that 
the vector  contains no exogenous economic variables; though in the estimation of 
the VARs we incorporate deterministic terms, intercepts and a time trend, as will be 
seen later. The vector  contains one variable to encapsulate the “strength or 
weakness” of monetary policy, the “indicator variable”, and a set of endogenous 
variables (as just implied, exogenous variables are excluded here as is generally the 
case in studies of MTMs) which help to determine it: and which the monetary 
authority is regarded as endeavouring to influence by its monetary policy instruments. 
ty
ty
The MA representation of equation (1) is: 
                                                 
2 Johansen’s work, of course, relied upon the Representation Theorem of Engle and 
Grainger (1987) which they had developed for a single-equation, OLS, approach to 
cointegration.  
 41
1)]([:)( −−=ΘΘ= LASLy tt ε                                                                                   (3) 
Where [ ] 0=tE ε and, as in Sims (1980)3, [ ] ntt IE ='εε . In this case [ ]'ttE εε  will be  
if , the matrices and being conformable with the 
nI
1×= nyt S pA y vector. is the lag 
operator, where 
pL
p describes the order of the VAR.  
 
The reduced form of equation (1) is:  
ttttt SuuyLASy ε
11 :)( −− =+=                                                                                   (
 Hen
4) 
ce:   
′′==Ω −−−− SS tttttt εεεε                                                         (5) 
If we assume, as in Sims (1980), that E
( ) (' = SSuuE )( ) ))()(( 11'11
nItt ′)(  then:  εε =
))(( 11 ′=Ω −− SS                                                                                                          (6) 
rom the moving average (MA) representation of the system (equation (3)), it follows 
that for the system to respond in a stable manner to any given random disturbance, so 
                                                




3 That is, the structural disturbances are orthogonal (and so independent). Therefore 




+pp  constraints) on  needed to identify the elements of . The latter, of 


































that over time the responses approach 0, it must be mathematically stable, in that the 
roots of the matrix polynomial, ( ) 0)(1 =− − LASI n , must lie outside the unit circle in 
the VAR. Alternatively, if the V mpanion form, that the roots of the 
companion matrix should be less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1 in 
the presence of cointegration.
absolute value, or are 1 in the presence of cointegration, and hence, of unit roots, in 
AR is written in co
 
position to uncover the structural innovations means 
at the system is then a recursive model or Wold-causal chain; the way in which the 
                                                
4  
 
Employing the Choleski decom
th
 
4 In converting the VAR into a first-order system the use of the companion form 
makes the mathematical stability condition transparent. If we let: 
, the companion 































Here the “diagonal below the diagonal” consists of identity matrices. Covariance-
stationarity holds if the eigenvalues of Z all lie inside the unit circle. Thereby any 
disturbance eventually dwindles to zero, since as the matrix Z is raised to the power of 
t, as t approaches infinity, it approaches a null matrix; and we have the same condition 
required to render a deterministic first-order difference equation stable. Since the 







nI Lλλλ  (see, for example, Hamilton (1994)). Hence 
the VAR is stable for provided 1≤λ  for all values that satisfy this equation. The 
roots of the companion matrix are then obviously the reciprocal of those of the matrix 
polynomial (Hamilton (1994) and Johansen (1996)).  
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variables affect each other is determined by their position in the ordering. In this 
sense, the contemporaneous innovations in the other variables influence all those 
below them in the chain and none of those variables above them in the order (footnote 
7).  
Accordingly, Sims (1992) maintained that the leading indicator of monetary policy 
should be ordered first if (it is assumed that) there is no contemporaneous feedback 
from non-policy variables onto that indicator. Thus, if it is assumed that the monetary 
policy decisions are set without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic 
variables; such as when information on non-policy variables is not readily available to 
the monetary or policy-making authorities. Furthermore, should it be thought that the 
indicator variable responds to contemporaneous feedback from non-policy variables, 
the policy variable should be placed last in the chain.  
 
Having said this, it does not matter how the variables are ordered for the calculation 
of impulse responses and variance decompositions, if the correlations between the 
error terms from the estimated VAR are zero or virtually so. There exist, of course, 
alternative approaches to generating a set of orthogonal innovations, such as the 
generalised impulse responses formulated by Pesaran and Shin (1998). In their 
formulation, the impulse responses from an innovation to the i-th variable, are 
obtained from having computed a Choleski decomposition with the i-th variable 
ordered as the first variable. Such responses will be identical to those obtained from 
the Choleski decomposition on the “original” system if the correlations between the 
innovations in the VAR are zero.  
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The impulse responses derived from the moving average formulation of the system 
 
.3.2: VECs and cointegrating relationships 
hat kind, if any, MTM, operates in a 
provide the information on the monetary transmission mechanism, tracking as they do 
the impacts of a ceteris paribus, one standard deviation innovation to the monetary 
indicator, on the other variables instantaneously and over time. Stability of the system 
guarantees that those effects eventually dwindle to zero. Those impulses over the 
“short run” and the cumulative, “long run”, impacts are analysed for our models. 
Likewise the consequent variance decompositions of the variables after an innovation 




In addition to using the VARs to ascertain w
given economy, they can be utilised to evaluate the presence or otherwise of long-run 
relationships between the variables in the system, and ideally, between the policy 
indicators and the key variables in the banking/financial system. Such associations 
require the discovery of cointegrating relationships between particular variables; and 
the estimation of vector error correction models (VECMs). Expanding equation (4) 
we have:  
( )iASyyyy tt 1 −Π= itptpt 1221 ; −−− =Π+Π++Π+ εL                                               (8) 




























From Granger’s representation theorem  we can write the long-run matrix as:  
nrnrrn ≤×=′×=′=Π ,,: βαβα                                                                         (11) 
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In equation (11), r denotes the rank of the matrixΠ ; which for cointegration to be 
present must be of reduced rank, nr < . The matrix β ′  contains the coefficients in the 
cointegrating relationships betw the n varia es; which provide the error 
correction, disequilibrium, terms to which the coefficients in the matrix 
een bl
α determine 
how, if at all, any disequilibrium changes the endogenous variables. The trace statistic 
developed by Johansen is used to determine r, the number of cointegrating 
relationships in the VARs that follow.  
 
When cointegration is found, of course, the cointegrating vectors are not necessarily 
we have sought to identify such relationships. The Likelihood Ratio tests for 
                                                
identified (unique).5 Normalisations are employed to obtain the vectors, and that 
suggested by Johansen (1996) is frequently adopted.6  The vectors can only be 
identified by the imposition of parameter restrictions that follow from economic 
theory as such, or as in the case of MTMs, which are suggested by the possible 
relationships between the monetary indicator variable and the portfolio activities of 
the banking sector and its possible linkages with the real sector. For example, it might 
be possible to identify a long-run relationship between bank lending, the monetary 
policy indicator variable (such as an interest rate) and GDP. In this econometric study 
 
5 As Johansen ((1996), pp.71-72) noted:  
The parameters in α  and β  are not uniquely identified in the sense that given any 
choice of  α  and β  and any non-singular matrix )( rr ×ξ the choice of αξ  and 
 will give the same matrix 1)( −′ξβ Π  and hence determine the same probability 
distribution for the variables. One way of expressing this is to say that what the data 
can determine is the space spanned by the columns of β  …., and the space spanned 
by α …. 
6 Some software packages, such as EViews, use alternative normalisations, though it 
does provide the Johansen normalisation: however, it does not identify the vectors.    
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determining whether cointegrating vectors have been identified and the restrictions 
that have been imposed to identify them do hold, are detailed in Johansen ((1995), 
(1996)).  
3.4: Estimation of VARs: MTM, impulse response, variance decompositions and 
identified long run relationships 
is chapter, the variables in our VARs are for the 
annel via the notion of 
3.4.1: Variables, monetary policy indicators and the data 
As discussed in introduction of th
aggregate banking sector. To get insight into the credit ch
“credit constrained” sectors or industries, we have processed the data on bank loans 
into those to two broad categories of borrowers: government and government-related 
sectors and non-government, or private/personal, sectors. This division has to bear a 
heavy burden, as it were, because it is endeavouring to capture the idea that small 
enterprises/groups might be unable to obtain credit in a period of monetary 
contraction, because for various reasons, there only source of finance is the banking 
sector. The loans to the two sectors are simply labelled: TLps, for total loans to the 
public sector; and TLnps, for total loans granted to the non public sector, or private 
sector, the “n” , that is, stands for non. The raw data are transformed into logarithms 
for the purposes of estimation. The deposits of the banking sector are summed across 
both times of deposits: again the logarithms of these are used in the estimation. They 
are assigned the notation, TDeps. The other major component of the banking sector’s 
portfolio which alters with changes in the conditions that affect loans and deposits, are 
government (“federal”) securities: these we label Fgs, and they also are used in their 
logarithmic form. The real sector variables included are the price level (Cpi) and the 
log of real GDP (GDP). The remaining variable in the VARs is an indicator of the 
strength or weakness in the monetary/banking sector.  
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The State Bank of Pakistan’s basic monetary control mechanisms have not altered 
dically over the years, and in the past as now (see, for example, Agha et.al., 2003), 
ables: 
ixmtbr, TLoans, Fgs, TDeps, Cpi and GDP. Model (2) differs from Model (1) in that 
phs reveal that many variables have 
ends; and so a trend is included in the VARs. Additionally, a trend was included in 
 
                                                
ra
it seems to use the Treasury Bill rate as its policy indicator. This is similar to the 
situation in the USA where the Fed Funds rate is used as the indicator. Therefore, a 
short term interest rate, determined by the buoyancy in the sector, such as the six 
month Treasury Bill have been used as an appropriate choice in the test VARs.  
 
In the following we report on two models. Model (1) contains these vari
S
TLoans are separated out into TLps and TLnps.  
 
The data are graphed in Appendix A. The gra
tr
the unit root tests when appropriate, and was indicated to be so by the test statistics 
under both the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests. The ADF tests found all variables to be 
I(1), and this was the case except for TLps which was I(1) by the Phillips-Perron tests; 
and the latter found M to be I(1), whilst the ADF test indicated that at just under the 





7 The ADF statistics, on the levels of the variables, are: Sixmtbr, -2.546 [0.11]; MB, -
2.393 [0.381]; Discrate, -1.822 [0.367]; TLoans, -2.351 [0.402]; TLps, -2.751 [0.220]; 
TLnps, -2.874 [0.176]; TDeps, -2.531 [0.313]; Fgs, -1.813 [0.690]; Cpi, 2.428 [1.00], 
and for GDP, -1.330 [0.612].  
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3.4.2: Estimates of VARs and Identified Cointegrating Vectors 
.4.2.1: Model (1) 
th 1.  
): VAR estimates 
Fgs TDeps Cpi GDP 
 
3
The estimates of the best VAR are given in Table 3.1, with lag leng
 
Table 3.1 Model (1
 
 Sixmtbr TLoans 









[- [ 9.481] [- [-1.427 [-2.258 [ 2.849]
GS(-1) 
[- [ 1.520] [ 13.405] [ 1.407] [ 1.179] [ 1.425]
Deps(-1) 
[ 2.326] [ 3.429] [ 1.358] [ 10.121] [ 3.473] [ 0.298]
pi(-1) 
[ 1.435] [ 0.091] [- [-2.571 [ 61.128] [-
DP(-1) 
[ 1.814] [ 0.959] [ 0.751] [- [ 2.336] [ 18.432]
tercept - - -
[ 0.296] [ 0.544] [ 3.879]
 








T -1.136 0.716 -0.344 -0.120 -3.438 8.058
 -2.524 -0.075 -0.229 -0.084 -1.522 -2.828
 0.450
 
] 1.500] ] ] 
  
F -0.008 0.034 0.903 0.035 0.528 1.185





T 5.365 0.236 0.284 0.781 4.830 0.770
 -2.306 -0.069 -0.209 -0.077 -1.391 -2.584
   
   
C 0.041 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 1.041 -0.077
 -0.028 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017 -0.032
  0.440] ]  2.431]
   
G 0.075 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.058 0.853
 -0.041 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.025 -0.046
  0.884]  
   
In 36.255 0.187 1.042 2.738 17.152 73.123







T -0.751 -0.005 -0.002 0.032 -0.459 0.161
 -0.274 -0.008 -0.025 -0.009 -0.165 -0.307
 2.747
 




2R  0.797 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.999 1.000
2R  
.E. equation 1.517 0.045 0.138 0.051 0.915 1.700
 Log likelihood -14 14 5 13 -10 -15
0.778 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.999 1.000
S  
6.319 1.463 0.412 2.281 4.862 5.653
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Further properties of these equations and of the system iven endix
T  cov en  the ion  th ag
deviation innovation to Sixmtbr: Model (1) 
 are g in App  B. 
hose attributes er the eig values of  compan  matrix, e test for l  length 
and the properties of the residuals.   
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The period-by-period impulse responses in Figure (3.1) show that the rise in the short 
term interest is maintained for something like six years; though only the initial period 
changes are “reasonably” statistically different from zero.8 After a tiny increase in 
total loans, they fall consistently for five years. Total deposits fall immediately, doing 
so for two years, but raise continually over that period from their initial fall. These 
impacts can be linked through interest rates and GDP, possibly also via the real rate of 
interest; thereby providing some support for the money view of the MTM. For 
example, the increase in the money rate of interest, which for given inflation rate 
clearly raises the minimum return on capital investment that must be used to evaluate 
expenditure on plant and machinery. In fact, the real rate increases for a period of four 
years, though its increases decline exponentially from the first period. It could then be 
suggested that those increases had a negative impact on the propensity to invest in 
capital equipment. The consequence, other things being equal, would be a decline in 
GDP; which latter we see from Figure 3.1.  
 
In an economy, such as that of Pakistan, which in the majority of the years of our 
sample did not possess an advanced Stock Market, the concomitant of which we 
would conjecture would be a fall in the demand for loans from the Banking Sector. 
Such a fall would also be partly occasioned by that sector being more cautious of the 
increased moral hazard then attaching to any investment plans of potential borrowers. 
Deposits begin to recover quickly, whilst loans to not cease falling until five years 
later. That is when, others things being given, recovery in GDP begins. We notice that 
                                                 
8 In almost every set of impulse responses in the literature the standard errors of 
impulse responses tend to be large. Those for the immediate periods tend to be lower 
than others; and some, as here, do indicate that the impulses are significantly different 
from zero.  
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much of the discrepancy between deposits and loans is taken up by increased holdings 
by the Banking Sector of government securities, Fgs. The cumulative impulse 
responses over the 30 periods are graphed in Figure (3.2). For the initial periods the 
standard error range is “smallish” for some of the responses; and the graphs confirm 
in pictorial form some of the preceding observations.  
 
Those observations illustrate the difficulties of extricating any definite MTM, within 
an aggregate framework, where banks are not differentiated by bank type, loans are 
not differentiated by sectors (industrial, agricultural, services,…) and by type (private, 
government,…), and where feasible alternative means of finance for business 
concerns are not included (government agencies such as development funds, stock 
markets,…). Thus the availability of stock market data over our period would have 
helped to confirm or otherwise the bank lending channel which Model (1) partly 
points to you; and thereby to see if the interest rate was also present, or was “the” 




loans by sector would have further aided understanding of those two main channels. 
That is a dimension that we can investigate in part, as we do in our variant Model (2) 
later.  
 
We turn now to the variance decompositions produced by the VAR of Model (1). 








Table 3.2 Model (1): Table of Variance Decompositions: One standard deviation 
column 
 Sixmtbr TLoans Fgs TDeps Cpi GDP 
Innovation to the variable in the top row, impact on the variable in the left hand 
 
After 1 period 
Sixmtbr 100.00 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TLoans 0.017 99.835 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fgs 0.090 0.584 93.326 0.000 0.000 0.000
TDeps 3.773 1.182 1.626 93.418 0.000 0.000
Cpi 11.096 0.928 0.840 0.435 86.703 0.000
GDP 0.0136 4.772 0.323 0.237 4.146 90.512
After 2 periods 
Sixmtbr 97.653 0.002 0.014 1.832 0.099 0.399
Tloans 1.919 93.057 1.061 3.849 0.007 0.107
Fgs 0.049 1.749 97.619 0.525 0.000 0.058
Tdeps 3.226 0.840 3.463 92.230 0.148 0.093
Cpi 7.177 0.459 0.399 5.056 86.415 0.494
GDP 3.115 10.656 0.325 0.151 3.155 82.599
After 5 periods 
Sixmtbr 84.151 0.011 0.983 11.807 0.451 2.597
Tloans 9.921 64.369 10.072 15.281 0.162 0.168
Fgs 0.069 5.825 92.157 1.654 0.047 0.248
Tdeps 2.621 5.125 7.689 82.181 1.578 0.807
Cpi 2.564 2.680 2.533 15.848 74.132 2.244
GDP 20.201 19.143 4.601 0.119 1.477 54.188
After 10 periods 
Sixmtbr 69.797 0.334 6.212 18.905 0.460 4.292
Tloans 10.732 49.827 20.932 15.649 2.445 0.415
Fgs 0.684 9.400 87.477 1.527 0.510 0.402
Tdeps 8.130 9.754 7.593 68.574 4.448 1.501
Cpi 1.088 7.984 8.753 18.721 59.814 3.639





hese decompositions need little comment. However, we remark on the important 
hich declines over time, and in the “long-run” the 
pact is relatively small. By contrast the impact on output (GDP is in real terms we 
call) is initially small and then increases until it is relatively large over two and a 
alf years. In effect, the tighter monetary policy stance (such a reduction in the 
onetary base), which has produced an increase in the short term interest rate, makes 
T
first column. It suggests that there is a more or less immediate substantial impact on 






a substantial contribution to the variation in output, but a correspondingly small 
impact on the variation in inflation. The impulse responses functions for Cpi and GDP 
dicate that ings hic turally, y stro resump  this 
exercise neta ggesti e not i ence. rease in the 
est rate will a utput n the d the n: out l not f
ort run bu to its original level in the long- lso, i  will 
 short run and incr  run oretically, to match th
ionate cha , say oney  which dered novati
rt term interest rate in the VAR). S onsid s lead natura
pts to identify long-run ship les in th
o so we o th e ble e ic or ary 
hips the ce of  we m xplor ious o the cu
xt are the lo  influe n the g sect o mai cial cl
s and deposi ose on the latter be re  as i g a 
omponent of the long-run demand for money. In Table 3.3 we report identified 
ointegrating vectors, which are graphed in Figure 3.3.9 It will be noticed that the 
in  other th  equal (w h, na is a ver ng p tion in
kind of ) the mo rists’ su ons ar n evid An inc
inter ffect o both i short an long ru put wil all in 
the sh t return run. A nflation not be 
zero in the ease in the long  (the e 
proport nge in , the m supply  engen  the in on to 
the sho uch c eration  us on lly to 
attem cointegrating relation s between the variab e 
VAR. 
 
To d need t ink of som  possi conom monet policy 
relations  presen which ight e e. Obv nes in rrent 
conte ng-run nces o  bankin or’s tw n finan aims, 
loan ts. Th could garded dentifyin major 
c
c
vectors contain a trend; so that Model 4 of Johansen (1996) was estimated. His 
Likelihood Ratio test (for rank 2 of the long-run matrix) for the presence of a trend 
                                                 
1, , no intercept and no trend, -3.00 [0.003]; C vector 2, with an intercept and trend, -
3.927[0.015].  
9 We note that the findings of tests for Unit roots: ADF t-stats. and prob.[.]: C vector 
 
 55
versus (the restricted model of) no trend was, 555.10)2(2 =χ , which exceeds the 5% 
critical value.10  
 
The first cointegrating vector is normalised on total deposits, and perhaps could be 
regarded as a long-run demand for (or supply of, in terms of the banking sector’s 
portfolio) deposits. Converting it into an equation indicates that in the long-run that 
the relationships between the short-term interest rate, output, the price level and 
deposits are all positive. The price level effect can be seen as a desire of the non-
banking sector (if we envisage the long-run relationship as representing the non-
banking sector’s desired holding of deposits) to maintain what is the substantial 
proportion of its real balances. The trend effect is also positive.  However, we observe 
at in this vector only the six month Treasury bill rate and the trend are statistically 
 
                                                
th
significant links with total deposits. When the trend is not included this remains the 
case. Effectively, we have a long-run relationship between the six month Treasury bill 







10 The LR ratio is: . Here: N=number of )]1ln()1[ln( ,1,1 imim
r
i
N −= −−−− ∑ λλ
observations; r is the rank of the matrix under the assumption that there is a trend; m 
is Model 4, so that m-1 stands for Model 3; and the sλ  are the eigenvalues for each 
cointegrating rank up to r.   
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β (1,4)=1,β (2,2)=1, β (1,3)=0, β (2,1)=0,β (1,2)=0 
Convergence achieved after 235 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
(1) 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2): 
 0.553115  
Probability  0.457048  
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 
2χ
Sixmtbr(-1) -0.037785  0.000000 
  (0.00718)  
 [-5.26061]  
   
TLoans(-1)  0.000000  1.000000 
   
Fgs(-1)  0.000000 -0.043591 
  [-0.67854] 
TDeps(-1)  1.000000 -1.001603 
  [-5.22252] 
Cpi(-1) -0.001614 -0.009190 
 [-0.58307] [-3.75414] 
GDP(-1) 
   (0.06424) 
   
   (0.19179) 
   
  (0.00277)  (0.00245) 
   
-0.002390 -0.014129 
  (0.00373)  (0.00291) 
 [-0.64132] [-4.84764] 
   
Trend -0.059817  0.083910 
  (0.02293)  (0.02377) 
 [-2.60907] [ 3.53013] 
   
Intercept -8.282444  1.041939 
 
*( )=standard errors; [ ] = t-stats 
                                                 
 As stated above, all degrees of freedom for the values are based those provided 
in Johansen (1996). For the current system where the restrictions on the beta vectors 
r ank r is required to identify each 
of degrees of freedom equals the sum of the differences between the number of 
number of degrees of freedom equals the sum of the restrictions less r-squared  
11 2χ
are diffe ent and where r of the vectors, the number 
restrictions in each equation and r.  For r = 2 above, this yields 1. Effectively, the 
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The second long-run relationship is between total bank loans, total deposits, the price 
level, aggregate riskless banking sector asset, government 
securites. All associatio nticipated in regard to 
deposits and output: si ns created”, and loans 
as well as deposits nomic a ld be ex ected to increase in an 
expanding econom e pric s in ll coefficients in 
this equation are statistically significantly from zero, except for that of 
federal governm s.  
 
Figure 3.3: Cointegrating relationships in Model (1) 
 output and the relatively 
ns are positive. This is what would be a
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Now we analyse model (2) t total loans (TLoans) are 
total loans to public sector (TLps) and total loans to non- public or 
tin
 differs from model (1) in tha
separated out into 








Table 3.4: Model (2): VAR estimates 
Sixmtbr TLps TLnps FGS Tdeps Cpi GD
 
 P 
Sixmtbr(-1) -0.2530.763 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.064 
 
 ]
    
TLps(- 1.778




 -0.107 -0.234 -0.086 -1.520 -2.852
 [-0.197] [ 0.631] [ 5.336] [-1.291] [-0.460] [-0.984] [ 1.975]
    
FGS(-1 0.039 0.643 1.152
 -0.754 -0.093 -0.032 -0.069 -0.025 -0.448 -0.842
 [ 0.150] [ 0.116] [ 0.7023] [ 12.886] [ 1.540] [ 1.434] [ 1.368]
    
TDeps(-1) 5.611 0.389 0.224 0.265 0.762 4.595 1.326
 -2.431 -0.299 -0.102 -0.223 -0.081 -1.447 -2.715
 [ 2.308] [ 1.302] [ 2.204] [ 1.191] [ 9.359] [ 3.176] [ 0.488]
    
Cpi(-1) 0.041 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 1.037 -0.072
 -0.030 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.018 -0.033
 [ 1.380] [-0.740] [ 0.933] [-0.380] [-2.669] [ 58.399] [-2.168]
    
GDP(-1) 0.075 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.051 0.855
 -0.043 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.026 -0.048
 [ 1.752] [-0.406] [ 1.539] [ 0.683] [-1.102] [ 1.998] [ 17.860]
    
Intercept -40.687 -3.558 1.380 1.036 2.429 -25.648 -67.977
 -21.227 -2.611 -0.888 -1.944 -0.711 -12.631 -23.704
 ]
    
T 0.149
 4 -0.012 -0.025 -0.009 -0.165 -0.310
 ] [-0.376] [-0.023] [ 3.401] [-2.865] [ 0.481]
    
-0.065 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.038 -0.072
[ 11.819 [-0.352] [-1.306] [ 0.270] [ 0.493] [-1.671] [-3.514
1) -0.570 0.776 0.018 -0.023 -0.036 -1.004 
[-0.963] [ 10.652] [ 0.725] [-0.423] [-1.809] [-2.850] [ 2.689]
   
-1) -0.503 0.198 0.570 -0.302 -0.039 -1.495 
-2.554 -0.314 
) 0.112 0.011 0.022 0.889
[-1.917] [-1.363] [ 1.555] [ 0.533] [ 3.416] [-2.031] [-2.868
-0.785 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001 0.032 -0.474 
-0.278 -0.03
[-2.823] [-0.331
2R  0.796 0.989 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.999 1.000
2R  0.773 0.988 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.999 1.000
 S.E. equation 1.523 0.187 0.064 0.139 0.051 0.906 1.701
Log likelihood -144.237 25.516 112.896 49.390 130.873 -102.189 -153.178
Further diagnostics statistics for these estimates can be found in Appendix B.  
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The resultant, key, impulse responses are graphed in Figure (3.4).  
Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to 1 standar iation vation to Sixmtbr
el (2) 
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As might be anticipated, the cyclical patterns of the responses are sim deed 
virtually identical, over the first 10-12 periods following the innovation to the short 
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the upturn in loans is due to the lending to the public sector. We further note that the 
ase for Model (1). As a consequence we observe that output changes become 
positive after 16 periods, whilst in Model (1) changes in output remain negative until 
at least 30 periods, beginning a period of near stagnation after period 20. The early 
return to “normality” of loans to the public sector, has created a subsequent multiplier 
effect on output: and it is possible that the moral hazard to the banking sector of loans 
to the public sector encouraged the recovery in those loans, against the riskier private 
sector loans. The initial time path of the response of Cpi matches that of Model (1), 
but thereafter the price level continues to fall by a low, constant, amount; even when 
output ceases to fall. The cumulated impulse responses are graphed in Figure (3.5). 
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The responses are similar to those in Figure (3.3), for Model (1) is, as expected given 
our previous discussion. The differences primarily affect the loans’ responses.  
 
Table 3.5: Variance Decompositions: Model (2) 
 Sixmtbr TLps TLnps Fgs TDeps Cpi GDP 
 
 
After 1 period 
Sixmtbr 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TLps 0.271 99.729 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TLnps 1.627 25.335 73.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fgs 0.191 0.410 1.777 97.621 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tdeps 4.544 1.196 2.811 2.505 88.944 0.000 0.000
Cpi 9.807 1.776 2.908 0.356 0.002 85.151 0.000
GDP 0.001 0.530 4.021 0.273 0.136 4.960 90.078
After 2 periods 
Sixmtbr 97.046 0.383 0.070 0.073 1.920 0.108 0.401
TLps 0.594 98.370 0.299 0.045 0.652 0.017 0.022
TLnps 1.325 22.951 72.922 0.369 2.007 0.073 0.353
Fgs 0.120 0.257 3.447 95.685 0.439 0.000 0.052
Tdeps 3.971 3.040 1.887 4.793 85.969 0.188 0.153
Cpi 5.726 5.524 2.190 0.400 2.749 83.032 0.378
GDP 2.804 1.426 8.282 0.320 0.074 3.926 83.168
After 5 periods 
Sixmtbr 79.701 3.688 0.290 2.194 11.237 0.461 2.428
TLps 1.513 91.514 0.839 0.815 4.638 0.371 0.310
TLnps 4.717 18.131 62.203 4.702 8.964 0.122 1.161
Fgs 0.117 0.222 7.037 90.918 1.493 0.058 0.155
Tdeps 2.865 8.041 2.581 10.192 73.456 1.763 1.103
Cpi 1.731 16.873 0.761 5.172 9.228 64.763 1.473
GDP 17.610 7.292 12.353 3.587 0.397 1.877 56.885
After 10 periods 
Sixmtbr 62.860 6.874 0.350 9.905 15.800 0.444 3.767
TLps 1.615 84.650 0.979 2.144 7.027 2.277 1.309
TLnps 6.438 15.720 54.134 11.529 10.247 0.824 1.108
Fgs 0.561 0.355 9.709 87.043 1.541 0.611 0.178
Tdeps 6.308 10.039 5.770 10.617 60.857 4.548 1.862
Cpi 0.868 25.187 1.042 14.666 8.977 47.192 2.068
GDP 25.858 18.238 8.946 7.507 0.425 4.766 34.260
 
The picture provided by Table (3.5) is naturally very similar to that provided by Table 
(3.2) for Model (1). The differences, of course, reflect the differences noted 
concerning the impact of innovations to the short term interest rate on: GDP, total 
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loans and on itself. The variance decompositions of all three variables with respect to 
that rate have has declined.  
 
For model 2 we again find that a trend should be included in the cointegrating vectors, 
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Table 3.6: Identified Cointegrating Equations in Model (2)12  
 
Cointegration Restrictions:  
β (1,2)=0,β (1,3)=1, β (1,4)=0,β (2,1)=0,β (2,2)=1, 
β (2,3)=0,β (2,6)=0,α (1,2)=0, α (3,2)=0,α (4,1)=0, 
α (4,2)=0,α (5,2)=0 
Convergence ac
dentify
 9.422123  
 0.307946  
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 CointEq2 
hieved after 63 iterations. 
Restrictions i  all cointegrating vectors 




Sixmtbr(-1)  0.032681  0.000000 
  (0.00837)  
 [ 3.90401]  
   
TLps (-1)  0.000000  1.000000 
   
Tlnps (-1)  1.000000  0.000000 
   
Fgs(-1)  0.000000 -0.580641 
   (0.21578) 
  [-2.69093] 
   
TDeps (-1) -1.848855  -0.679540 
  (0.24851) (0.65704) 
 [-7.43967] [-1.03425] 
   
Cpi(-1) -0.006723  0.000000 
  (0.00327)  
 [-2.05893]  
   
GDP(-1) -0.008944 -0.011476 
  (0.00423)  (0.00663) 
 [-2.11343] [-1,73220] 
   
Trend  0.117510  0.048786 
  (0.03385)  (0.04789) 
 [ 3.47187] [ 1.01869] 
   
Intercept  7.731894 4.693950 
 
*( )=standard errors; [ ] = t-stats 
                                                 
 To the degrees of freedom for the values given in Footnote 11, we add to these 





Here, we have normalised on the two types of bank loans, rather on one type or the 
ther and deposits, with the same kind of objectives in mind as with the previous 
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13 Unit Root tests: CV1, ADF (neither intercept nor Trend), -4.525 [0.000], CV2, 
ADF (intercept and Trend), -3.163 [0.093], KPS (intercept and Trend), LM-stat, 
  
0.0725 < 10% level [when < 5% level is usually taken as the level at which I(0) can 
be taken to be the correct order of integration.
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3.5: Innovations in the monetary policy indicator variables in the 2 models and 
innovations to exogenous monetary policy instruments. 
 
In the above it was assumed that the innovations in the monetary policy indicators are 
onetary conditions in the financial markets, in the light of its objectives for the 
acroeconomy. It has been argued strongly by, for example, Rudebusch (1997), that 
is is the case, the VARs provide no information about the monetary 
ission mechanisms. The implication is that changes to monetary policy 
ents such be able to account for some if not all of the innovations to the 
s (1998) was not that sympathetic to that viewpoint: nor, it 
might be added, to other criticisms of the VAR methodology which he had invented 
ve agreed and, for example, Ford et al 







almost 20 years earlier). However, it seems that the point made by Rudebusch has 
substance and is crucial to the claims that any given monetary transmission 
mechanism is present in an economy. Others ha
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(2003) adopted this in their study of MTMs for Japan. We have done so in the 
llowing.  
 
In order to do so it is plainly necessary to consider the monetary instruments 
employed by the central bank for controlling the volume and cost of finance in the 
banking system. For Pakistan it seems from SBP information that over the years, 
despite changes to the structure and constitution of the banking sector, open market 
operations and changes in its discount rate have been used to alter the quantity and 
ost of funds.  
r to keep interest rates at a 




Generally we could surmise the central bank has some expectation of the level of its 
basic interest rate, the discount rate, that it must set in orde
le
Any observed divergence between that expected level and the actual level that it sets 
in current market conditions at any point, will trigger an increase or decrease in the 
discount rate. However, we have no information from the SBP what that expectation 
might have been at each point in time. One possible way of deriving the expectation is 
to estimate it using the Kalman Filter (see Appendix D). That is what we have done. 
From the consequent expected discount rate we have calculated the discrepancy 
between the actual discount rate and that expectation: to obtain, as it were, an 
“unanticipated change” in that rate. That represents the innovation to the rate; and it is 




Similarly, we can imagine that the bank has some expectation of what the money 
supply will be given the monetary base (MB) that it has set; and, therefore, some 
xpectation of the short term rate of interest, such as the six month Treasury Bill rate. 
are graphed in Figure (3.7); and the OLS estimates for the innovations 
 the Sixmtbr are detailed in Table (3.7).  
Figure 3.7: Innovations to Sixmtbr, the Discount Rate and the Monetary Base: 
 
e
If there is some discrepancy between its expectation of the monetary base and its 
actual value, generated of course by its own activities or alteration in the foreign 
currency reserves, the central bank will seek to reduce or expand the base as 
necessary. Our estimate of the central bank’s expected level of the MB is also derived 
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These variables are all stationary.14  
 
The statistics in Table (3.7) provide strong, and statistically significant evidence, in 
support of associations between the innovations to the short term interest rate in 
Model (1) and random changes to the two main instruments of monetary control.  
 








td. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Discrate Innovation(-1) 0.185725 0.096593 1.922764 0.0592 
Discrate Innovation(-8) -0.581090 0.156435 -3.714580 0.0004 
ovation(-10) 0.598147 0.198359 3.015483 0.0037 
-0.500450 0.186222 -2.687382 0.0093 
-0.420422 0.188357 -2.232044 0.0293 
Discrate Innovation(-14) 0.187853 0.063257 2.969673 0.0043 
MB Innovation(-5) -6.993788 2.626848 -2.662425 0.0099 
  




2R  0.434095   Jarque-Bera: 1.736 [0.420] 
2R  0.369156 AR: LM(4), F-stat, 0.68 [0.61] 
S.E. of regression 1.194197  ARCH(4), F-stat, 0.861 [0.493] 















                                                 
14 ADF unit root tests (no intercepts or trends) for the innovations yield (t-stats in (.) 
and probability in [.]): Sixmtbr, -8.401 [0.000]; MB, -137.96 [0.000]; and, Discount
Rate, -2.173 [0.03].  
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The matching figures and tables for Model (2) now follow.  
igure 3.8: Innovations to Sixmtbr: Model (2) 
 
 
 estimate to br: 2) 
 





Table 3.8: The OLS s for the innovations  the Sixmt  Model (
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Discrate Innovation (-1) 0504 0.194337 0.097362 1.996030 0.
Discrate Innova
iscrate Innova
tion (-8) 0004 
tion (-9) 0.0006 
iscrate Innovation (-10) 0.611912 0.199938 3.060510 0.0033 
-0.460212 0.187705 -2.451789 0.0171 
-0.398890 0.189857 -2.101004 0.0398 
0.175784 0.063761 2.756925 0.0077 




45 0.157680 -3.714126 





Discrate Innovation (-11) 
Discrate Innovation (-12) 
Discrate Innovation (-14) 
MB Innovation (-5) 
  
2R  0.415592 Jarque-Bera: 2.03 [0.363]       
2R  0.348529 AR: LM(4), F-stat., 0.975 [0.428] 
1.203704 ARCH (4): F-stat., 0.935 [0.45] 
-106.4481 Hetero: F-stat., 0.749 [0.732] 
 

















1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 





The State Bank of Pakistan considers treasury bills rate as its policy indicator and, 
erefore, we have used treasury bills’ short term interest rate as an appropriate choice 
in the test VARs. As discussed earlier, we have used two models to test VARs and 
both models have same responses over the first 10-12 periods following the 
innovation to the short term interest rate.  
 
The bank lending channel for MTM is playing very important role in Pakistan and our 
both models empirically confirm that when the tighter monetary policy stance (such a 
reduction in the monetary base), which has produced an increase in the short term 
interest rate creates immediate effect to the deposits which goes down which leads to 
decrease in loans as well and the overall effect of going down these two variables 
(deposits and loans) declines in investment in the economy that leads to a substantial 
ariation (decrease) in economy but create less impact on inflation. 
 
W un coin lationships between loans and deposits in 
bles are
 to our ,
te, output, e ep ll  The 
second long-run relationship is b  
level, aggregate output and the re ernment 
securites. All associations are positive. On the other hand, in model (2) the first 
lationship: “private sector” loans are positively related to total deposits and to GDP, 
nd negatively associated with the rate of interest and the price level. From the second 
th
v
e have identified long–r tegrating re
both models, as these varia  considered to have the long-run influences on the 
banking sector. According  model (1)  the long-run relationships between the 
short-term interest ra the price l vel and d osits are a positive.
etween total bank loans, total deposits, the price




relationship, public sector loans, we note: the positive link with total deposits, GDP 
nd also with government securities. 
 
In chapter four and chapter five, we have, further, investigated the portfolio behaviour 
of Pakistani scheduled commercial banks by using an expected utility model of 









































Appendix A: Basic Data  








































































































































































Appendix B: The diagnostic statistics of the VARs for the 2 models 
Model (1):  
 
(1) Lag length: 4 criteria indicate 1 lag; LR indicates 2 lags. Lag 2 is mathematically 
stable but produces inferior residuals’ statistics than lag 1.   




     Root Modulus 
 
 0.968057  0.968057 
 0.946150  0.946150 
 0.815947 - 0.180806i  0.835740 
 0.815947 + 0.180806i  0.835740 
 0.816420  0.816420 
 0.707126  0.707126 
 
 
(3) Residuals:  
 
Equation Normal distribution test 
 J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Sixmtbr 2.53 [0.281] 2.32 [0.21] 
TLoans 2.23 [0.330] 2.23 [0.15] 
Fgs 193.06 [0.00] 0.45 [0.00] 
TDeps 11.61 [0.003] 4.28 [0.02] 
Cpi 0.05 [0.975] 3.07 [0.90] 
GDP 0.97 [0.615] 2.49 [0.34] 
   
Vector 210.5 [0.000]  
  
 Vector tests 
  
 AR(4) Hetero. 
LM ( ) 35.61 [0.487]  )36(2χ
F(294,497)  1.095 [0.189] 











Model (2):  
 
(1) Lag length: 1 lag or 2 lags 1 are each indicated by 2 criteria; the fifth criteria 
 
     Root Modulus 
(AIC) indicates lag 7. Only lag 1 is mathematically stable.  
(2) Roots of the companion matrix: 
 
 0.981934  0.981934 
 0.933602  0.933602 
 0.827557 - 0.139892i 98 
 0.827557 + 0.139892i 8 
 0.787498 - 0.138035i 4 
 0.7 4 









(3) Residuals:  
 
Equation Normal distribution test 
 J-B statistic Kurtosis 
Sixmtbr 2.45 [0.29] 2.32 [0.21] 
TLps 6.91 [0.03] 4.23 [0.02] 
TLnps 0.57 [0.75] 2.64 [0.51] 
Fgs 154.91 [0.00] 8.72 [0.00] 
TDeps 6.27 [0.04] 3.74 [0.18] 
Cpi 0.35 [0.84] 3.01 [0.98] 
GDP 0.94 [0.62] 2.80 [0.72] 
   
Vector 172.4  [0.000]  
  
 Vector tests 
  
 AR(4) Hetero. 
LM ( ) )49(2χ 59.11 [0.153]  
F(448,446)  0.92 [0.80] 











Appendix C: Tests for Cointegration  
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
 
Table III. 1: Model (1) 
 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob. 
None *  0.706537  176.3305  95.75366  0.0000 
At most 1 * 4  75.79807  69  0.0154 
At most 2  37.71512  47  0.3146 
At most 3  13.53598  29  0.8656 
At most 4 67  15  0.6898 
At most 5 1  3.8  0.7780 
 0.37150 .81889 
 0.255370 .85613 
 0.087265 .79707 
 0.070208  6.0485 .49471 




able III. 3: Model (2) 




Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Statistic Prob. 




863  125.6154 6
At most 1 * 0  97  0.0378 
At most 2 3  61.51 9  0.1917 
At most 3 1  33.94 7  0.5047 
At most 4 46  13.23 9  0.8805 
At most 5 6551  4. 5  0.8319 







 0.22562 707  4 .85613 
 0.0991 588  2 .79707 
 0.05 778462  1 .49471 

















 Appendix D: Kalman Filter results. 
 
Table IV.1:  For the Discount Rate 
 
Conver ence achiev r 5 iterat
 
 
g ed afte ions 
 Coefficient rror PrStd. E z-Statistic ob.   
C(1) -12.29639 26 0.0000 
C(3) 2.058809 89 0.0000 






 Final Root M z-Statistic rob.   
SV1 27.57328 98 0.0000 
8.798709 22.65154 0.0000 
-176.8710      Akaike info criterion 4.334240 
 





signal equation, discrate=0.5*sv1+0.05*sv2+c(1) 
 
state variable, sv1=c(3
st  sv2 -1) + (3)
)*MB+[var=exp(c(3))] 
 





Ta For t ry B
 
Convergence achieved after 1 iteration 
ble IV.2:  he Moneta ase 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C(3) -16.90918 0.002080 -8127.739 0.0000 
C(4) -0.000333 2.25E-06 -147.6319 0.0000 
  
 Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.   
SV1 0.047200 0.000301 157.0274 0.0000 
SV2 -0.793679 0.003588 -221.2196 0.0000 
88.06053      Akaike info criterion -2.073748 
 
State Space System 
Log likelihood 
  
signal equation, MB=sv1+c(3)*sv2 
 
state variable, sv1=sv1(-1)+c(4)*sv2(-1)+[var=exp(c(3))] 
 






BANK PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR UNDER RISK AVERSION:  




The expected utility model, commonly reduced to the mean –variance model, of bank 
portfolio behavior under risk stems from Hicks (1935), Tobin’s (1958) and Markowitz’s 
(1952, 1959) as noted in chapter two. According to this approach, the determinants of 
alternative portfolios can be assessed by the trade-off between their expected return and 
valuations risk, where the former is the mean of the probability distribution of return and 
the latter is usually approximated by the variance of that distribution.  
 
In this chapter we test a number of static as well as dynamic models of the portfolio 
behaviour of Pakistani banks. The underlying static relationship is derived using the 
mean-variance expected utility, and dynamics are introduced through the application of 
the general stock adjustment process first propounded by Brainard and Tobin (1968). As 
noted in chapter two, prominent empirical work on commercial bank portfolio behaviour 
can be seen in Kane and Malkiel (1965), Perkin (1970), Parkin, Gray and Barrett (1970), 
Courakis (1974,1975,1980,1988), Klein (1971), Pyle(1971),Sharp (1974), White(1975), 
Bewley (1981),Hart and Jaffee (1974), Sealey (1980), Fan (1991), Subeniotis (1991), 
Arjoon (1994), Kagigi, Ford and Cadle (1994, 2001) and Wibowo (2005). The structure 
of the dynamic model enables us to examine the responses over time of the “choice” 
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assets to alterations to a set of exogenous variables that include policy –determined 
(central bank determined) or at least policy-influenced factors. In effect, we can derive 
multiplier effects and their time-profiles induced by changes to the banks’ investment 
environment. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. As background to our formal modelling 
and econometric analysis, the Section 4.2 presents the structure of the static and dynamic 
portfolio models and gives details of the impact, interim and total multiplier effects. 
Section 4.3 discusses specification of the model, gives details of the econometric 
methodology employed and also provides the data analysis. The statistical results, 
including the multiplier effects, are presented and evaluated in Section 4.4. But in section 
4.5 ,we estimate the best aggregated dynamic model, where all loans has been aggregated 
into one, and provide the comparison between the best disaggregated and best aggregated 
models. Section 4.6 provides the summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2: Theoretical Framework of Expected Utility Approach: 
We have developed a model of asset/ liability choice, which is based on the stochastic 
nature of asset return and borrowing cost, along the lines of those in the literature which 
are derivatives of Parkin-Gray-Barrett model (1970). 
 
Assume that a bank possesses the following static utility function over profits (π); which 
are stochastic and normally distributed1. 
                                                          
1 We utilize the exponential function given the dubious properties of the quadratic utility 
function (See, amongst others, Feldstein, 1969) 
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(4.1)     πγ beaU −−= 2 
Where, U = Utility per decision period, π = Real profit per decision period and a, b and γ 
are parameters ( b, γ > 0) 
By taking expectation of (4.1), we have 
(4.2)  )5.0(
2
)( σπγ bUbeaUE −−−=
where  and mean and variance of profitπU
2σ 3. Hence , to maximise expected utility of 
profit the bank effectively maximises: 
(4.3)  25.0 σπ bUW −=
That is the certainty –equivalent of the profit that is to be chosen4.  
                                                          
2 The exponential utility function has proved to be a popular function ever since it was 
introduced into this type of literature by Freund (1956). 
3 (4.2) follows from the fact that E (etπ) is moment Mπ(t) generating function (MGF) of a 





4 The parameter of b is the degree of risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt (see, 
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965)).The exponential utility function used is one of the HARA 








UARA −=  
 








UARA −=  
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We come now to the definition of profit: 






















Where r' is a (1× k) row vector of yields (returns) on assets and borrowing rates (costs) on 
liabilities. υ is a (1× k) column vector of assets and liabilities (where the liabilities are 
measured negatively.  is a (1×n) column vector of endogenous variables refers to 
“choice” assets or liabilities of balance sheet items and  (1×k) refers to the column of 

























Where as  is a (1×n) vector of expected rate of return/cost on the choice set items and 
 is a (1×k) vector of return/ cost on non- choice set items.  is the expected value of 
the exogenous non choice items. From (4.3) to (4.5); where Ω is the variance-covariance 


























































 We can imagine that equation (4.6) applies to the “representative” bank, so that 
aggregation across a given banking group merely results in the assets and liabilities in 
equation (4.6) being multiplied by the number of banks. The bank will choose the vector 
                                                                                                                                                                             




1A  to maximize W subject to the balance sheet constraint. That constraint is of equality 









Where as iʹ is a row unit vector. The liabilities are treated with (–ve) sign. In particular 
environment, the selection  might be constrained by other factors. For example, its 
cash element might be subject to a minimum required ratio to total deposits, imposed by 
the central bank. In this scenario, should that ratio be binding and effective in the Kuhn-
Tucker sense, the variable concerned will, as it were, constitute its “own” portfolio. Thus, 
if cash always equals the constraint of α times total deposits, then, cash is effectively 
predetermined; and so that the elements in  are chosen subject to deposits in  being 
equal to (1- α) of the total deposits. Effectively, the balance sheet constraint, equation 

























11Ω  is a (n×n) symmetric variance covariance matrix of the choice set items, return/ cost; 
 is a (k×k) symmetric variance and covariance matrix of non-choice set items’ return/ 
cost;  is (n×k);  is (k×n); and 
22Ω
12Ω 21Ω 21Ω  = 12Ω  is a (nxk) covariance matrix of the 
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choice non-choice set return and cost. Where n is number of endogenous variables and k 
is number of exogenous variables (includes interest rate and liabilities). We have now 
generally defined Ω under the assumption that the yields on endogenous and exogenous 
variables themselves are stochastic.  
 
Now, substituting equation (4.8) into equation (4.6), the bank chooses the vector  to 
maximize the resultant expression subject to the budget constraint, equation (4.7). In 
effect, to maximize this Lagrangean expression:  
1A





































































The λ is an undetermined Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint Partial 
differentiation of equation (4.9) with respect to  and λ produces these first-order 
conditions for a maximum value of expected utility: 
1A
(4.10)    
∧
Ω+−=+Ω− 21211111 AbeiAb λ







We note that in equation (4.10)  is a (n×1) vector, 1e 11Ω  is (n×n) and  is (n×1),  and 
are (n×1) and (k×1) unit vectors respectively from above two equations. From 
equations, (4.10) and (4.11), we can deduce that 
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We are only interested in Σ11 and Σ12 as we have to see the impact of profits/costs vector 
on the endogenous variables. By applying standard technique for inversion of partitioned 
matrices (see Hadley 1964), we can find the values of Σ11 and Σ12 respectively.  
























So, the impact of returns/costs vector on the endogenous variables is given by: 














The matrix Σ11 on the rates of return/cost vector must be symmetric, which follows from 
the fact that all the matrices in (Σ11)5 are symmetric. This matrix must also have column 
sums of zero; which is Cournot Aggregation condition on the vector e1 (this can be 
proved by pre-multiplying (Σ11) by  in the footnote 5). '1i
 
The Engel Aggregation condition follows immediately, since in addition: 






























Further, it can be shown that Σ11 is symmetric6. 
                                                          




































6 That is, . This can be proved by taking the transpose of  in footnote 5, 











Thus, we can write the (static) equation system in this general format7 according to which 
demand for assets depends on actual rates of return for the decision period and the level 
of exogenous variable. 
(4.17)    tttt AegA εϑ ++=
∧
,2,1,1
Where g is (n×n); ϑ is (n×k);  is a (n×1) and  is a (k×1). g and ϑ are the response 
matrices of the actual rates of return and the actual liabilities/ exogenous variables 
respectively. Here we have included the time subscripts and the
te ,1 2Â
tε vector of disturbance 
terms are normally distributed with mean vector zero and constant variance . The 
elements of the matrices g and ϑ are the parameters that have to be estimated and a set of 
restrictions, as discussed above, can be imposed on them. 
I2σ
(a)    (Symmetric) jiij gg =
(b)     (Cournot Aggregation) 0'1 =gi
(c )  (Engel Aggregation) 1
'
1 ii −=ϑ
 When (a) and (b) conditions hold the system of demand equation is homogeneous of 
degree zero in the vector of asset returns, since this constraint must then be satisfied: 
(d)  0''1
)
=gi   (Homogeniety) 
The second order condition for a maximum of expected utility is that the Hessian matrix:  










                                                          
7 therefore,  1211 , ∑=∑= Hg 12
' Ω−= bHi ρϑ ω
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must have principal minors that alternate in sign beginning positive (since we have one 
constraint). The selected vector of endogenous assets then maximizes expected utility. 
So, the volume of an asset will never decrease, if the rate of the interest on that asset 
increases (ceteris paribus). Similarly, should the rate on liability increase, the holdings of 
that liability will fall (liabilities are measured (-ve) sign)8. 
(4.19)   
∧
∀≤ 2,0 Agii
(4.20)   1,0 Agii ∀≥
Equation (4.17) represents the static model, which shows the bank optimal demand 
functions that represent the institutions long-run equilibrium solutions, when neither 
transactions cost nor market deficiencies deter the banking institution. It is assumed that 
banks take a decision at the beginning of the period and this decision is independent of 
the changes in the non-choice items during the period. This assumption is only consistent 
in the absence of transaction costs in the static nature of the model. The bank will 
continuously adjust its portfolio towards the optimal static position in the absence of 
transaction costs and market deficiencies. But in real world, portfolio adjustment towards 
the optimal static position is not possible due to the existence of transaction cost and 
                                                          
8 MaLarren and Upcher (1986) have shown empirically that, for the maximizing of the 
bank’s profit, the yield elasticity on liabilities’ supply should be negative and the yield 
elasticity on assets’ demand should be positive. That is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition. 
 88
market deficiencies9. Equivalently, the allocation of bank’s available funds (non-choice 
items) at the end of the decision period may not be the desired or optimal level of choice 
assets. Therefore, there is the requirement of the specification of a mechanism for the 
bank’s adjustment process from the beginning of period optimal position to a new one 
when incurs transaction cost, market deficiencies and changes in the non-choice items. 
That mechanism, then, translates the desired level of choice assets into its actual level. 
Such adjustment procedure was introduced by the Brainard and Tobin (1968), enabled 
the bank’s short run demand functions to be derived. 
                                                          
9 A bank has to incur adjustment costs when it adjusts its actual portfolio towards the 
optimal position. For example, the process of buying and selling securities include cost in 
the shape of commission and capital loss. Similarly, the more frequently a bank adjusts it 
portfolio, the more generate transaction costs it has to bear. For example, banks advances 
usually committed for a certain period of time. If a bank wishes to reduce its stock of 
advances before the agreed repayment is due it will increase additional costs in terms of 
damaging future customer relationship and/or explicit financial penalties for breaking an 
agreement. There is positive transaction cost involved either increasing or decreasing the 
holding of an asset. Sharp (1973& 1974) specified a model based on both utility 
maximization and total cost minimization that overcame the residual method of satisfying 
the balance sheet constraints. In his specification, he was encompassing the entire list of 
interest rates of the endogenous assets/liabilities in each and every demand function and 
taking into account a general stock adjustment mechanism so that the adjustment of any 
one asset was to be dependent on the deviations from desired levels of all endogenous 
choice items.  
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(4.21)    tt
d
tttt AALAAA ε+−=−=Δ −− )( 1,1,11,1,1,1
Where  is (1xn) vector of actual change in choice set item from time t-1 to time t 
period.  represents a (nx1) vector of difference between desired and actual 
holdings of choice set items. These differences generate the previously mentioned 
changes in actual holdings of choice set items through the (nxn) L response matrix. 
Therefore, the matrix L is a matrix of speeds of adjustments of the actual to the desired 
levels of the choice items in the portfolio. So, above equation states that the actual 
changes in the holding of any choice set item represents an adjustment from its actual to 
its desired level.  is the desired (optimal) vector of endogenous assets, which is 
identical with the left-hand side of equation of (4.17) (omitting its error term).When the 
latter expression is substituted in equation (4.21), we discover after some rearranging of 
terms that:  
tA ,1Δ









1,1,21,1,2,1,1 )(  
Where Lg = K , L ϑ= X and (I- L) = Z 
1,1 −tA , g, and ϑ are defined above with respect to the static system equation. I is the 
identity matrix and , is an n component vector of lagged endogenous (choice set) 
items, and εt is disturbance term. Similarly to the earlier model, the balance sheet 
constraint has its impact on the response matrices of this dynamic version of the demand 
function. The constraints on the parameters contained in g and ϑ are identical to those of 
the static model. As g is a symmetric matrix, we have no reason to believe that L is also 





matrices is not necessarily symmetric matrix. Therefore symmetry must not be applied to 
matrix K. As for as X and Z matrices are concerned, their properties depend also on the 
characteristics of the L matrix. Additionally, we have the following condition on the 
matrix of lagged responses: 
(4.23)  0' =Zi
This is the Cournot Aggregation condition implied by the balance sheet equation10. 
 
4.2.1: Impact, Interim and Total Multipliers: 
After estimating a dynamic equation (4.22), we will calculate the multiplier effects of the 
choice assets to unit changes to the non-choice items. For example, all interest rates with 
minimum and maximum limits within the economy are set by the SBP (the central bank 
of Pakistan), some of these can be taken as direct policy instruments: for example, it 
might be a CMR (using as a proxy for the discount rates). The multiplier effects are of 
                                                          
10 See Ford (1991).According to Brainard and Tobin (1968) in equation (4.22), matrix L 
should satisfy Cournot aggregation condition that is, L should possess columns (of 
adjustment coefficients) that sum to zero as they thought the argument of the balance 
sheet constraint would not be satisfied until and unless the matrix L has column sums of 
zero. 
Landenson (1971, 1973) and Clinton (1973) challenged the above claim of Brainard and 
Tobin. They claimed that the matrix (I- L) in equation (4.22) should have columns that 
sums to zero instead of matrix L (which is Cournot Aggregation condition) and the matrix 
L must have column sum of unity (which is Engel Aggregation condition). White (1975) 
concurred this argument. 
 
 91
three kinds: impact (current); interim (ensuing periods); and total (cumulative) 
multipliers.  
The multiplier effects are indispensable for an overall evaluation of the role of banks in 
policy implementation, and will drive these effects as follows: 




1,1,21,1,2,1,1 )(  










Equation (4.22) can be written as, 
(4.24)    tttt ZAxA ε++Φ= −1,1,1  
Where Φ is the matrix of the impact effects (current period) of the exogenous variables.  
Then, to drive the indirect effects, as they are distributed over the later periods, we lag 
equation (4.24) and substitute them it for endogenous variable . After repeating the 
substitution g times (Theil, 1971), we have: 
1,1 −tA































Then assuming that Z converges to a null matrix, that is, its eigenvalues are less than one 
in absolute value as g  ∞ the first term on the right hand side of equation (4.26) also 
converges to a null matrix and, therefore, we may express that equation as: 

















This is the final form of the equation system (4.22)11. The successive response matrices 
are, with the first being (as noted above) the impact multiplier effects, the remainder 
being the interim multiplier effects over time: 
(4.28)   )(),......,(),(),(, 2 ΦΦΦΦΦ ZZZZZZZ n
While, the total response matrix G is: 








The time-profiles of the multiplier effects for any given endogenous variable will depend 
upon the roots of the Z matrix. If some of the roots are complex numbers then the 
variables will exhibit a cyclical path to the steady state. 
 
4.3: Specification of the Models, Methodology and Data Analysis: 
Equations (4.17) and (4.22) represent static and dynamic models, respectively, for the 
portfolio behaviour of an individual bank. To estimate these models we have to use the 
same definitions of choice (A1) and non choice (A2) items in table (4.3.1) and make the 
following assumptions regarding aggregation over banks. We assume that  
 
• All banks possess the same decision period and maximize the same objective 
function, i.e, 25.0 σ  π bUW −=
• Future expectations of assets’ rate of returns and the subjective variance-
covariance matrix are identical for all banks. 
• The same transaction and disequilibrium costs coefficients are faced by all banks. 
                                                          
11 See Theil and Boot (1962) and Theil (1971) 
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Accordingly, we may sum over the n commercial banks of Pakistan and use consolidated 
balance sheet data. In order to estimate static and dynamic equations (4.17) and (4.22), 
we require one more assumption. The vector of expected rate of return on the choice 
variables, , and the expected values of the non choice variables , , are 
unobservable. Consequently, we approximate the expected rate of return of choice 





tr ,1 and replace the expected values of the non-
choice items by their actual values . In consideration of the above, we can write 
equations (4.17) and (4.22) for all banks under consideration as: 
∧
tA ,2 tA ,2
 (4.30)    tttt ArgA εϑ ++= ,2,1,1
(4.31)   ttttt ZAAXKrA ε+++= −1,1,2,1,1
Parkin at el (1970) include the error term in the demand equation by anticipating that 
actual and optimal levels of the choice items deviate by a factor ε  which is a vector of 
normally distributed random errors with mean zero. Berndt, McCurdy and Rose (1980) 
argue the introduction of the error term ε  in the static demand equation – which is 
assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables. They prove that the error term ε  
is a composite disturbance vector of endogenous and exogenous variables and it is 
correlated with two vectors of explanatory variables i.e, in our case these are  and te ,1
                                                          
12 As the returns on some of the assets/liabilities are known at a given time, and are fixed 
by the banks or do not change much over the one-period decision (such as Federal Govt 
securities, Tbills etc). 
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∧
tA2 . According to them, any error in the demand equation of an individual bank cannot 
be assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables which mean that there could 
be a possibility of autocorrelation. (4.30) and (4.31) equations represent static and 
dynamic equations in this chapter. We assume that both error terms in the above 
equations are independent of the other stochastic components in the models and are thus 
independent of the explanatory variables in the regression equations. It should be noted 
that assuming error terms for both the static and dynamic model is theoretically 
inconsistent. If the static model specification is correct, then the dynamic model is 
incorrect, or at least redundant. Conversely, the dynamic model is the appropriate 
specification if the static model is misspecified.  
 
One of the important assumptions made in the mean-variance model is that the portfolio 
return is normally distributed. This assumption is only satisfied if the returns of all items 
are normally distributed. We have checked the normality of the each return by looking 
Jarque-Bera statistics and Kernel Density graphs and standard EDF tests, and found that 
all interest rates are normally distributed except for inflation where there were some 
outliers. But inflation is approximate normally distributed. So for given assets and 







4.3.1:  Methodology, Data and Their Properties: 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) technique 13  is employed for the 
estimation of the coefficients of the system’s equations. FIML is being used because 
whether the static or the dynamic system is estimated, one of the equations must be 
deleted from the system, and without losing any information. The complete system (4.31) 
is singular and n-1 of the n equations can be estimated independently and the nth 
equation can be estimated by using the balance sheet constraints as mentioned in equation 
(b) and (c) respectively. If the system is estimated by SUR, the estimates depend upon 
which equation is omitted to avoid singularity. 
 
 
The exogenous and endogenous scalar variables are detailed in table 4.3.1, which repeats 
table 2.2.2 for convenience  
 
                                                          
13 Barten (1969) proved that under FIML it does not matter which equation is omitted, as 
it is possible to estimate the coefficients of deleted equation indirectly by imposing 
restrictions of Cournot and Engel aggregation respectively. He also explained even when 
restrictions are imposed on the matrices of coefficients; FIML estimates the likelihood 
function under the assumption that the contemporaneous errors have a joint normal 
distribution. Provided that the likelihood function is correctly specified, in general, FIML 
estimators are consistent, asymptotically efficient, asymptotically normally distributed. 




Table 4.3.1: Choice and Non Choice Items of the Pakistani Banks 
Notation Status Description 
Panel A : Balance Sheet    
Assets    
GOVTS Endogenous Loans to the Govt.Sector 
PUBS Endogenous Loans to the Public Sector 
PRIVS Endogenous Loans to the Private Sector 
PERS Endogenous Loans to the Personal Sector 
OTHERS Endogenous Loans to the Others Sector 
TRUST Endogenous Loans to the Trust Funds & Non-
Profit Org. 
PGS Exogenous  Provincial Govt. Securities 
SUMB Endogenous Borrowing from, SBP 
FGS Endogenous Federal Govt. Securities (Bonds) 
TBILLS Endogenous Treasury Bills 
CASH Endogenous Cash 
Liabilities    
CAPITAL Exogenous Capital 
RESERVE Exogenous Reserve 
CAPRES Exogenous Capital & Reserve 
TTD Exogenous Total Time Deposit 
TDD Exogenous Total Demand deposits 
TDTL Exogenous Total Demand and Time Deposit 
Panel B: Rates of Return on the 
Asset  
  
WAG Exogenous Warra (weighted average rate of 
return) Govt.    Sector 
WAP Exogenous Warra Public Sector 
WAPR Exogenous Warra Private Sector 
WAPL Exogenous Warra Personal Sector 
WAOH Exogenous Warra Other Sector 
WAT Exogenous Warra Trust Funds & Non-Profit 
Org. 
PGR Exogenous Provincial Govt. Securities Rates 
CMR Exogenous Call Money Rates—proxy for 
discount rates 
GBYLD Exogenous Govt. Bond Yield 
SIXMTBR Exogenous Six Month Treasury Bills Rates 
INFLN Exogenous Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 
 
 
 Due to the existence of non-stationarity among endogenous/exogenous variables, one 
alternative is to estimate the system (static or dynamic) in ratio forms. We adopt that 
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approach and divide the assets and liabilities of the balance sheet by the total liabilities 
(total deposits and liabilities, borrowings, capital and reserve). 
  
In order to avoid spurious regression, we still need to conduct unit root tests, first to 
ensure that the ratios are I(0). If a variable contains a unit root, is I(1), then it is non-
stationary and regression involving the series can falsely imply the existence of a 
meaningful economic relationship (Phillips, 1986). There are several ways of testing for 
the existence of a unit root. Here we use augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron 
and Perron’s (1997) unit root tests to test the null hypothesis that a series contains a unit 
root. Both tests confirm (in tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.3) that all endogenous and exogenous 
variables, including the interest rate variables, are I(0) processes.  
 
 
4.3.2: Unit Root Tests: Endogenous Variables (Asset/Liability Ratios) 
 
Ratio Unit root tests: t-statistics and probabilities 
 ADF 
GOVTS -3.891887 (0.0032) 
PRIVS -3.564245 ( 0.0086) 
OTHERS -3.087933 ( 0.0314) 
SUMB -3.964685 ( 0.0026) 
TBILLS -3.837104 ( 0.0195) 




PUBS -2.965866 (0.0424) 
PERS -3.916092 ( 0.0030) 
FGS -2.722452 (0.0746) 
  
 Perron: Structural Break test 
TRUST Model I01, all methods: -10.88(0.00) 
 Model I02, all methods: -10.80(0.00) 




Unit Root Tests: Endogenous Variables (Asset/Liability Ratios): Continued 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































4.4. Discussion of Empirical Results: 
We have estimated various static and dynamic models. The type of estimated static 
models are, static model itself or static unrestricted model, static restricted model with 
symmetry, static restricted model with homogeneity and static restricted model with 
symmetry and homogeneity. Similarly, we have estimated dynamic unrestricted model, 
dynamic restricted model with dummy, dynamic restricted model without three interest 
rates (wag, wap and warp) and dynamic restricted model with dummy and without three 
interest rates (wag, wap and warp), dynamic unrestricted model with separate demand 
deposit and time deposit with dummy, dynamic restricted model with demand deposit 
equal to time deposit and with dummy. We have employed dummy for the structural 
break "between" 1985 to 1990 as discussed in chapter two. The analysis of model is 
given in table 4.4.1. 
 
Table 4.4.1: Analysis of Models 
 
Models  Log-likelihood Restrictions  LR-Test Results  
Model 1 2401.39 Unrestricted  Accepted 
Model 2 2371.09 Restricted 60.6> χ2(36,0.05)= 50 Rejected 
Model 3 2353 Restricted 47.45> χ2(9,0.05)= 16.9 Rejected 
Model 4 2365 Restricted 72.78> χ2(45,0.05)= 67.5 Rejected 
Model 5 2621.71 Unrestricted      
Model 6 2617.61 Restricted 8 < χ2(9,0.05)= 16.98 Accepted 
Model 7 2573.13 Restricted 63.6> χ2(27,0.05)= 40 Rejected 
Model 8 2586.14 Restricted 62.9> χ2(27,0.05)= 40 Rejected 
Model 9 2628.97 Unrestricted    Accepted 
Model 10 2618.54 Restricted 20.8> χ2(9,0.05)= 16.9 Rejected 
 
Model 1: Static Unrestricted Model; Model 2: Static Restricted Model with Symmetry; Model 3: Static 
Restricted Model with Homogeneity; Model 4: Static Restricted Model with Symmetry & 
Homogeneity;Model 5: Dynamic Unrestricted Model; Model 6: Dynamic Restricted Model with dummy 
;Model 7: Dynamic Restricted model with out three interest rates (wag wap wapr); Model 8: Dynamic 
Restricted Model with dummy and without three interest rates (wag wap wapr);Model  9: Dynamic Model 
with TTD and TDD separate with dummy ; Model 10: Dynamic Restricted Model  with TTD=TDD  with 
dummy. 
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The above analysis shows that, the model 1 as in equation (4.30) and model 9 as in 
equations (4.31) are the best models in the expected utility static and dynamic models, 
respectively. The dynamic model 9 is the extension of model 6. 
 
The best static model has poor quality as R2 and D-W statistics show in table 4.4.2 that 
the explanatory variables do not explain most of the dependent variables and they have 
also suffer from autocorrelation. 
 
Table 4.4.2: Statistics for Static Unrestricted Model 
 
EQNS R^2 D-W 
GOVTS 0.44 1.46 
PUBS 0.44 1.19 
PRIVS 0.46 0.94 
PERS 0.29 0.92 
OTHERS 0.55 1.24 
TRUST 0.89 1.78 
SUMB 0.46 1.29 
 FGS 0.25 0.53 
TBILLS 0.76 1.06 
 
As noted in table 4.4.1 the dynamic 9 is the best of the models, and it is that model whose 
results we present and analyze in what follow. The model 9 is consist of 10 choice items, 
14 non choice items (ten interest rates of choice items and 4 exogenous variables), 10 
lagged endogenous (dynamic effect) items and dummy. It is also superior to the best 
static unrestricted model 1, as it has high R2, no AR in the residuals, no ARCH in the 
residuals, and the covariance matrix of the residuals indicates that the residuals do not 
suffer from covariance. Thus we can say that the residuals are independently distributed 
(that is, i.i.d).  
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 Though they are dubious for models with lagged dependent variables, the DW stats from 
the FIML estimates in TSP suggest that there is no AR. LM test as one possible test for 
looking the AR shows that the different lags are statistically zero. Further, it does confirm 
that Fgs and Trust exhibit no AR up to lag 4 (give the LM tests and Chi-square 
probability), but other 7 residuals' series there is evidence of some AR up to lag 4, 
especially for Govt, Pubs, Pers and Sumb. Table 4.4.3 shows the correlogram test with 
lag length 7 confirms almost all equations are free of AR and ARCH in our dynamic 
unrestricted model 9. 
 
Table 4.4.3: Correlogram Test at lag 7 
GOVTS  Q-Stat 0.248 0.543 4.174 5.284 5.290 5.292 6.580 
   Prob [0.618] [0.762] [0.243] [0.259] [0.382] [0.507] [0.474] 
PUBS  Q-Stat 2.019 2.816 2.831 2.871 4.648 4.952 8.586 
   Prob [0.155] [0.245] [0.418] [0.580] [0.460] [0.550] [0.284] 
PRIVS  Q-Stat 1.070 1.725 2.140 2.331 2.524 2.524 2.526 
   Prob [0.301] [0.422] [0.544] [0.675] [0.773] [0.866] [0.925] 
PERS  Q-Stat 12.174 18.509 24.457 27.208 27.232 29.664 30.097 
   Prob [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
OTHERS  Q-Stat 0.086 0.145 0.225 11.938 11.946 12.479 12.569 
   Prob [0.769] [0.930] [0.974] [0.018] [0.036] [0.052] [0.083] 
TRUST  Q-Stat 0.245 1.159 1.414 1.429 1.432 1.451 1.452 
   Prob [0.621] [0.560] [0.702] [0.839] [0.921] [0.963 [0.984] 
SUMB  Q-Stat 7.663 10.806 10.864 11.265 11.311 11.935 11.938 
   Prob [0.006] [0.005] [0.012] [0.024] [0.046] [0.063] [0.103] 
FGS  Q-Stat 1.208 1.704 1.750 1.753 1.861 2.001 2.364 
   Prob [0.272] [0.426] [0.626] [0.781] [0.868] [0.920] [0.937] 
TBILLS  Q-Stat 1.279 1.420 1.470 1.721 1.734 2.499 2.533 
   Prob [0.258] [0.492] [0.689] [0.787] [0.885] [0.869] [0.925] 
 
 
Further, we have to see whether or not each of the 9 series of residuals is normally 
distributed. The J-Bera test suggests that Fgs, Pers, Pubs, Sumb and Tbills are: the other 4 
are not. Those 4 suffer from outliers (extreme kurtosis); without which they would be 
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normally distributed. We say all of this because strictly the use of FIML assumes that all 
residuals are normally distributed and are also independently distributed.  
 
Finally, our best dynamic unrestricted model 9 is also stable. As discussed earlier, the 
characteristics roots of Z should lie between zero and unity. The dynamic system 
equation (4.23) would be stable if dominant root of the characteristic equation lies inside 
the complex unit circle. It can be seen from Table 4.4.4 that all eigenvalues are less than 
1 in absolute value.  
 
Table 4.4.4: Eigenvalues of the System’s Dynamic Matrix  
0.8620 + 0.1110i 
0.6069 - 0.3476i 
0.3443 + 0.0753i 
0.6069 + 0.3476i 





0.3443 - 0.0753i 
 
Where as i is the imaginary number. So the multiplier effects will have a cyclical path for 







4.4.1: Return on the Interest rate Matrix: 
We employed ten rates of return in our dynamic model analysis. To repeat this for easy 
reference these are: WAG, weighted average rate of return on loans provided by 
scheduled banks to the Govt. sector; WAP, weighted average rate of return on loans 
provided by scheduled banks to the Public sector; WAPR, weighted average rate of return 
on loans provided by scheduled banks to the Private sector; WAPL, weighted average 
rate of return on loans provided by scheduled banks to the Personal Sector; WAOH, 
weighted average rate of return on loans provided by scheduled banks to the Other sector; 
WAT, weighted average rate of return on loans provided by scheduled banks to the Trust 
fund and non-profit organisation ; CMR, bank rate charged by the state bank of Pakistan;  
GBYLD, expected rate of return on Federal Govt. Securities; SIXMTB, expected rate of 
return on treasury bills; INFL, is the inflation rate which is used as rate of return on cash 
holding. The estimated co-efficient on these rates are shown in table 4.4.5. 
 
Given the aggregation condition implied from the balance sheet constraint, we have 
dropped the cash equation from the system of demand equations. To obtain the interest 








Table 4.4.5: Estimated Impact Response: Rate of Return Variables. 
EQNS WAG WAP WAPR WAPL WAOH WAT CMR GBYLD SIXMTBR INFLN 
GOVTS 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0012 0.002 0.0011 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0023 0.0779 
  [0.252] [-0.112] [-0.145] [0.697] [1.01] [0.599] [0.345] [0.171] [-1.11] [1.01] 
PUBS 0.002 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0013 0.0006 0.001 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0656 
  [1.05] [0.0852] [-0.34] [-1.7]*** [-0.82] [0.382] [0.617] [-0.982] [-0.972] [-1.04] 
PRIVS -0.0005 -0.0036 0.0015 0.0045 -0.0021 -0.0009 0.0036 -0.0001 0.0019 0.0179 
  [-0.15] [-0.621] [0.258] [1.78]*** [-0.74] [-0.334] [1.22] [-0.04] [0.615] [0.161] 
PERS -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0016 0.0008 -0.072 
  [-1.51] [-0.726] [0.688] [-0.150] [-0.924] [1.35] [0.496] [-1.33] [0.622] [-1.49] 
OTHERS 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0004 0 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0091 
  [0.242] [-0.764] [1.07] [-4.19]* [-0.915] [1.60] [-0.016] [1.12] [-1.52] [-0.932] 
TRUST -0.0003 0.00032 -2E-05 0.00003 -4E-05 -1E-05 7E-05 0.00005 -0.00002 -0.0009 
  [-4.6]* [2.53]** [-0.173] [0.594] [-0.616] [-0.113] [1.04] [0.817] [-0.248] [-0.362] 
SUMB -0.0024 -0.00258 0.0028 0.00382 0.00219 0.00208 0.006 0.00133 -0.00483 -0.0032 
  [-1.11] [-0.690] [0.751] [2.34]** [1.20] [1.19] [3.15]* [0.715] [-2.46]** [-0.04] 
 FGS 0.0005 -0.0067 0.0009 0.0005 0.0012 0.004 -0.0005 0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0727 
  [0.233] [-2.00]** [0.274] [0.351] [0.711] [2.54]** [-0.311] [2.04]** [-0.114] [-1.12] 
TBILLS -0.0029 0.0106 -0.0028 0.0015 0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0044 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0558 
  [-0.876] [1.93]*** [-0.508] [0.606] [0.228] [-1.05] [-1.57] [0.853] [-0.194] [0.524] 
CASH 0.0053 0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0079 -0.0012 -0.0061 -0.007 -0.0044 0.0073 0.0719 
 [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] 
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available 
because is not estimated directly. 
 
 
The elasticities for the rate of returns are given in table 4.4.6 
 
Table 4.4.6:  Rate of Return Elasticities 
 
EQNS WAG      WAP          WAPR     WAPL        WAOH      WAT      CMR      GBYLD       SIXMTBR        INFLN      
GOVTS 0.15 -0.1 -0.14 0.24 0.42 0.26 0.12 0.06 -0.42 0.07 
PUBS 0.43 0.05 -0.23 -0.42*** -0.24 0.12 0.15 -0.23 -0.26 -0.05 
PRIVS -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.1*** -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0 0.04 0 
PERS -0.48 -0.36 0.35 -0.03 -0.21 0.32 0.09 -0.24 0.13 -0.05 
OTHERS 0.37 -1.86 2.68 -3.88* -0.99 1.89 0 1.03 -1.54 -0.16 
TRUST -2.4* 2.04** -0.13 0.16 -0.23 -0.06 0.33 0.24 -0.1 -0.02 
SUMB -0.21 -0.2 0.22 0.25** 0.16 0.16 0.34* 0.08 -0.29** 0 
 FGS 0.05 -0.67** 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.4** 0.04 0.25** -0.02 -0.03 
TBILLS -0.42 1.43*** -0.39 0.17 0.08 -0.37 -0.4 0.24 -0.06 0.03 
CASH 0.56 0.43 -0.3 -0.68 -0.1 -0.61 -0.5 -0.32 0.57 0.03 
The star (*, **, ***) values of elasticities is based on table 4.4.5 
 
4.4.2: Results on the own-rate effects: 
Five out of ten own-rates bear the correct sign; these are for Federal Govt. Securities, 
lending to Govt., Public and Private sectors and Cash holding. Among the own rate co-
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efficient, the one corresponding to Federal Govt. Securities is only significant one. The 
best equation (in terms of the statistical reliability and signs of the coefficients) in table 
4.4.5 is that of Sumb and FGS. It is also noticed that most of the elasticities are very 
small in table 4.4.6. Among own rates elasticities, ten out of ten own elasticities bear the 
correct sign. The most sensitive assets to the changes in the interest rates are Others and 
Trust sectors. 
 
It is also noticeable that almost all of the own interest rates are very small which indicates 
the unresponsiveness of the choice assets to the changes in their own interest rates. So we 
can draw a conclusion that unless the monetary authority changes the interest rate 
sharply, there will be no major changes in the holdings of the assets as a result of the 
interest rate movements. 
 
Therefore, these outcomes clearly run counter to a priori expectations about the direction 
of own-rates effects for some of the assets, and most co-efficients are insignificant on the 
basis of asymptotic t-ratios. As noted by Mclaren and Upcher(1986), this is common 
feature of such an unrestricted model14. 
 
4.4.3: Results on the Cross-rate effects: 
With regard to off-diagonal rate of return’s coefficients, the results show that only ten out 
of ninety coefficients in the yields’ matrix are significantly different from zero: banks in 
Pakistan are not generally responsive to the movements in the yields on their assets.  
                                                          
14 See Kagigi & Ford (1994,2001) 
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4.4.4: Results on non-choice Assets: 
 
The results on the non-choice assets in table 4.4.7 show that fifteen coefficients out of 
forty-five directly estimated co-efficient are significantly different from zero. The 
exogenous balance sheet items appear to be the most likely candidates in explaining the 
portfolio behavior of schedule banks in Pakistan. 
 
Table 4.4.7: Estimated Impact Response: Exogenous Balance Sheet Items. 
EQNS PGS CAPRES TTD TDD DUMMY 
GOVTS -0.46502 0.86203 -0.11314 0.00406 -0.04077 
  [-0.872]     [2.20]**     [-1.50]    [0.051]    [-2.25]**    
PUBS -0.67136 -0.12098 0.10286 -0.0033 0.00289 
   [-1.54]    [-0.378]    [1.67]***    [-0.05]     [0.194]    
PRIVS 2.7308 -0.3811 -0.0991 0.06087 0.04942 
   [3.55]*    [-0.675]     [-0.910]    [0.530]    [1.89]***    
PERS -0.43285 -0.45066 0.05574 -0.0039 0.00701 
  [-1.30]     [-1.8]***    [1.18]    [-0.078]     [0.618]    
OTHERS -0.20621 0.04766 0.00205 0.00074 -0.0056 
  [-3.07]*     [0.968]    [0.216]    [0.0737]    [-2.45]**    
TRUST 0.01846 0.03633 0.00259 -0.0038 -0.00136 
   [1.08]     [2.90]*    [1.07]    [-1.51]    [-2.35]**    
SUMB 1.89552 -0.52108 -0.46003 -0.3041 0.0102 
   [3.78]*     [-1.42]    [-6.48]*    [-4.07]*     [0.598]    
 FGS 0.56753 0.03416 -0.06787 -0.0071 0.00203 
  [1.27]    [0.104]    [-1.07]    [-0.106]    [0.133] 
TBILLS 0.11256 -0.75789 0.24909 0.10558 0.04288 
   [0.153]    [-1.41]    [2.39]**     [0.963]    [1.71]***    
CASH -3.54943 1.25153 0.3278 0.15096 -0.0667 
  [NA]  [NA]  [NA]  [NA] [NA]  
: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available 













Table 4.4.8 Elasticities based on the Exogenous Assets 
 
EQNS PGS CAPRES TTD TDD 
GOVTS -0.17 0.92** -0.99 0.04 
PUBS -0.21 -0.11 0.77*** -0.02 
PRIVS 0.11* -0.04 -0.1 0.06 
PERS -0.14 -0.41*** 0.42 -0.03 
OTHERS -1.6* 1.08 0.38 0.14 
TRUST 0.19 1.07* 0.63 -0.93 
SUMB 0.23* -0.19 -1.35* -0.89* 
 FGS 0.09 0.02 -0.26 -0.03 
TBILLS 0.02 -0.47 1.28** 0.54 
CASH -0.56 0.57 1.24 0.57 
The star (*, **, ***) values of elasticities is based on table 4.4.7 
 
 
Above table 4.4.7 indicates the signs, magnitude and significance of the different 
explanatory variables. Table 4.4.8 shows the elasticities of the respective exogenous 
variables bear the correct sign. The major effects on the bank’s portfolios of changes in 
assets and liabilities are summarized as follows, 
 
• An increase in PGS (Provincial Govt. Securities) of 1 leads to a decrease in others 
sector of 0.20621, [elasticity,-1.6], and an increase in Banks borrowing of 1.89552, 
[elasticity, 0.23], and Private sector of 2.73080, [elasticity, 0.11]. 
• An increase in Capital and Reserve of 1 leads to a decrease in lending to the Personal 
sector 0.45066, [elasticity, -.41], and an increase in lending to the Trust & non Profit 
organization of 0.03633, [elasticity, 1.07], and Govt. sectors of 0.86203, [elasticity, 
0.92].  
• An increase in Total Time Deposit (liabilities) of 1 leads to a decrease in total 
borrowing of 0.46003, [elasticity,-1.35], and an increase in lending to the Public 
Sectors of 0.10286, [elasticity, 0.77], and Tbills of 0.24909, [elasticity, 1.28]. 
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• An increase in Total Demand Deposit (liabilities) of 1 produces a decline in total 
borrowing of 0.30412, [elasticity, -0.89]. 
 
It should be noted that none of the exogenous variables in the Federal Govt. Securities 
equation came out as significant. However, in the SUMB equation most of the exogenous 
variables are significantly different from zero at 1% and 10%. It is noticed that the 
highest elasticities are those associated with deposits. 
 
4.4.5: Results on the System’s Dynamic Matrix: 
Table 4.4.9 shows the system’s dynamic matrix (Z) (derived from the estimated system 
by using Cournot aggregation condition to obtain information on the cash equation)15. It 
explains the internal dynamics of the endogenous assets structure by specifying how 
current state of the assets holdings portfolio depends on its lagged state in the absence of 
external pressure. In particular, the pth row of Z gives indication how the current stock of 
the pth asset is influenced by changes in the structure of assets last period and the pth 
column of Z provides the rearrangement of the current assets structure induced by a 
partial change in the pth asset. The diagonal elements of Z may be loosely, if somewhat 
incorrectly, interpreted as own adjustment rates; the smaller in absolute value the pth 





                                                          
15 See Ford (1994 2001) 
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Table 4.4.9: Estimated System’s Dynamic Matrix (Z). 
EQNS GOVTS_1     PUBS_1    PRIVS_1     PERS_1    OTHERS_1     TRUST_1     SUMB_1     FGS_1       TBILLS_1    CASH_1     R^2  D-W  
GOVTS 0.43769 0.0927 0.1202 -0.092 0.129 -3.8683 -0.20545 0.12922 0.01777 -0.0586 0.60 2.1 
   [2.66]*    [0.541]    [1.12]     [-0.40]    [0.110]    [-1.22]     [-1.7]**    [1.29]    [0.186]    [-0.295]       
PUBS 0.42902 0.579 0.03589 0.29151 -0.20468 -0.0421 0.06225 -0.0221 -0.0067 -0.1991 0.76 2.5 
   [3.18]*     [4.13]*     [0.408]     [1.58]   [-0.213]    [-0.016]   [0.622]   [-0.269]    [-0.086]   [-1.23]       
PRIVS 0.16214 0.43396 0.6404 0.24913 0.46604 4.65582 0.02379 0.09782 0.21139 0.07002 0.73 2.29 
   [0.682]    [1.75]***   [4.13]*    [0.764]    [0.275]    [1.02]    [0.135]   [0.675]    [1.53]    [0.245]       
PERS -0.07762 -0.12633 0.15033 0.33258 1.4119 -1.5883 -0.04218 0.01845 -0.0062 0.17247 0.60 2.36 
  [-0.753]     [-1.18]    [2.23]**    [2.35]**   [1.92]***   [-0.800]    [-0.551]   [0.293]    [-0.104]    [1.39]       
OTHER 0.06999 0.01459 0.02056 0.03732 0.42382 0.40174 -0.03335 0.02135 -0.0023 -0.0319 0.80 1.71 
   [3.37]*    [0.676]     [1.52]     [1.31]   [2.87]*    [1.01]    [-2.17]**   [1.7]*** [-0.191]   [-1.28]       
TRUST 0.00674 0.00381 -0.00658 0.00164 -0.07194 0.7146 -0.00015 -0.0019 0.00835 0.01568 0.95 2.15 
  [1.28]    [0.695]     [-1.9]***   [0.226]   [-1.92]***   [7.04]*   [-0.0394]    [-0.61]    [2.73]*     [2.47]*       
SUMB 0.61569 0.727 0.51596 -0.0405 -0.77691 3.33264 -0.02991 0.47091 0.23133 0.12756 0.84 2.34 
   [3.97]*     [4.51]*    [5.10]*     [-0.19]    [-0.705]    [1.12]     [-0.260]   [4.98]*    [2.58]**    [0.684]       
 FGS 0.07536 -0.12638 0.03273 -0.2945 0.21163 3.28904 0.17288 0.81973 0.0674 -0.1401 0.83 2.37 
  [0.545]    [-0.880]    [0.363]    [-1.55]   [0.215]    [1.24]    [1.69]***   [9.73]*   [0.842]    [0.843]       
TBILLS -0.02614 -0.02773 -0.24237 0.29938 -0.94137 1.03347 -0.05756 -0.2631 0.45277 0.17574 0.88 2.28 
  [-0.115]    [-0.117]     [-1.63]    [0.961]   [-0.582]    [0.236]   [-0.341]   [-1.9]** [3.44]*    [0.643]       
CASH -1.69288 -1.57063 -1.26713 -0.7846 -0.64748 -7.9286 0.10968 -1.2703 -0.9738 -0.1318 NA  NA  
  [NA]  [NA] [NA] [NA]  [NA]  [NA]  [NA] [NA]  [NA]  [NA]     
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available because is 




The elasticities for the system dynamic matrix Z is given in table 4.4.10 
 
 
Table 4.4.10: Elasticities for the System Dynamic Matrix (Z) 
 
EQNS GOVS_1 PUBS_1 PRIVS_1 PERS_1 OTHERS_1 TRUST_1 SUMB_1 FGS_1 TBILLS_1 CASH_1 
GOVTS 0.335* -0.242 2.181 -0.35 0.212 -0.208 -0.466** 0.237 -0.024 -0.602 
PUBS 0.197* 0.922* -0.356 0.354 -0.054 0.047 0.1 0.057 -0.103 -0.167 
PRIVS 0.001 0.06*** 0.831* -0.005 0.008 -0.001 -0.069 0.054 0.025 0.069 
PERS -0.066 -0.098 0.532** 0.372** 0.063*** -0.002 -0.078 0.036 -0.008 0.234 
OTHERS 0.402* 0.364 0.628 0.379 0.557* 0.114 -1.431** 0.759*** 0.022 -0.82 
TRUST 0.186 0.062 -0.30*** 0.213 0.013*** 0.891* -0.219 -0.036 -0.002* 0.201* 
SUMB -0.001* 0.1* 0.367* -0.205 0.002 -0.001 0.408 0.163* 0.066** 0.016 
FGS -0.003 -0.064 -0.047 -0.171 -0.009 0.02 0.203*** 0.897* 0.044 0.106 
TBILLS 0.255 -0.168 1.446 0.589 0.044 -0.263 -0.533 -0.83** 0.394* 0.473 
CASH -0.057 0.027 0.745 -0.05 0.023 -0.03 -0.068 0.198 0.019 0.227 
The star (*, **, ***) values of elasticities is based on table 4.4.9 
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From the above table, we find that out of hundred coefficients of the lagged endogenous 
variables twenty-seven are significantly different from zero. It is also noticeable that all 
assets except SUMB do respond to their own disequilibrium. It is also noted from the 
elasticity table that the greatest own disequilibrium response is in Pubs sector loans 
which also react most to disequilibrium in CASH holdings. Further, some observations 
can be made on the structure of the system’s dynamic matrix, 
 
• The largest (in absolute value) off-diagnal elements of the dynamic matrix are found 
in the column relating to SUMB and CASH. The rows relating to lagged quantities of 
these two instruments are much smaller in absolute value. This suggest that changes 
in the lagged assets structure strongly affect SUMB and CASH holdings, but changes 
in these instruments have only small impact on other portfolio assets. Similarly, 
changes in the assets structure generate strong pressure on SUMB and cash holding, 
but these asset transfer very little of this pressure back into the rest of the portfolio, 
which is consistent with the view that SUMB and CASH holding as buffering 
function in asset structure. 
• The magnitudes in the rows relating to lagged quantities of loans to OTHERS sector 
and TRUST sector substantially exceed magnitudes in the columns associated with 
their current stocks. This suggests that changes in these items transmit substantial 
adjustment pressure to the remaining items in the portfolio but they, in turn, absorb 




As discussed earlier in section 4.2, dynamic matrix Z= I-L, where as L (L=I-Z) is the speed of 
adjustment matrix which is the “true” adjustment costs .Table 4.4.11 shows the estimated value 
of matrix L for illustration. 
 
Table 4.4.11: L – Matrix for “True” Adjustment Costs 
EQNS GOVTS_1   PUBS_1    PRIVS_1   PERS_1    OTHERS_1   TRUST_1   SUMB_1   FGS_1       TBILLS_1   CASH_1    
GOVTS 0.5623 -0.0927 -0.1202 0.0920 -0.1290 3.8683 0.2055 -0.1292 -0.0178 0.0586 
PUBS -0.4290 0.4210 -0.0359 -0.2915 0.2047 0.0421 -0.0623 0.0221 0.0067 0.1991 
PRIVS -0.1621 -0.4340 0.3596 -0.2491 -0.4660 -4.6558 -0.0238 -0.0978 -0.2114 -0.0700 
PERS 0.0776 0.1263 -0.1503 0.6674 -1.4119 1.5883 0.0422 -0.0185 0.0062 -0.1725 
OTHER -0.0700 -0.0146 -0.0206 -0.0373 0.5762 -0.4017 0.0334 -0.0214 0.0023 0.0319 
TRUST -0.0067 -0.0038 0.0066 -0.0016 0.0719 0.2854 0.0002 0.0019 -0.0084 -0.0157 
SUMB -0.6157 -0.7270 -0.5160 0.0405 0.7769 -3.3326 1.0299 -0.4709 -0.2313 -0.1276 
 FGS -0.0754 0.1264 -0.0327 0.2945 -0.2116 -3.2890 -0.1729 0.1803 -0.0674 0.1401 
TBILLS 0.0261 0.0277 0.2424 -0.2994 0.9414 -1.0335 0.0576 0.2631 0.5472 -0.1757 
CASH 1.6929 1.5706 1.2671 0.7846 0.6475 7.9286 -0.1097 1.2703 0.9738 1.1318 
 
 
4.4.6: The Overall Evaluation of the dynamic Model: Explanatory and Predictive 
Performance: 
This section is relates to the estimated equations and their properties of residuals. We are 
going to present fitted and actual values for the equations, the stability of the coefficients 
over the estimation period using recursive graphics. The fitted values and actual values of 
the estimated equations for all endogenous variables for the whole sample period 
(1964:2-2005:1) indicate that most of the variables, have no divergence between actual 










































































































































































































































According to the recursive graphic analysis as reflected by the one step ahead for 
residuals, we find that the results are good (See Figures in Appendix A). Based on 
stability tests indicate that results for most of the variables are good except lending to the 
trust sector. However, we can argue that the results of this dynamic model still much 
better than the stability tests that produced by static model (See Figures in Appendix A). 
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4.4.7: Impact Effects of Exogenous Variables on the Pakistani Banks’ Portfolios: 
In this section we see the impact of the exogenous variables on the portfolio of the 
Pakistani banks. First of all, we look at some of the effects caused by rates of return on; 
Federal Govt. Securities, Treasury Bills, Banks’ borrowings, lending to the Govt. Pubs, 
Privs, Pers, Others and Trust sectors. Then, we analyse to discuss the impact (current) 
and interim effects of the exogenous variables on the portfolio of the commercial banks 
in Pakistan presented in the table (4.4.12). 
 
Table 4.4.1 Proximate Impact Effects of Ceteris Paribus Unit Changes in Exogenous 
Variables on the Portfolio of Pakistani Banks 
Exogenous       Effects on the Choice Set (millions of rupees)    
Variables*          
EQUNS GOVTS PUBS PRIVS PERS OTHERS TRUST SUMB  FGS TBILLS CASH 
WAG              0.0006 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0029 0.0053 
WAP             -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0067 0.0106 0.0043 
WAPR            -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0015 0.0017 0.0005 -0.00002 0.0028 0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0029 
WAPL             0.0012 -0.0025 0.0045 -0.0002 -0.0009 0.00003 0.0038 0.0005 0.0015 -0.0079 
WAOH            0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.00004 0.0022 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0012 
WAT             0.0011 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0016 0.0004 -0.00001 0.0021 0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0061 
CMR             0.0007 0.0010 0.0036 0.0006 0.0000 0.00007 0.0060 -0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0070 
GBYLD           0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0003 0.00005 0.0013 0.0034 0.0023 -0.0044 
SIXMTBR       -0.0023 -0.0017 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.00002 -0.0048 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0073 
INFLN         0.0779 -0.0656 0.0179 -0.0720 -0.0091 -0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0727 0.0558 0.0719 
PGS          -0.4650 -0.6714 2.7308 -0.4329 -0.2062 0.0185 1.8955 0.5675 0.1126 -3.5494 
CAPRES      0.8620 -0.1210 -0.3811 -0.4507 0.0477 0.0363 -0.5211 0.0342 -0.7579 1.2515 
TTD -0.1131 0.1029 -0.0991 0.0557 0.0021 0.0026 -0.4600 -0.0679 0.2491 0.3278 
TDD 0.0041 -0.0033 0.0609 -0.0039 0.0007 -0.0038 -0.3041 -0.0071 0.1056 0.1510 
DUMMY -0.0408 0.0029 0.0494 0.0070 -0.0056 -0.0014 0.0102 0.0020 0.0429 -0.0667 
*Unit changes in the interest rate are 1%. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent change in the interest rate on Federal Govt. securities 
(GBYLD) seems to cause an increase in the bank borrowing by a small fraction (0.0013). 
Further, the same percent change would cause an increase in the holding of the Federal 
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Govt securities by very tiny percentage of 0.0034%. On the other hand, such an increase 
produces a rise in the holdings of treasury bills by 0.0023 percent and loans to the Govt 
sector by 0.0003 percent, the Others sector by 0.0003 percent, and the Trust sector by 
0.00005 percent. However, such an increase leads to a decrease Pers sector loans 0.0016 
percent and Pubs sector loans by 0.0016 percent. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the rate of return on Treasury Bills (SIXMTB) 
would produce an immediate unexpected decrease in the demand for Treasury bills and 
lending to the Pers and Privs sectors. However, such an increase would lead to a decline 
in lending to the Govts, Others, Pubs and Trust sectors. Further, this increase leads to 
decreased demand for Federal Govt. securities, banks’ borrowings and, surprisingly, 
increase demand for Cash holding. So, we can conclude here that banks invest more in 
Treasury bills, Private and Personal sectors, as they are profitable opportunities. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent change in cost of borrowing (CMR) leads to a decrease in 
Cash holding and to an increase in demand for lending to Govts, Pubs, Privs, Pers, 
Others, and Trust sectors. We also observe that such an increase leads to a decrease in the 
demand for Federal Govt. securities and Treasury Bills .Further this increase will lead to 
an increase in the demand for funds by borrowings. This is understandable on the basis 
that the banks found it is profitable to borrow at specified rate and lend it on profitably to 
the different sectors. This is confirmed by the fact that an increase in this rate would 
produce almost an equal increase in loans to the different sectors. However, such actions 
are incapable of restraining the credit expansion by the authorities since any increase in 
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the bank rate will generate similar direction and “quantity” of both borrowing from the 
central bank and lending to the different sectors.  
 
A ceteris paribus one percent change in the rate of return on Govt sectors loans (WAG) 
leads to an immediate increase in demand for Federal Govt securities and to an increase 
in lending to Govts, Pubs, and Others sectors and Cash holding. However, such an 
increase leads to a decrease in demand for Treasury bills, banks’ borrowing, lending to 
the Privs, Pers and Trust sectors.  
 
A ceteris paribus one percent change in the rate of return on Public sector loans (WAP) 
leads to an increase in demand for Treasury bills and to an increase in lending to the 
Public and Trust sectors. It is also observed that this increase leads to a decrease in 
demand for Federal Govt. securities, borrowing and lending to the Govt, Privs, Pers and 
Others sectors. This increase leads to an increase in Cash holding. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the interest rate of return on Private sectors 
loans (WAPR) would produce immediate decrease in Cash holding and to an increase in 
demand for Federal Govt securities and lending to the Privs, Pers and Others sectors. This 
increase also decreases demand for Treasury bills and lending to the Govts, Public and 
Trust sectors. Further, this increase will lead to increase in the demand for borrowing for 
banks to make profitable investment in different sectors of the economy; in this case, 
these are Privs, Pers and Others sectors. 
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A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the rate of return of Personal sector (WAPL) 
leads to an immediate increase in the demand for Federal Govt. securities, Treasury Bills 
and lending to the Govt, Privs and Trust sectors. Unexpectedly, such an increase leads to 
produce an immediate decrease in Pers sector. Again, this increase leads to decrease Cash 
holding and an increase in demand for banks’ borrowing (discussed above the 
relationship between borrowing and investment). On the other hand, such an increase 
leads to a decrease in lending to the Pubs, Pers and Others sectors. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the rate of return on the Other sector loans 
(WAOH) leads to an immediate increase in the demand of Federal Govt securities, 
Treasury bills and Govt sector. Unexpectedly, this increase leads to decrease in lending to 
Others sector. Surprisingly, such an increase will lead to an increase in demand for bank 
borrowing and a decrease in demand for Cash holding. As mentioned above, this is 
justifiable as banks found it is profitable to borrow from the specified rate and lend it 
profitably to the Govt. sector. This increase also leads to a decrease in lending to the 
Pubs, Privs, Pers,Other and Trust sectors.   
 
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the rate of return on Trust sectors loans (WAT) 
leads to an immediate decrease in Cash holding and to an increase in the demand for 
Federal Govt. securities and lending to the Govts, Pubs, Pers and Others sectors. Also this 
increase leads to decrease in the demand for the Treasury bills and lending to the Privs 
and Trust sectors. Further, such an increase leads to an increase in the demand for banks 
borrowing. 
 123
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in the inflation rate (INFL) leads to an immediate 
decrease in  cash holdings, Treasury bills and lending to the Govt., and Privs sectors. The 
increase in inflation also leads an increase in Federal Govt. securities and lending to the 
Pubs, Pers, Others and Trust sectors. In addition, such an increase leads to a decrease in 
banks’ borrowing. 
 
Now, we turn to see the impacts arising from a change in deposits. A ceteris paribus one 
million/rupees change in the deposits (TTD) would lead to an increase 0.2491 
million/rupees in the Tbills holdings by the commercial banks. Similarly, such increase in 
deposits would produce an increase in lending to the Pubs, Pers, Other, Trust sectors by 
0.1029, 0.0557, 0.0021 and 0.0026 millions respectively. However, this increase in 
deposits will decrease the demand for Fgs by 0.0679 millions, borrowing by 0.4600 
millions, lending to Govts sector by 0.1131 millions and lending to the Privs sector by 
0.0991 millions. In this case, we see this increase leads to an increase the demand for 
cash holding and a decrease in banks borrowing. 
 
A ceteris paribus one percent increase in TDD leads to an immediate decrease in, Pubs, 
Pers and Trust sector loans. This increase also leads to a decline in Fgs and bank 
borrowing. On the other hand this increase in TDD also increases the demand for 
Treasury Bills, lending to the Govt, Privs and Others sectors. Further, this increase leads 




4.4.8: Interim Effects of Exogenous Variables s on the Pakistani Banks’ Portfolio: 
In this section, rather than considering the impact of all of the exogenous variables, we 
are selecting those that can be influenced by the central bank. These are: Cmr, Gbyld, 
Sixmtbr, TTD and TDD. It is studying these multiplier impacts we are looking at the 
ceteris paribus impacts that changes in monetary conditions, engineered by the State 
Bank of Pakistan, have on the behaviour of the banks.The interim multiplier effects for 
exogenous variables on the set of choice assets are shown in figure (4.4.7), where time is 
on horizontal axis (30 period). They all exhibit decreasing amplitude around zero over 
time since the model is stable. 
 
We can say that Sixmtbr is more effective in influencing the scheduled commercial banks 
in Pakistan for interim effects towards choice assets since they diffuse much longer than 
Gbyld and Cmr  ( after about 25 period for Sixmtbr, around 24 period for Gbyld and 15 
period for Cmr) . It illustrates that all of the interim effects of Gbyld on choice assets still 
last towards the end of the observation. On the other hand, we notice that the interim 
effects of TDD is more effective in influencing commercial banks behaviour towards 
choice assets since TDD interim effects last longer ( about 25 period) than TTD interim 
effects that diffuse just after 20 periods to become zero towards the end of the period. 
The reason behind this might be that the ratio of TDD that might be bigger than TTD to 
total deposits in commercial banks; this evidence might be caused by the Pakistani 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.9: Total Effects of Exogenous Variables on the Pakistani banks’ Portfolio: 
The previous section considered impact and interim multiplier effects of selected 
exogenous variables, and now we present their cumulative impacts after they have all 
ceased, namely, their long-run effects. These are given in 4.4.13. 
 
Table 4.4.13 Total Effects of Ceteris Paribus Unit Changes in Exogenous Variables 
on the Portfolio of Pakistani Banks 
Exogenous       Effects on the Choice Set (millions of rupees)   
Variables*         
EQNS GOVTS PUBS PRIVS PERS OTHERS TRUST SUMB  FGS TBILLS 
CMR             0.02182 0.02807 -0.0087 -0.0098 0.00287 -0.00235 0.016433 0.014702 -0.0289 
GBYLD           -0.02323 -0.0390 0.00664 0.0121 -0.00272 0.002407 -0.0225 -0.00083 0.02976 
SIXMTBR       -0.05082 -0.4104 -0.0304 -0.0631 -0.03068 0.022263 -0.10083 0.093597 0.26315 
TTD 0.60159 0.97034 0.23003 -0.1519 0.07194 -0.06553 0.152843 -0.57859 -0.3411 
TDD -0.00104 0.05929 0.05597 -0.0223 -0.01071 -0.00822 0.042252 -0.01828 0.01099 
*Unit changes in the interest rate are 1%. 
 
Comparing Tables (4.4.12) and (4.4.13), there are alterations of sign between 
corresponding impact and total multipliers relating to several variables. The effect of the 
variable lending to Treasury Bills has the correct sign under the total multiplier effect.  
 
A major reason for these outcomes could be the fact that the monetary authorities relied 
mainly on direct controls as a means of influencing the portfolio behaviour of the banks 
during most of the periods. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the response of the banks to 
these kinds of policies was negative, especially in respect of the interest rates. 
 
No clear conclusion emerges as to the banks’ preference between the different sources of 
funds. However, it seems that the banks are more responsive in applying funds to more 
 131
liquid assets than they are to non-liquid portfolios. The results also confirm the 
importance of banks’ capital (Pringle; 1974) in terms of banks’ reaction towards choice 
asset. 
 
4.5: The Aggregation of Loans: A Comparison Between The Best Disaggregated 
And Aggregated Model.  
In the aggregated model, we have aggregated all loans and used the notation for 
aggregated loans in the table is “Loan” which is summation of Govt, Pubs, Pers, Privs, 
Others and Trust sectors loans and remaining items are as it is. The basic idea is to see if 
there is a loss of information in explaining the items in the portfolio, and hence the total 
portfolio, in aggregating all loans, implying that they are perfect substitutes for the banks.  
We have estimated various dynamic aggregated expected utility models. These are: 
aggregated dynamic unrestricted model, aggregated dynamic restricted model with 
homogeneity, aggregated dynamic restricted model with symmetry and dynamic 
restricted model with homogeneity and symmetry. The analysis of models is given in 
table 4.5.1. 
 4.5.1: Analysis of Aggregated EU Models 
 Models Log-likelihood Restrictions LR-Test Results  
Model 1 864.342 Unrestricted     
Model 2 863.942 Homogeneity 0.8 < χ2(4,0.05)= 9.48        Accepted 
Model 3 862.125 Symmetry 4.43 < χ2(6,0.05)= 12.59        Accepted 
Model 4 861.755 
Homogeneity & 
Symmetry 5.17< χ2(10,0.05)= 18.30        Accepted 
Model 1: Dynamic Unrestricted Model; Model 2: Dynamic Restricted model with Homogeneity; Model 2: 





We find aggregated expected utility dynamic model with symmetry & homogeneity 
restrictions wins in Table 4.5.1 and this dynamic model is stable as well. It can be seen 
from Table 4.5.2 that all eigenvalues are less than 1 in absolute value.  
 
4.5.2: Eigenvalues of the System’s Dynamic Matrix  
 
0.723848 +  0.0489878i 





We have already presented tables and explained disaggregated model in previous section, 
we also present results for the best aggregated model in table 4.5.3, which shows that the 
behaviour of the expected utility aggregated model with symmetry and homogeneity 
restrictions is similar to the disaggregated model. Here, the best equation in terms of 
significance is sumb equation. 
  
Table 4.5.3: Aggregated Expected Utility Dynamic Model (with Symmetry &  
Homogeneity Restrictions) 
EQNS  WARRA CMR GBYLD SIXMTBR INFLN PGS TDD TTD CAPRES DUMMY 
LOANS -0.00688 0.00372 -0.00039 0.00070 0.00285 0.37029 0.06732 
-
0.01771 0.54623 -0.01801 
  [-0.59] [1.11] [-0.13] [0.09]   [0.22] [0.29] [-0.08] [0.64] [-0.42] 
SUMB -0.00372 -0.0032 0.00077 0.00237 0.00380 -0.7555 0.25647 0.41907 0.06726 0.01240 
  [1.11] [1.28] [-0.34] [-1.02]   [0.91] [-1.83] [-2.69]* [-0.08] [-0.33] 
FGS -0.00039 -0.0008 0.00164 0.00070 
-
0.00118 0.21907 0.04867 
-
0.03773 0.42579 -0.00871 
  [-0.13] [-0.34] [0.49] [0.24]   [0.23] [0.34] [-0.22] [0.39] [-0.19] 
TBILLS 0.00070 -0.0024 0.00070 0.00008 0.00090 
-
0.59320 0.17799 0.34076 -0.80967 0.04245 
  [0.09] [-1.02] [0.24] [0.02]   [-0.68] [0.73] [1.47] [-0.66] [0.90] 






0.70439 -0.22961 -0.02813 
  [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] 
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available because is not 
estimated directly. 
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Table 4.5.4:  Dynamic Matrix (Z) for Aggregated Expected Utility Model with 
Symmetry & Homogeneity Restrictions 
EQNS  LOANS_1 SUMB_1 FGS_1 TBILLS_1 CASH_1 R^2 D-W 
LOANS 0.95828 -0.14104 0.18160 0.26591 0.02100 0.73 2.51 
  [3.64]* [-0.26] [0.51] [0.94] [0.04]     
SUMB -0.44409 -0.16322 -0.37638 -0.28048 -0.20227 0.72 1.91 
  [2.54]* [0.75] [2.18]** [1.58] [0.51]     
FGS -0.09505 0.25155 0.80408 0.08123 0.01316 0.78 1.95 
  [-0.38] [1.01] [3.83]* [0.42] [0.02]     
TBILLS -0.13934 -0.12406 -0.31288 0.36347 0.07009 0.86 2.02 
  [-0.58] [-0.34] [-1.25] [1.64] [0.11]     
CASH -0.2798 0.17677 -0.29643 -0.43013 0.09802 [NA] [NA] 
  [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA]     
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available because is not 
estimated directly. 
 
To see the comparison between expected utility disaggregated and aggregated models, we 
plot different forecasting and other statistics below. 
 
 
Table 4.5.5: EU Disaggregated forecasting table (1964:1 to 2005:1) 
 
 EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Theil I Coeff  Bias Prop    Var Prop  Cov Prop  R^2 
LOANS 0.022710 0.01818 3.046623 0.019108 0.000006 0.083217 0.916777 0.77 
GOVT 0.0139 0.0104 48.5845 0.1376 0.0000 0.1194 0.8806 0.6 
PUBS 0.1136 0.0085 16.6517 0.0984 0.0000 0.0664 0.9336 0.76 
PRIVS 0.0200 0.0154 3.6826 0.0236 0.0000 0.0592 0.9408 0.73 
PERS 0.0087 0.0069 15.1026 0.0779 0.0000 0.1433 0.8567 0.6 
OTHERS 0.0017 0.0012 131.1107 0.2049 0.0000 0.0569 0.9431 0.8 
TRUST 0.0004 0.0003 35.2929 0.0829 0.0000 0.0116 0.9884 0.95 
SUMB 0.0131 0.0101 7.6548 0.0462 0.0002 0.0232 0.9766 0.84 
FGS 0.0116 0.0085 8.2808 0.0532 0.0000 0.0416 0.9584 0.83 
TBILLS 0.0191 0.0151 92.8433 0.0991 0.0000 0.0320 0.9680 0.88 
 
 
Table 4.5.6: EU Aggregated forecasting table (1964:1 to 2005:1) 
 
  EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Thiel I Coeff  Bias Prop Var Prop Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.02407 0.01901 3.186498 0.020254 0.000013 0.037189 0.962798 0.73 
SUMB 0.01646 0.013145 10.15622 0.058882 0.000718 0.03996 0.959322 0.72 
FGS 0.01341 0.009503 9.05565 0.061278 0.000023 0.052797 0.94718 0.78 




Table 4.5.7: EU Disaggregated forecasting table (1964:1 to 2008:1) 
 
 EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE 
Theil I 
Coeff  Bias Prop     Var Prop  Cov Prop  R^2 
LOANS 0.015997 0.012817 2.227711 0.013685 0.000026 0.069861 0.930113 0.73  
GOVT 0.0138 0.0104 47.9957 0.1408 0 0.1415 0.8585 0.60 
PUBS 0.0111 0.0083 16.4101 0.0979 0 0.066 0.934 0.77 
PRIVS 0.021 0.0161 3.8556 0.0246 0 0.0509 0.9491 0.70 
PERS 0.0109 0.0082 16.4993 0.092 0.0012 0.2709 0.7279 0.59 
OTHERS 0.0021 0.0014 128.179 0.2502 0.0185 0.0441 0.9374 0.69 
TRUST 0.0005 0.0003 33.4408 0.0902 0.0002 0.0115 0.9882 0.94 
SUMB 0.0138 0.0105 8.2319 0.0498 0.0021 0.0005 0.9974 0.83 
FGS 0.0117 0.0087 9.284 0.0549 0.002 0.0016 0.9964 0.86 
TBILLS 0.0201 0.0158 86.6555 0.0999 0.0002 0.0264 0.9735 0.87 
 
 
Table 4.5.8: EU Aggregated forecasting table (1964:1 to 2008:1) 
 
EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Thiel I Coeff  Bias Prop Var Prop Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.029242 0.02332 3.931399 0.025321 0.241236 0.009393 0.749371 0.67 
SUMB 0.05698 0.029666 26.05439 0.214374 0.199656 0.290126 0.510217 0.70  
FGS 0.021282 0.01662 15.13585 0.108554 0.551746 0.145421 0.302832 0.81  





Above forecasting statistics show that almost all equations with forecasting point of 
views are best except (a) Others and Tbills in disaggregated model for 1964:1 2008:1 (b) 
Tbills in aggregated model for 1964:1 2008:1 (c) Others and Tbills in disaggregated 
model for 1964:1 2005:1 and (d) Tbills for aggregated model for 1964:1 2005:1, as they 
have very high percentage of MAPE. Further, if you compare the forecasting statistics for 
disaggregated and aggregated models for the same period, we find there is no big 
difference among similar equations. 
 
The equation for a given asset ratio, that provides the greater R-squared must have the 
lowest bias proportion. R squared values tell us the disaggregated model wins aggregated 
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model for the in-sample period 1964:1 2005:1.Disaggregated model explains Loans 
better (0.77 against 0.73); Sumb better (0.84 against 0.72); and FGS better (0.83 against 
0.78), and Tbills better (0.88 against 0.86). For the whole sample: (a) for Loans, R-
squared is 0.73 for the disaggregated model and 0.67 for aggregated model; (b) for sumb, 
R-squared is 0.83 for disaggregated model and 0.70 for the aggregated model; (c) for 
FGS, R-squared is 0.86 for disaggregated model and 0.81 for the aggregated model; and 
(c) for Tbills, the R-squared is 0.87 for the disaggregated model and 0.86 for the 
aggregated model. In sums, we can say that the disaggregated models are superior in both 







To investigate the portfolio behaviour of scheduled commercial banks of Pakistan, we 
have estimated various disaggregated static and dynamic models. We have found that the 
static unrestricted model is the best model among all potential static models on the basis 
of Log likelihood values but it has poor quality as R-squared and D-W statistics show 
that the explanatory variables do not explain most of the dependent variables and they 
have also suffer from autocorrelation. Therefore, to explain the banking behavior of 
Pakistani commercial banks, we have chosen dynamic model with separate total time 
deposit and total demand deposit with dummy. As this dynamic model wins over all the 
potential dynamic models in the sense of Log likelihood values and it has high R-squared 
and good residual properties. 
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We have also estimated various dynamic aggregated expected utility models in which we 
have aggregated all loans i.e Govt, Pubs, Pers, Privs, Others and Trust sectors loans, and 
remaining items are as it is. The basic idea is to see if there is a loss of information in 
explaining the items in the portfolio, and hence the total portfolio, in aggregating all 
loans, implying that they are perfect substitutes for the banks. We have also plotted 
different forecasting and other statistics to compare the best expected utility 
disaggregated and aggregated models within the sample period and out of the sample 

























Graphs: The Recursive Analysis 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 






In this chapter our study will focus on the banking sector portfolio behaviour based on the 
safety first principle of A.D Roy (1952). Individuals and institutions design the portfolio 
primarily to avoid a disaster level of outcome occurring. Roy (1952) argued that “there is 
close resemblance between economic life and navigation in poorly charted waters or 
manoeuvres in a hostile jungle. Decisions taken in practice are less concerned with whether a 
little more of this or of that will yield the largest net increase in satisfaction than with 
avoiding known rocks of uncertain position or with deploying forces so that, if there is 
ambush round the next corner, total disaster is avoided”. In view of the above it is sensible to 
suppose that decision-makers are primarily interested in avoiding disaster or to secure safety. 
As a result, it is also sensible to suppose that investors/decision-makers is looking to 
minimise the probability of a portfolio return falling below a critical level; as Roy advocates.   
 
The principle of safety first in various forms has been applied to the optimal hedge ratio 
(OHR) – with the aim of reducing risk. As number of future contracts to buy to hedge against 
the movements of the return in the spot market and the effectiveness of a hedging strategy is 
measured by the extent to which it minimises risk and maximizes excess return 1 . The 
principal of safety first has also been applied to the theory of risk insurance industry, to the 
theory of the firm under price uncertainty and to the problem of revenue rising under 
                                                          
1 Prominent work on hedging can be seen in Cheung, Kwan and Yip (1990), Kolb and 
Okunev (1992,1993), Shailt (1995), Chen, Lee and Shrestha (2001) and Cotter and 
Hanly(2006)  
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uncertainty2. Such rules are important to commercial banks as well, as their main resources 
are deposit liabilities.  
 
In this chapter, we will explore the implications of applying the principle of safety first to the 
modelling of bank portfolio behaviour. Section 5.2 presents a brief description of the 
principle and its application and describes the bank’s optimal static and dynamic asset 
demand equations and derived under the principle which highly non-linear. Section 5.3 
discusses specification of the model, gives details of the econometric methodology employed 
and also provides the data analysis. In Section 5.4 the empirical results from applying the 
model to Pakistani banks are reported. Section 5.5 ,we estimate the best aggregated dynamic 
model, where all loans has been aggregated into one, and provide the comparison between the 
best disaggregated and best aggregated models. Section 5.6 provides the summary of the 
chapter. 
 
5.2: A Safety First Approach to Portfolio Behavior: 
Roy principle is a rule for decision making in the context of portfolio selection behavior 
under the uncertainty in which decision makers have in mind some disaster level of returns 
(profit) and they behave so as to minimize the probability of the target variable (profit) falling 
below this threshold of disaster D.. With every possible action, there is the expected value of 
the gross return μ which is not certain. Thus, there is a quantityσ  which is the standard error 
ofμ . 
 
                                                          
2 See Cramer (1930), Arzac (1976) and Dickinson, Driscoll and Ford (1984) respectively. 
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Further, mean returnμ  and its standard error σ are assumed to be known and can be obtained 
from the information about the past. For all feasible choice of action, given the values ofμ  
andσ , we have the efficient mean-variance frontier as 
(5.1) 0),( =μσf  
As the investor knows nothing about the precise probability of the final return being a 
predetermined disaster level of D or less, Roy (1952) applied Tchebycheff inequality which 
permits us to place an upper bound on the probability of disaster. Tchebycheff’s inequality 






σδμπ ≤≥−  
Namely, the probability that the random variable,π , will differ from its mean, μ , by more 
than a fixed number, δ , is less than or equal to the ratio of its variance to the square of the 


































According to Roy, the investor’s objective is to minimize the probability of 
disaster, )Pr( D≤π , which can be achieved by minimizing, 2
2
)( D−μ





μ D− . Hence, the true principle of Safety First can be obtained from the maximization of 
this quantity. If σ2 is constant for all values of μ , then the maximisation of 2
2)(
σ
μ D−  is 
equivalent to maximising expected return for any given disaster level. That suggest the above 
procedure based upon the Principle of Safety First may be regarded as a generalisation of 
profit maximisation under uncertainty.  
 
The safety first principle can be presented by a geographical demonstration. In figure 1, the 
0),( =μσf curve describes the efficient set. If an investor desires to avoid an outcome of D 
or worse, the optimal portfolio is at the point P where the line drawn from the point D (0, d) 




σ , is minimized, or 2
2)(
σ
μ D− is maximized. This means that the investor can have 
the upper bound of the probability of D or worse happening as small as possible from taking 












Figure 1: The graphical presentation of the best μ  and σ  combination 
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5.2.1: The Principle of Safety First and Commercial Bank Portfolio Behaviour 
The following model is formulated to apply the safety first principle for the analysis of bank 
portfolio behavior. According to this model, bank is assumed to concern that its actual return 
at the end of the decision period from a given portfolio, π , should not be less than a 
predetermined level, D. This predetermined level of return could be the target set by the bank 
to assess the performance of its management team, or it could be that level of return the 
management deems necessary for the bank to the break even. Unlike the individual investor 
the bank is not able to determine the level of each and every asset/liability. As expected 
utility maximization model, we partition the bank’s balance sheet into choice and non choice 
items. We assume that liabilities are negative assets, and then the bank’s actual return from a 







Where A1 is the (m x 1) vector of choice set assets items, r1 is the (m x 1) vector of return on 
the choice items, A2 a (n-m x  1) vector of non-choice items( where n>m) and r2 is the (n-
m x 1) vector of rates of return on the non-choice items. Since the actual level of assets and 
liabilities and their returns at the end of each decision period are not known at the moment of 
decision, the actual return from a given portfolio is uncertain and the bank will have to form 
expectations about it. However, the bank is assumed to be able to estimate from the past data 
only the expected values of π, μπ and its variance σπ2 
 
Assuming that  the rate of return on assets/ liabilities are not correlated with the levels of 
these assets/liabilities and that only the rates of return within the choice items are correlated 
with each other, the expected return on a given portfolio and its variance can be written as, 






Where  are the expected values of A1, A2, r1, r2 and the variance covariance 





























To solve for the bank’s optimal portfolio for the choice assets, we first derive the bank’s 
efficient mean variance frontier along which the optimal value of the μπ  is located. 
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Accordingly,  has to be chosen to minimize the level of a total risk subject to a given 
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Forming the Lagrangean, we have 
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And then differentiating it with respect to the choice set vector ,1'
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A 21 λλ and , we obtain the 
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By rearranging (5.10), we have. 
(5.13)  )( 1211
1
111 ieA λλ −Ω=
−
∧
Where  is the inverse of . This solution vector involves the two undetermined 
Lagrangean multipliers. To eliminate them, we substitute (5.13) for  into equations (5.6)-
















































By expanding (5.14) and utilising (5.15) and (5.16), we have 






















































By substituting the expression λ1 and λ2 from equations (5.18) and (5.19) into (5.17) we find 




























22 =Ω−Ω+Ω−Ω−Ω+Ω− −−−−−− deeddeidiideidiiiid πππ μμσ
 
According to equation (5.20), all of the possible portfolios on this frontier are efficient. In 
addition, by dividing equation (5.20) by , we see that it is a hyperbolic function in the 
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All portfolios along this frontier are efficient. If the individual investor locates his preferred 
position on the frontier then immediately the optimal combination of μπ, σπ2 is specified. By 
substituting these values in (5.18), (5.19) and (5.13), it is yield the bank’s optimal asset 
holdings, . After some algebraic manipulation we obtain the bank’s optimal static asset 






















This shows that the asset demand equation differ from the expected utility maximisations. A 
detailed derivation of the above system of equations is provided in the Appendix A to the 
chapter. A non-trivial solution requires that the inverse matrix exists. Let mij be the 












Where |Ω11|, the determinant of Ω11 (positive semi-definite), and M11 is the adjugate matrix of 
 with mij being its (j,i)th element. The inverse matrix exists if and only if |Ω11| is 
positive definite. That is, all the rates of return on the choice items are not linearly dependent. 
In other words, σii > 0 for all i, which can be implied that there are no riskless assets exist in 













as the row sum of the adjugate matrix M11 . Since  is a symmetric variance and 












which is special case where Ω11 is diagonal so that M11 is also diagonal, reduces to 
 
(5.29)  iii mm =
Thus, if the ith element  and its expected return, , are defined as and , respectively, 























The demand equations presented in equation (5.30) are nonlinear with the denominators are 
the same for all asset demand equations since the denominator is independent of the subscript 
i. It is interested to note that the quantity (d1-D)/d2 is subtracted from each and every 
expected rate of return on the choice items. Further, because =1d 22' eA
∧
 and , 
where  are the expected levels and expected rate of return of non choice items 
respectively. Thus equation (5.30) shows that , the bank’s optimal holding on choice assets 
are not only depends on the expected rates of return on choice items and the riskiness of the 
returns (i.e, the covariance) but also the expected return rates and the expected level of non 
choice items. That is, the safety first model includes the effects of the exogenous variables 
into the decision making and allow us to examine how the changes in non choice items can 







In addition, it is assumed that all choice assets are contained in , and all liabilities which 






A =2d 22' iA
∧
 is the total disposable fund 
that the bank can invest in the choice assets and =1d 22' eA
∧
 is the net cost of the bank’s 
liabilities, as bank has to pay the interest on its liabilities. Therefore, the unit cost (cn ) of 
















and the disaster rate of return (rc)required for each unit of liabilities can be written as 
(5.32)
2d
Drc −=  

















In parentheses, it shows that the net expected rates of return (e1i-cn) for i =1,2,…m, i.e, the 
gross expected rates of return minus the net unit cost of disposable funds. To decide which 
asset should hold in the portfolio, bank considers whether the net expected rate of return on 
the asset in equation is greater than the disaster rate of return (rc), while the net expected rates 
of return of all other assets fell to the disaster rate of return. Should the net expected rate of 
return on this particular asset be greater than the disaster rate of return, the bank would then 
hold some of its total disposable funds in this asset. In contrast, for the asset which its net 
expected rate of return is less than the disaster rate of return, the bank would then eliminate 
this particular asset from its portfolio. The proportion of each asset in the bank’s portfolio 
depends on the size of the difference of between the expected rate of return on this particular 
asset and the disaster rate of return, and the variance and covariance of the expected return. 
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Similar to the case of an individual investor the bank’s disaster rate of return depends only 
upon the predetermined level of return, D and disposable funds. Further, in contrast to the 
individual investor, the net rate of the return on an asset depends not only on the gross 
expected rate of return on that particular asset but also on the net unit cost of the bank’s 
disposable funds, which in turn depends upon the levels of the non-choice items as well as 
their expected rates of return. That is, both the level of non-choice items and the expected 
rates of return on them will affect the bank’s optimal holdings for the choice items. 
 
 
In expected utility framework, it is assumed that the bank’s demand for an asset will depend 
only upon the expected rate of return on this particular asset when the rates of the return on 
the choice items are not correlated with each other. This property does not hold under the 
Safety First Principle. If the rates of return on the choice items are not correlated with each 

















Its mean even when the rates of return on the choice assets are not correlated with each other, 
the demand for one asset still depend on its own expected rate of return as well as the 
expected rates of return on all assets in the choice assets. 
 
By putting the values of cn, rc, from equations (5.31), (5.32) and (5.26) in equation (5.25), we 

















rc, and cn are scalars so that the same constant will be subtracted from each expected rate of 
return on the choice item of the portfolio. We have set out the equations as vectors of the 
levels of the assets and then (because that levels are I(1)) we  have estimated the equations in 
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terms of shares/ratios which is assets to . Thereafter, we have worked with the ratio 
version and when putting the system into dynamic form we have written out that form for the 
ratios, not for the levels. If we divide both sides of (5.35) equation by d2, we can rewrite the 



















As d2 is the total disposable fund and the bank can invest in the choice assets and  as the 
vector of the share/ratio of each asset in the choice portfolio. Therefore, above equation is the 









5.2.2: The Bank’s Portfolio Adjustment: 
The bank’s asset demand equations in (5.36) are static equilibrium solutions which represent 
the bank’s long run equilibrium solutions. In the absence of transaction cost and market 
deficiencies the bank will always adjust its portfolio towards the optimal asset holdings. But 
in reality, transaction cost and market deficiencies do exist and, therefore, a bank may be 
incapable of adjusting optimally its portfolio. Equivalently, the allocation of its available 
funds at the end of a decision period may not be desired or the implied by the optimal 
demand functions. The bank, obviously, will continue to adjust its portfolio during the next 
decision period in order to reach the optimal asset levels. Let us assumed that the bank’s 
adjustment process similar to the expected utility framework in previous chapter. 
  
(5.37)    )ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 1,1,11,1,1,1 −− −=−=Δ ttttt AALAAA
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Where  is (1xn) vector of actual change in choice set item from t-1 to t time period. 
represents a (nx1) vector of difference between desired and actual holdings of 
choice set items. By substituting (5.35) into (5.37) yield the bank’s dynamic asset demand 
equations as: 
tA ,1ˆΔ






































11LMG =  & 
(I-L)=Z 
Equation (5.39) represents the bank’s short-run asset demand functions. 
 
5.3: Specification of the Models, Methodology and Data Analysis: 
Equations (5.36) and (5.39) represent static and dynamic models, respectively, for the 
portfolio behaviour of an individual bank. To estimate these models we have to use the same 
definitions of choice (A1) and non choice (A2) items in table (5.3.1) and make following 
assumptions regarding aggregation over banks. Specifically, we assume that 
• The disaster return D is zero for all banks ( therefore  
2d
Drc −= =0 in equations 4.36 
and 4.39) 











• Future expectations of assets’ rate of returns and the subjective variance-covariance 
matrix are identical across all. 
• The same transaction and disequilibrium costs are faced by all banks. 
• The vectors of expected rates of return on the choice variables e, and the expected 
value of the non-choice variables are unobservable. We approximate the expected 
rates of return by the actual rates “r” and replace the expected values of the non-
choice items by their actual values A2. 
 
The assumption one is implies that every bank regards break even as the critical point and 
will try to minimise the probability that actual return from their portfolios fall short of the 
costs of funding. Such an assumption is not as restrictive as it may seem at first sight. As we 
can see from the asset demand equations in (5.25), the same quantity D/d2 is subtracted from 
each and every expected rate of return of choice asset. Thus, whatever the value of D it will 
not alter the relative attractiveness of the assets in the portfolio. 
 
On the above assumptions, we may sum over the n commercial banks of Pakistan so that we 
can use consolidated balance sheet data. Expanding the static and dynamic equations (5.36) 
and (5.39), respectively, we have;. 































Actual behaviour may depart from the theoretical behaviour randomly and we assume that 
the vector of random errors tε  enter the demand equations additively. We also assume that in 
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both the static and dynamic equations they are normally distributed random variables with 
mean zero. 
The following restrictions apply to the system of equations in (5.40) and (5.41) 




















(3)  0' =Zi
The first and second restriction are accumulating restrictions that require that mi (gi) equal the 
sum of all elements in the ith row of the adjugate matrix M11 (G). Given the symmetry of the 
adjugate matrix, the accumulated restrictions also imply that mi (gi) be equal to the sum of all 
elements in the ith column of M11 (G).Restriction three is actually about the Cournot 
aggregation condition and says that the column sums of the lagged endogenous variable 
response matrix are zero.  
 
5.3.1:  Methodology, Data and Their Properties: 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) technique is employed for the estimation of 
the coefficients of the system’s equations. FIML estimator is consistent in non-linear systems 
of equations if ε is normally distributed but is generally inconsistent if ε is not normal, as 
shown in Amemiya (1977) and (1983). FIML is the only known efficient estimator for 
models that are non-linear in their parameters 
 
To estimate the static and dynamic equations in safety first principle, we have to divide 
balance sheet of scheduled banks of Pakistan into choice (endogenous) and non-choice 
(exogenous) items. Table 5.3.1 gives full presentation of both types of variables where as 
definition of interest rates are same as provided information in chapter two. 
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Table 5.3.1: Choice and Non Choice Items of the Pakistani Banks 
Notation Status Description 
Panel A : Balance Sheet    
Assets    
GOVTS Endogenous Loans to the Govt.Sector 
PUBS Endogenous Loans to the Public Sector 
PRIVS Endogenous Loans to the Private Sector 
PERS Endogenous Loans to the Personal Sector 
OTHERS Endogenous Loans to the Others Sector 
TRUST Endogenous Loans to the Trust Funds & Non-
Profit Org. 
PGS Exogenous  Provincial Govt. Securities 
SUMB Endogenous Borrowing from, SBP 
FGS Endogenous Federal Govt. Securities (Bonds) 
TBILLS Endogenous Treasury Bills 
CASH Endogenous Cash 
Liabilities    
CAPITAL Exogenous Capital 
RESERVE Exogenous Reserve 
CAPRES Exogenous Capital & Reserve 
TTD Exogenous Total Time Deposit 
TDD Exogenous Total Demand deposits 
TDTL Exogenous Total Demand and Time Deposit 
Panel B: Rates of Return on the 
Asset 
  
EFORGOVTS Exogenous (r11-cn)   =   (Wag – Cn) 
EFORPUBS Exogenous (r12-cn)   =   (Wap -  Cn) 
EFORPRIVS Exogenous (r13-cn)   =   (Wapr - Cn) 
EFORPERS Exogenous (r14-cn)   =   (Wapl - Cn) 
EFOROTHERS Exogenous (r15-cn)   =   (Waoh –Cn) 
EFORTRUST Exogenous (r16-cn)   =   (Wat – Cn) 
EFORSUMB Exogenous (r17-cn)   =   (Cmr – Cn) 
EFORFGS Exogenous (r18-cn)   =   (Gbyld - Cn) 
EFORTBILLS Exogenous (r19- cn)  =   (Sixmtbr - Cn) 
EFORCASH Exogenous (r20-cn)   =   (Infl – Cn) 
 
In order to get static and dynamic equations’ estimation, we have to divide both side the 
equation by d2 (as we have seen in equation (5.36).Its mean endogenous variables will be 
divided by d2 (where as d2 is consist of Time Deposit + Demand Deposit +Capital +Reserves-
PGS) and notation  in static and dynamic equations (5.40) & (5.42) (represents 








cn =  which is subtracted from all interest rates in numerator and denominator. 
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In our case Cn = (deposits *its rate – PGS* its rate)/ (Time Deposit + Demand Deposit 
+Capital +Reserves-PGS). 
 
In order to avoid spurious regression, there are several ways of testing for the existence of a 
unit root. We conduct augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron and Perron’s (1997) 
unit root test to test the null hypothesis that a series contains a unit root. So, ADF and Philips-
Perron confirm ( in tables 4.3.2 & 4.3.3 in chapter four) that all endogenous and interest rate 
variables are I(0) processes. Here, we are also providing table 5.3.2 for unit root test for 
interest rates (Efors) variables which shows that these variables are I(0) processes in ADF 
and Philips-Perron tests. 
 
 











Efor Unit root tests: t-statistics and probabilities  
 
 ADF 
eforgovt -4.65053 (0.0003) 
eforpubs -3.67876 (0.0062) 
eforprivs -3.60329 (0.0077) 
eforpers -2.65913 (0.0856) 
eforothers -3.31341 (0.0174) 
efortrust -3.57059 (0.0085) 
eforsumb -4.24255 (0.001) 
eforfgs -3.2984 (0.0181) 
efortbills -2.88463 (0.0515) 
  
 Perron: Structural Break test, Model AO 
eforcash Method UR: -4.8 (0.05), I(0) with a break at 1990s1; 
Methods Studabs and Stud: -4.72 (0.05), I(0) with a break at 
1989s1 
 
Further, the descriptive statistics of endogenous and interest rates (Efors) are given in 
Appendix B and Graphic presentation of endogenous variables and interest rates (Efors) is 































































































































































































































































5.4: Discussion of Empirical Results: 
We have estimated various safety first static and dynamic models in this section. The type of 
estimated static models are, static model itself or static unrestricted model, static restricted 
model with symmetry, static restricted model with sums Gi and static restricted model with 
symmetry and sums Gi . Similarly, we have estimated dynamic unrestricted model, dynamic 
restricted model with symmetry, dynamic restricted model with symmetry and sums Gi . The 
analysis of model is given in table 5.4.1.  
 
Table 5.4.1: Analysis of Models 
 
 Models Log-Likelihood Restrictions  LR-Test Results  
  Static Models  
          
Model 1 2141.92 None     
Model 2 2080.27 Symmetry 123.3>χ2 = 48       Rejected 
Model 3 2021.16 Sum 241.5>χ2 = 16.9       Rejected 
Model 4  1776.75 Sym+ 728.34>χ2 =60 Rejected 
          
  Dynamic Models  
          
Model 5 2415.39 None     
 Model 6 2404.46 Symmetry 21<  χ2= 48        Accepted 
Model 7 1333.23 Sym + 2164.32> χ2=60 Rejected 
 
Model 1: Static Unrestricted Model; Model 2:  Static Restricted Model with Symmetry; Model 3:  Static 
Restricted Model with Gi (Sums); Model 4: Fully Restricted Static Model with Symmetry and Gi restrictions; 
Model 5: Dynamic Unrestricted Model; Model 6: Dynamic Restricted Model with Symmetry; Model 7: Fully 
Restricted Dynamic Model with Symmetry and Gi restrictions. 
 
 
Above analysis in table 5.4.1 show that the Model 1 as in equation (5.40) and Model 6 as in 
equation (5.41) are the best models in safety first static and dynamic models respectively. 
 
The best static unrestricted model 1 has poor quality as R2 and D-W statistics show in table 
5.4.2 that the explanatory variables do not explain most of the dependent variables and they 
have also autocorrelation problem.  
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Table 5.4.2: Statistics for Static Unrestricted Model 
 
EQNS R^2 D-W 
GOVTS 0.17 1.18 
PUBS 0.41 0.88 
PRIVS 0.28 0.82 
PERS 0.19 0.81 
OTHERS 0.11 0.51 
TRUST 0.67 1.44 
SUMB 0.4 1.43 
FGS 0.33 0.51 
TBILLS 0.54 1.25 
 
As noted in table 5.4.1 the dynamic version model 6, is one the best models among all 
potential models in the sense of Log likelihood and  we have tested and explained in this 
chapter a dynamic (with symmetry) model, which is more statistically stable than the static 
system. It is also superior to the best static unrestricted model 1, as it has high R2, no AR in 
residual, no ARCH in residual, and the covariance matrix of the residuals indicates that the 
residuals do not suffer from covariance. Thus we can say that the residuals are 
independently distributed (that is, i.i.d).  
 
Though they are dubious for models with lagged dependent variables, the DW stats from the 
FIML estimates in TSP suggest that there is no AR. Table 5.4.3 shows the Correlogram test 
with lag length 7 confirms that almost all equations are free of AR and ARCH in our dynamic 
with symmetry version of safety first model 6. Moreover, the normality of the return (profit) 







Table 5.4.3: Correlogram Test at lag 7 
GOVTS  Q-Stat 1.103 1.605 3.648 4.231 4.277 6.319 7.751 
   Prob [0.294] [0.448] [0.302] [0.376] [0.510] [0.388] [0.355] 
PUBS  Q-Stat 1.019 1.124 1.421 3.514 4.870 4.870 6.543 
   Prob [0.313] [0.570] [0.701] [0.476] [0.432] [0.561] [0.478] 
PRIVS  Q-Stat 0.610 0.611 0.651 1.449 1.495 2.308 2.310 
   Prob [0.435] [0.737] [0.885] [0.836] [0.914] [0.889] [0.941] 
PERS  Q-Stat 3.052 4.962 9.508 14.553 14.553 16.222 16.698 
   Prob [0.081] [0.084] [0.023] [0.006] [0.012] [0.013] [0.019] 
OTHERS  Q-Stat 0.064 0.080 0.155 3.411 3.524 3.603 3.695 
   Prob [0.801] [0.961] [0.985] [0.492] [0.620] [0.730] [0.814] 
TRUST  Q-Stat 5.836 7.205 7.222 7.224 7.823 8.539 9.467 
   Prob [0.016] [0.027] [0.065] [0.125] [0.166] [0.201] [0.221] 
SUMB  Q-Stat 26.472 32.882 34.065 34.080 34.080 34.456 34.826 
   Prob [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FGS  Q-Stat 0.004 0.039 0.243 0.297 0.567 0.770 0.822 
   Prob [0.953] [0.981] [0.970] [0.990] [0.989] [0.993] [0.997] 
TBILLS  Q-Stat 0.359 0.460 0.595 0.598 0.659 9.373 10.774 
   Prob [0.549] [0.795] [0.898] [0.963] [0.985] [0.154] [0.149] 
 
 Moreover, our best safety first dynamic unrestricted model 6 is also stable. As discussed 
earlier that the characteristics roots of Z should lie between zero and unity. The dynamic 
system equation (4.23) would be stable if dominant root of the characteristic equation lies 
inside the complex unit circle. For the computed characteristic roots reported in Table (5.4.4), 
it can be seen that this condition is satisfied for the estimated Z as the absolute value of all 
eigen values of Z of each variable is less than 1.  
Table 5.4.4: Eigenvalues of the System’s Dynamic Matrix 
0.772597 +  0.176615i 
0.772597 - 0.176615i 
0.788413 
0.697971 +  0.315665i 
0.697971 - 0.315665i 
0.455681 + 0.357562i 




Where as i is the imaginary number. So the multiplier effects will have a cyclical path for 
most of the variables.  
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5.4.1: Return on the Interest rate Matrix: 
The estimated co-efficient are shown in below table and no constant term is included in the 
estimation. Given the aggregation condition implied from the balance sheet constraint, we 
have dropped cash equation from the system of demand equations. To obtain the response 
matrix of interest rate, we have used the Cournot aggregation condition to drive the co-
efficient for cash equation, since that condition must hold by definition.  
 
5.4.2: Results on the Own-rate Effects: 
It is observed that the performance of our dynamic symmetry model is disappointing. Seven 
out of ten own-rates bear the correct sign; these are Fgs, Tbills, Cash holdings, lending to the 
Personal, Public, Trust and Private sectors. The other three co-efficents are wrongly signed; 
these are Sumb, lending to the Govt and Others sectors. 
 
 Among the own rate, in table 5.4.5, four out of ten co-efficients are significant on the basis 
of asymptotic t-ratios. Whereas out of four significant own rates three coefficents have 
correct signs i.e gi3, gi7 and gi8. It is also noticeable that almost all of the own interest rates 
have comparatively big numbers that indicate the responsiveness of the choice assets to the 
changes in their own interest rates.  
 
5.4.3: Results on the Cross-rate Effects: 
In table 5.4.5, with regard to off-diagonal rate of return’s co-efficients, the result shows that 
sixteen out of hundred co-efficients in the yields’ matrix are significantly different from zero. 
Some of the composite interest rates are significant; these are Sumb, Tbills and Privs sector. 
This indicates, similar to E-U model, that interest rates have no effects on decision of 
allocating the available funds between the choice assets. 
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Table 5.4.5: Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry Restrictions 
         (Estimated impact response: rate of return variables) 
 
EQUNS gi1 gi2 gi3 gi4 gi5 gi6 gi7 gi8 gi9 gi10 gi 
GOVTS -27.32 246.16 -231.69 -48.47 3.7 -13.14 336.09 67.08 -334.37 -47.58 2478.4 
  [-0.28] [2.68]* [-0.92] [-0.95] [0.19] [-2]** [0.82] [1.02] [-1.10] [-1.4] [0.81] 
PUBS 246.2 195.39 -616.81 -143.66 -14.23 18.69 980.19 28.75 -785.03 32.72 6975.6 
  [2.7]* [0.64] [-0.98] [-1.7]*** [-0.37] [1.18] [1.24] [0.25] [-1.39] [1.10] [1.04] 
PRIVS -231.7 -616.81 1960.46 236.24 125.03 -17.02 -3258.89 -389.47 2554.02 -76.03 -27077 
  [-0.92] [-0.98] [1.94]*** [1.17] [1.19] [-0.34] [-3.44]* [-1.8]*** [3.21]* [-1.3] [-5.48]* 
PERS -48.47 -143.66 236.24 45.8 -50.89 3.71 -89.09 -65.42 131.73 5.66 -685.35 
  [-0.95] [-1.7]*** [1.17] [0.81] [-3.63]* [1.00] [-0.27] [-1.12] [0.54] [0.24] [-0.26] 
OTHERS 3.7 -14.23 125.03 -50.89 -29.44 0.4 -55.24 19.12 1.82 15.09 572.88 
  [0.19] [-0.37] [1.19] [-3.63]* [-2.5]** [0.11] [-0.33] [0.91] [0.01] [2.8]* [0.48] 
TRUST -13.14 18.69 -17.02 3.71 0.4 5.47 22.47 3.2 -18.86 -1.26 772.49 
  [-1.98] [1.18] [-0.34] [1.00] [0.11] [1.19] [0.28] [0.46] [-0.32] [-0.8] [0.81] 
SUMB -336.1 -980.19 3258.89 89.09 55.24 -22.47 -5744.75 -362.98 4093.15 17.23 -42908 
  [0.82] [1.24] [-3.44]* [-0.27] [-0.33] [0.28] [2.35]** [0.95] [-1.9]*** [-0.4] [3.56]* 
FGS 67.08 28.75 -389.47 -65.42 19.12 3.2 362.98 258.77 -205.07 20.41 3209.5 
  [1.02] [0.25] [-1.8]*** [-1.12] [0.91] [0.46] [0.95] [2.28]** [-0.62] [0.69] [1.17] 
TBILLS -334.4 -785.03 2554.02 131.73 1.82 -18.86 -4093.15 -205.07 2900.55 -17.11 -31094 
  [-1.10] [-1.39] [3.21]* [0.54] [0.01] [-0.32] [-1.9]*** [-0.62] [1.51] [-0.3] [-2.50]* 
CASH 674.15 2050.93 -6879.65 -198.13 -110.75 40.02 11539.39 646.02 -8337.94     
  [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA]   
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available 
 
Those coefficients taken at their face the value, however, cannot be very informative about 
the impact of the net returns on the portfolio composition, because of the non-linearity of the 
demand equations. It is the slopes of the demand equations, and more especially, the resultant 
“efor” elasticities that can do so; and the former and latter are listed in Table 5.4.6 & 5.4.7. 
Of course, we cannot attach any statistical significance to these, since they are affected by all 













5.4.6: Slopes for Efors of Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry Restrictions 
 
EQUNS eforgovts eforpubs eforprivs eforpers eforothers efortrust eforsumb eforfgs efortbills eforcash 
GOVTS 0.00043 -0.00292 0.00208 0.0006 -0.00003 0.00019 -0.0029 -0.00075 0.00327 0.00061 
PUBS -0.00252 -0.00071 0.00096 0.00166 0.00033 -0.00004 -0.00155 0.00046 0.00209 -0.00042 
PRIVS 0.00009 -0.0002 0.00631 -0.00223 -0.00227 -0.00068 -0.00805 0.00126 0.00332 0.00097 
PERS 0.00052 0.00156 -0.00194 -0.00056 0.00063 -0.00008 -0.00058 0.00071 -0.00044 -0.00007 
OTHER -0.00012 -0.00003 -0.0008 0.00067 0.00036 -0.00003 -0.00057 -0.00034 0.0009 -0.00019 
TRUST 0.00018 -0.00022 0.00015 -0.00005 0 -0.00007 -0.00018 -0.00003 0.00016 0.00002 
SUMB -0.0007 -0.00241 0.00237 0.00015 0.00154 0.00084 -0.01119 0.00002 0.00727 0.00022 
 FGS -0.00051 0.00062 0.00114 0.00074 -0.00016 0.00007 0.00145 -0.00286 -0.00179 -0.00026 
TBlLLS 0.00144 0.00205 -0.00166 -0.0009 -0.00068 -0.00064 0.00321 -0.00106 -0.00153 0.00022 
CASH 0.00084 0.00024 -0.00158 -0.00014 -0.00014 0.00009 0.00427 0.00004 -0.00271 NA 
 
Below table of efors elasticites shows that the most sensitive asset to the changes in the efors 
is other sector, which is relatively sensitive to the changes in eforpubs, efortbills and 
eforprivs. 
 
5.4.7:  Elasticities for Efors of Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry   
Restrictions 
 
EQUNS eforgovts eforpubs eforprivs eforpers eforothers efortrust eforsumb eforfgs efortbills eforcash 
GOVTS 0.05366 0.04983 0.24204 -0.3204 -0.00271 0.02176 -0.16978 -0.0465 0.223328 -0.0513 
PUBS -0.27121 0.11989 0.09625 -0.0676 0.026866 -0.004 -0.07856 0.02425 0.123698 0.03049 
PRIVS 0.00126 -0.0205 0.08093 -0.0024 -0.02359 -0.0084 -0.05196 0.0086 0.025062 -0.009 
PERS 0.05625 -0.0403 -0.1954 0.14805 0.05139 -0.0076 -0.02928 0.03788 -0.02623 0.00529 
OTHERS -0.33034 1.22562 -2.0244 -0.0608 0.743766 -0.0692 -0.03331 -0.4595 1.348016 0.35611 
TRUST 0.62353 -0.1176 0.49895 -0.6968 -0.00995 -0.2197 -0.30124 -0.0582 0.319944 -0.039 
SUMB -0.02919 0.00402 0.09202 -0.0883 0.048599 0.03141 -0.21882 0.00037 0.166143 -0.0062 
 FGS -0.02772 0.02708 0.05817 0.02998 -0.00677 0.0034 0.037229 -0.0774 -0.05363 0.00965 
TBILLS 0.10965 -0.0459 -0.1176 0.13754 -0.03925 -0.0443 0.114826 -0.0398 -0.06401 -0.0112 
CASH 0.04566 -0.005 -0.0798 0.01137 -0.00571 0.00435 0.108526 0.00111 -0.08051 [NA] 
 
 
What conclusions can be extracted from those tables? The most important conclusion is that 
we can identify “unique”, or two-way, complementarity or substitutability, between the 
endogenous ratios. Such relationships are summarised in Table 5.4.7.1. 
 
We can ascribe economic interpretations to these relationships, which fit in with the risk-
return characteristics of the demand equations. Consider for example, the two safest assets in 
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the portfolio, ignoring cash: Federal Government Securities and Treasury Bills. As would be 
expected, other things being equal, they are substitutes. For given, almost identical, low, risk 
on each, as the return on the one increases, the other remaining fixed, it is purchased by a 
switch from the other security. Consider an increase in the return on Federal Government 
Securities and the supply of loans and the borrowing ratio. In regard to the provision of loans, 
as the holdings of securities increase, they produce a reduction in the holdings of Government 
Sector Loans, and those to Other Sectors. The former are probably more lucrative, though 
riskier, than securities, in that they are probably viewed as more difficult to offload, as 
perhaps are Other Sector Loans, which are to a more diverse group of borrowers. The 
increase in the apportionment of the portfolio to loans to the Public, Private and Personal, 
Sectors, will suggest that these offer higher return per unit of risk than do securities; so that to 
maintain the required balance between the risk-return characteristics of the portfolio, their 
holdings are increased, pari passim, with the increased holding of government securities. 
Finally, the increase in the return on securities that has prompted their increased share in the 
portfolio would be expected to increase the borrowing from the central bank, at the expense 
of some of the loans in the portfolio, since that would provide funds for investing in 
securities.  
 
Table 5.4.7.1: Complementarity and substitutability across the asset ratios 
Complements (Y) and Substitutes (X) Ratio 
Govts Pubs Privs Pers Others Trust Sumb Fgs TBills Cash
Govts   Y  X Y X X Y  
Pubs     Y   Y   
Privs    X X   Y   
Pers  X X   X X Y   
Others X  X   X  X   
Trust Y X  X X      
Sumb X   X  Y  Y   
Fgs X Y Y Y X  Y  X  
TBills Y      Y X   
Cash   X Y    Y X  
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5.4.8: Rate of Return Elasticities of Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry  
Restrictions 
 
EQUNS WAG WAP   WAPR WAPL WOAH WAT CMR GBYLD   SIXMTBR INFL 
GOVTS 11.2 -1.8 2.4 10 -197.5 26.7 -2.4 -9.2 2 2302 
PUBS -2.2 -8.5 6.1 4.2 19.9 -144 -5.3 17.7 3.7 -3872 
PRIVS 479.7 -243 7.2 -24.4 -22.6 -69 -8 49.9 18.1 13072.8 
PERS 10.7 3.9 -3 -12.4 10.4 -76 -14.1 11.3 -17.3 -22331 
OTHERS -1.8 -9.4 -0.3 0.4 0.7 -8.4 -12.4 -0.9 0.3 -331.5 
TRUST 1 -0.8 1.2 -4.3 -53.7 -2.6 -1.4 -7.4 1.4 3030.2 
SUMB -20.7 -6.5 6.4 124.4 11 18.5 -1.9 1167.8 2.7 18888.8 
 FGS -21.8 19.1 10.1 18.5 -78.9 170.9 11.1 -5.5 -8.5 -12227 
TBILLS 5.5 4.2 -5 -10.9 -13.6 -13.1 3.6 -10.8 -7.1 10524.9 
CASH 13.2 50.3 -7.3 -100.8 -93.5 133.5 3.8 387.8 -5.6 [NA] 
 
 
As per the above table of rate of return elasticities, almost all choice assets are sensitive to the 
changes in the interest rates. Where as other sector is insensitive to the changes in the interest 
rates of gbyld, waoh, wapl, sixmtbr and wapr. On the other hand, Trust sector is insensitive to 
the changes in the interest rates of wag and wap. 
 
There is one further aspect of the impact of the returns on the shares in the portfolio then we 
can extract from the estimates that related to the “cost of capital” element in the net returns. 
The slopes and elasticities of the demand equations with respect to component of the net 
returns are given in Table 5.4.9.  
 
5.4.9:  Slopes & Elasticities for CN of Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry 
Restrictions 
 
EQUNS CN Slope CN Elasticity 
GOVTS -0.00057 0.135408 
PUBS -0.00025 -0.019119 
PRIVS 0.001457 0.014003 
PERS 0.000252 0.019 
OTHERS 0.00014 0.267331 
TRUST 5.17E-05 0.129043 
SUMB 0.001901 0.055354 
 FGS 0.001555 0.059464 
TBILLS -0.00045 -0.024218 
CASH -0.00091 -0.034602 
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Above table shows that all choice assets are insensitive to the changes in the Cn (d1/d2).The 
greatest impact among all choice assets is on Other sector generated by Cn. The data in Table 
5.4.9 match obvious a priori expectation. A ceteris paribus increase in the cost of capital 
increases the ratio of the main earning assets, with the exception of Public Sector Loans. The 
cost, obviously, is a reduction in liquidity, as Treasury Bills and Cash holdings are reduced; 
but to provide a correct balance between return and risk, the ratio of Government Securities 
(with their higher return that Treasury Bills) is increased (for example, as some kind of 
yardstick, the ratios of the mean net returns on the securities and Treasury Bills are, 
respectively, 1.44 and 1.36).  
 
5.4.4: Results on the System’s Dynamic Matrix: 
From the table (5.4.10), we find that out of one hundred co-efficients on the lagged 
endogenous variables thirty-seven are significantly different from zero. It is also noticeable 
that all assets do respond to own disequilibrium. Further, some observations can be made on 






















5.4.10: Safety First Dynamic Model with Symmetry Restrictions 
    (Estimated system’s Dynamic Matrix Z) 
 
EQUNS GOVTS_1 PUBS_1 PRIVS_1 PERS_1 OTHERS_1 TRUST_1 SUMB_1  FGS_1 TBILLS_1 CASH_1 R^2  D-W 
GOVTS 0.617 -0.204 0.226 -0.252 1.708 -1.109 0.31 0.123 -0.025 -0.207 0.49 2.42 
  [4.780]* [-1.6]*** [3.58]* [-1.380] [1.95]*** [-0.871] [-3.04]* [1.590] [-0.511] [-1.490]     
PUBS 0.442 0.743 -0.038 0.399 -0.757 2.419 -0.067 0.054 0.063 -0.192 0.77 2.68 
  [4.21]* [7.57]* [-0.713] [2.84]* [-1.097] [2.25]** [0.842] [0.914] [1.597] [-1.8]**     
PRIVS 0.185 0.492 0.848 0.084 -0.632 -2.888 0.264 -0.082 0.103 -0.119 0.75 2.15 
  [0.745] [2.18]** [7.26]* [0.253] [-0.379] [-1.271] [-1.382] [-0.570] [1.083] [-0.474]     
PERS -0.182 -0.045 0.071 0.435 0.986 -0.819 0.027 0.002 0.0002 0.112 0.55 2.30 
  [-2.41]** [-0.635] [1.95]*** [4.35]* [1.85]*** [-1.051] [-0.467] [0.039] [0.009] [1.408]     
OTHERS 0.057 0.002 0.006 0.028 0.497 0.526 0.034 0.029 -0.009 -0.058 0.74 1.84 
  [3.42]* [0.123] [.649] [1.191] [4.41]* [2.93]* [-2.71]* [2.89]* [-1.306] [-3.42]*     
TRUST 0.011 0.009 -0.004 0.008 -0.06 0.858 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.93 1.63 
  [1.97]*** [2.01]* [-1.300] [1.217] [-1.9]*** [17.53]* [-0.325] [-0.262] [2.26]** [1.392]     
SUMB -0.536 -0.305 -0.515 0.27 0.208 1.143 0.173 -0.153 -0.078 0.132 0.71 2.40 
  [2.77]* [1.77]*** [5.48]* [-1.059] [-0.164] [-0.683] [-1.19] [1.422] [1.027] [-0.712]     
FGS 0.151 -0.095 0.073 -0.286 0.016 1.298 -0.077 0.734 0.06 0.016 0.78 2.23 
  [1.356] [-0.920] [1.353] [-1.855] [0.020] [1.131] [0.872] [11.31]* [1.432] [0.140]     
TBILLS 0.161 0.346 -0.288 0.452 -2.659 -0.326 0.08 -0.18 0.609 0.629 0.82 2.12 
  [0.870] [2.08]** [-3.06]* [1.80]*** [-2.19]** [-0.187] [-0.546] [-1.625[ [7.89]* [3.27]*     
CASH -0.906 -0.943 -0.379 -1.138 0.693 -1.102 -0.745 -0.526 -0.7282 -0.32 [NA] [NA] 
  [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA]     
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available because is not 
estimated directly. 
 
• The largest (in absolute value) off-diagnal elements of the dynamic matrix are found in 
row relating to cash holdings and Tbills. The column relating to lagged quantities of these 
two instruments are much smaller in absolute value magnitudes. This suggest that 
changes in the lagged assets structure strongly effect Tbills and Cash holdings, but 
changes in these instruments have only small impact on other assets portfolios. Similarly, 
changes in the assets structure generate strong pressure on Tbills and cash holding, but 
these asset transfer very little of this pressure back into the rest of the portfolio, which is 
consistent with the view that Tbills and Cash holding as buffering function in asset 
structure. 
• The magnitudes in the columns relating to lagged quantities of loans to Other sector and 
Trust sector substantially exceed magnitudes in the rows associated with their current 
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stocks. This suggest that changes in these items transmit substantial adjustment pressure 
to the remaining items in the portfolio but they, in turn, absorb very little pressure from 
other changes in the portfolio. 
 
As discussed earlier in section 4.2, dynamic matrix Z= I-L, where as L (L=I-Z) is the speed of 
adjustment matrix which is the “true” adjustment costs .Table 5.4.11 shows the estimated 
value of matrix L for illustration. 
 
Table5.4.11: L –Matrix for “True” Adjustment Costs 
EQUNS GOVTS_1 PUBS_1 PRIVS_1 PERS_1 OTHERS_1 TRUST_1 SUMB_1  FGS_1 TBILLS_1 CASH_1 
GOVTS 0.383 0.204 -0.226 0.252 -1.708 1.109 -0.31 -0.123 0.025 0.207 
PUBS -0.442 0.257 0.038 -0.399 0.757 -2.419 0.067 -0.054 -0.063 0.192 
PRIVS -0.185 -0.492 0.152 -0.084 0.632 2.888 -0.264 0.082 -0.103 0.119 
PERS 0.182 0.045 -0.071 0.565 -0.986 0.819 -0.027 -0.002 -0.0002 -0.112 
OTHERS -0.057 -0.002 -0.006 -0.028 0.503 -0.526 -0.034 -0.029 0.009 0.058 
TRUST -0.011 -0.009 0.004 -0.008 0.06 0.142 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.007 
SUMB 0.536 0.305 0.515 -0.27 -0.208 -1.143 0.827 0.153 0.078 -0.132 
FGS -0.151 0.095 -0.073 0.286 -0.016 -1.298 0.077 0.266 -0.06 -0.016 
TBILLS -0.161 -0.346 0.288 -0.452 2.659 0.326 -0.08 0.18 0.391 -0.629 
CASH 0.906 0.943 0.379 1.138 -0.693 1.102 0.745 0.526 0.7282 1.32 
 
 
4.4.5: The Overall Evaluation of the dynamic Model: Explanatory Performance: 
This section is relates to the estimated equations and their properties of residuals. We are 
going to present the fitted values and actual values of the estimated equations for all 
endogenous variables for the whole sample period (1964:2-2005:1) indicate that most of the 































































































































































































































5.5: The Aggregation of Loans: A Comparison Between The Best Disaggregated And 
Aggregated Model.  
In the aggregated model, as noted in chapter four, we have aggregated all loans and used the 
notation for aggregated loans in the table is “Loan” which is summation of Govt, Pubs, Pers, 
Privs, Othres and Trust sectors loans and remaining items are as it is. Similar to the chapter 
four, we also want see here if there is a loss of information in explaining the items in the 
portfolio, and hence the total portfolio, in aggregating all loans, implying that they are perfect 
substitutes for the banks. We have estimated various dynamic aggregated safety first models. 
These are: aggregated dynamic unrestricted model, aggregated dynamic restricted model with 
symmetry, and fully restricted aggregated dynamic model with symmetry and Gi. The 
analysis of models is given in table 5.5.1. 
 
5.5.1: Analysis of Aggregated Safety First Models 
 
Models Log-likelihood Restrictions LR-Test Results 
Model 1 822.125 Unrestricted  Accepted 
Model 2 812.438 Symmetry 19.37> χ2(6,0.05)= 12.59 Rejected 
Model 3 782.438 Symmetry & Sum Gi 79.39> χ2(10,0.05)= 18.30 Rejected 
 
Model 1: Unrestricted Dynamic Model; Model 2: Restricted Dynamic Model with Symmetry; Model 3: Fully 
Restricted Dynamic Model with Symmetry & Gi restrictions 
 
We find aggregated unrestricted safety first dynamic model wins in Table 5.5.1 and this 
dynamic model is stable as well. It can be seen from Table 5.5.2 that all eigenvalues are less 
than 1 in absolute value 
 









We have already presented tables and explained the best disaggregated model in previous 
section, we also present results for the aggregated model in table 5.5.3, which shows that the 
behaviour of the safety first (aggregated) unrestricted model is similar to the disaggregated 
model. Here, the best equations in terms of significance are Loans and FGS.  
 
Table 5.5.3: Safety First (Aggregated) Unrestricted Dynamic Model  
 
*: Significant at 1% level. **: Significant at 5%level. ***: Significant at 10% level. NA: not available because is not estimated directly. 
  gi1 gi2 gi3 gi4 gi5 gi LOANS_1 SUMB_1 FGS_1 TBILLS_1 CASH_1 R^2 D-W 
LOANS 0.16719 -0.1529 -0.3005 0.18412 -0.1997 -0.8880 0.91281 -0.48744 -0.09502 -0.21306 -0.20812 0.75 2.29 
  [1.98]* [-0.96] [-2.2]** [1.05] [-2.6]* [-2.63]* [7.74]* [-2.28]** [-0.57] [-1.74]*** [-0.72]     
SUMB 0.02111 -0.0126 -0.0464 0.02924 -0.0333 0.96277 0.17902 0.19476 -0.06416 -0.15117 -0.06271 0.55 2.06 
  [1.01] [-0.30] [-1.33] [0.66] [-1.37] [1.27] [2.99]* [1.33] [-0.60] [-2.07]** [-0.30]     
FGS 0.07097 -0.0883 -0.1245 0.09699 -0.0884 1.51838 -0.11656 0.21280 0.72925 -0.01303 -0.06083 0.78 1.95 
  [2.79]* [-1.20] [-3.22]* [1.22] [-4.57]* [3.31]* [-3.18]* [2.68]* [12.06]* [-0.33] [-0.58]     
TBILLS 0.07405 -0.1000 -0.1099 0.08645 -0.0693 -1.0384 -0.07639 -0.11973 -0.05970 0.66733 0.35418 0.82 1.95 
  [1.29] [-1.17] [-1.18] [1.00] [-1.24] [-1.26] [-0.92] [-0.87] [-0.53] [7.82]* [1.93]***     
CASH 
-
0.33332 0.35397 0.58143 
-
0.39680 0.39085  -0.89889 0.19961 -0.51037 -0.29008 -0.02253 [NA] [NA] 
  [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA] [NA]   
 
 
To see the comparison between safety first disaggregated and aggregated models, we plot 
different forecasting and other statistics below. 
 
Table 5.5.4: Safety First Disaggregated forecasting table (1964:2 to 2005:1) 
 
 EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Thiel I Coeff  Bias Prop Var Prop Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.034847 0.026252 3.792178 0.025093 0.002055 0.068162 0.929783 0.81 
GOVT 0.019185 0.014021 52.35086 0.159681 0.000167 0.146317 0.853516 0.49 
PUBS 0.014815 0.010748 17.05652 0.10765 0.024904 0.006822 0.968274 0.77 
PRIVS 0.032531 0.024226 4.974609 0.032093 0.000008 0.086566 0.913426 0.75 
PERS 0.011215 0.008678 16.34723 0.084846 0.000158 0.210047 0.789795 0.55 
OTHES 0.002343 0.001484 123.5613 0.236241 0.000056 0.073537 0.926407 0.74 
TRUST 0.001451 0.001202 128.9436 0.255371 0.629418 0.02327 0.347312 0.88 
SUMB 0.025256 0.018596 11.64175 0.073884 0.000072 0.065395 0.934534 0.71 
FGS 0.016208 0.0114 9.287103 0.062359 0.000144 0.040473 0.959383 0.78 






Table 5.5.5: Safety First Aggregated forecasting table (1964:2 to 2005:1) 
 
  EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Thiel I Coeff  Bias Prop Var Prop Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.042494 0.031484 4.445572 0.029971 0 0.072747 0.927253 0.75 
SUMB 0.031606 0.023143 14.77807 0.09275 0 0.148887 0.851113 0.55 
FGS 0.015796 0.011721 9.553852 0.060763 0 0.05944 0.94056 0.78 
TBILLS 0.026476 0.020591 107.2862 0.120852 0 0.049411 0.950589 0.82 
 
 
Table 5.5.6: Safety First Disaggregated forecasting table (1964:2 to 2008:1) 
 
 EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Theil I Coeff  Bias Prop       Var Prop  Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.042711 0.029865 4.34059 0.030808 0.000513 0.005746 0.993741 0.70 
GOVT 0.019191 0.014023 51.90505 0.160357 0.001298 0.152554 0.846148 0.50 
PUBS 0.015518 0.011118 17.61977 0.116674 0.174706 0.002697 0.822598 0.32 
PRIVS 0.032797 0.024697 5.031115 0.032489 0.015266 0.093443 0.891291 0.41 
PERS 0.011267 0.008648 16.60881 0.084548 0.011497 0.193091 0.795413 0.64 
OTHES 0.002684 0.00148 94.184 0.311692 0.073565 0.417556 0.508879 0.33 
TRUS 0.001691 0.001329 119.9317 0.292606 0.504007 0.009459 0.486533 0.46 
SUMB 0.026172 0.019835 12.00327 0.078133 0.069062 0.095819 0.835119 0.52 
FGS 0.016226 0.011426 9.246181 0.062612 0.003329 0.045066 0.951605 0.76 
TBILLS 0.026544 0.019787 122.6874 0.12106 0 0.0442 0.955799 0.82 
 
 
Table 5.5.7: Safety First Aggregated forecasting table (1964:2 to 2008:1) 
 
 EQNS RMSE MAE MAPE Thiel I Coeff  Bias Prop Var Prop Cov Prop R^2 
LOANS 0.045655 0.033475 4.732788 0.032283 0.000058 0.051007 0.948935 0.69 
SUMB 0.036543 0.026072 17.54427 0.109897 0.000602 0.117143 0.882254 0.42 
FGS 0.016033 0.011843 10.87237 0.063558 0.0008 0.103435 0.895765 0.82 




Above forecasting statistics show that almost all equations with forecasting point of views are 
best except (a) Govt, Others, Trust and Tbills in disaggregated model for 1964:1 2005:1,(b) 
Tbills for aggregated model for 1964:1 2005:1, (c) Govt, Others, Trust and Tbills in 
disaggregated model for 1964:1 2008:1  and (d) Tbills in aggregated model for 1964:1 2008:1 
(c), as they have very high percentage of MAPE. Further, if you compare the forecasting 
statistics for disaggregated and aggregated models for the same period, we find there is no big 
difference among similar equations. 
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On the other hand, R squared values tell us the disaggregated model wins aggregated model 
for the in-sample period 1964:1 2005:1. Disaggregated model explains Loans better (0.81 
against 0.75); Sumb better (0.71 against 0.55); and FGS, Tbills have same values (0.78 & 
0.82 respectively) in both disaggregated and aggregated models. For the whole sample: (a) 
for Loans,R-squared is 0.70 for the disaggregated model and 0.69 for aggregated model; (b) 
for sumb, R-squared is 0.52 for disaggregated model and 0.42 for the aggregated model; (c) 
for FGS, R-squared is 0.76 for disaggregated model and 0.82 for the aggregated model; but, 
(c) for Tbills, the R-squared is 0.82 for the disaggregated model and 0.74 for the aggregated 
model. 
 
For the in sample data the disaggregated model is the superior model. For the whole sample, 
it is better for accounting for the choice of the riskier assets and some of the safer assets. The 
in-sample findings suggest that the banks separate out the choice of risky versus “safe” assets 
and then choose across the risky assets: such that those assets are potential competitors, and 






For further investigation to the portfolio behaviour of commercial banks in Pakistan, we have 
estimated various disaggregated static and dynamic safety first models. We have found that 
the static unrestricted model is the best model among all potential static models on the basis 
of Log likelihood values but it has poor quality as R-squared and D-W statistics show that the 
explanatory variables do not explain most of the dependent variables and they have also 
suffer from autocorrelation. Therefore, we have chosen the best safety first dynamic model 
with symmetry restriction to explain the banking portfolio of Pakistan. As this dynamic 
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model wins over all the potential dynamic models in the sense of Log likelihood values and it 
has high R-squared and good residual properties. 
 
We have also estimated various dynamic aggregated safety first in which we have aggregated 
all loans i.e Govt, Pubs, Pers, Privs, Others and Trust sectors loans, and remaining items are 
as it is. The basic idea is to see if there is a loss of information in explaining the items in the 
portfolio, and hence the total portfolio, in aggregating all loans, implying that they are perfect 
substitutes for the banks. We have also plotted different forecasting and other statistics to 
compare the best safety first disaggregated and aggregated models within the sample period 
and out of the sample period. The comparison shows that the disaggregated model wins over 
















APPENDIX   A  
 
DERIVATION OF THE BANK’S OPTIMAL DEMAND FOR CHOICE ASSETS 
In order to minimise the probability of disaster investor has to select the highest slop. For 
example, If bank chooses the portfolio at the point P in figure 1, where the line DP touches to 
the mean-variance curve AB that is a tangential to the efficient mean-variance frontier, can be 
expressed as follows. 
 
(5.1A) ππ σμ sD +=  
At the optimal portfolio point P, the tangent line DP and the mean variance curve AB must be 
equal. Thus, substituting πμ from equation (5.1A) into equation (5.21) gives 
(5.2A)  0)()]([)(2)( 2222121
22 =−+−−−−−+− dddDdDdksd γββσβσα ππ
Equation (4.2A) can be written as quadratic function of σπ2  
(5.3A)  02 =++ cba ππ σσ
Where 
2sda −= α  
)(2 21 dDdsb β−−=  
0)()]([ 22221 =−+−−−= dddDc γββ  







Since, at the point P where line DP is tangent to the curve AB, it must be the only one of 
these roots for equation (5.3A) which is required that 
042 =− acb  
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Or 
 which we deduce the optimal value for s  as From 2
(5.4A) ])(1[
2
212 ddDds βα +−+=  
)( 22
2 dγβ −
Equation (5.1A) shows that the slope of the tangent line DP is s. At this tangent point, the 
slop has to be equal to the slop of the efficient mean-variance frontier AB which can be found 

























































By putting above value of μπ in equations (5.18) and (5.19), and using the expression of β 
2 )( ddd βγβμ −+−=  
from equation (5.23) to get the solution of λ1,and λ2, which are not involve  μπ and  πσ , as  




















2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 24 ( ) 4( )[( ) ( ) ]s d D d d s d D d dβ α β γ β− − = − − − − +
dd
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Substitute solution from equations (5.10A) and (5.11A) into equation (5.13) to yield the 
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1: Descriptive Statistics of Endogenous Variables (Ratios):  





 Mean 0.05 0.05 0.42 0.05 0 
 Median 0.04 0.05 0.42 0.05 0 
 Maximum 0.12 0.11 0.5 0.1 0.02 
 Minimum 0 0.03 0.3 0.02 0 
 Std. Dev. 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0 
 Skewness 3.  0.49 1.05 -0.4 0.05 55
 Kurtosis 3.33 2.96 3.07 3.31 15.05 
 Jarque-Bera 3.  67 7 71 15.26 2.2 0.37 6.9
 Probability 0.16 0 0.33 0.83 0 
 
 
T  T    RUSTS SUMB FGS BILLS CASH 
 Mean 0 0.  0.  14 0.11 0.08 11
 Median 0 0.14 0.1 0.08 0.1 
 Maximum 0.01 0.22 0.19 0.2 0.15 
 Minimum 0 0.08 0.06 0 0.08 
 Std. Dev. 0 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 
 Skewness 1.  69 0.3 0.76 0.34 0.54 
 Kurtosis 4.24 2.53 3.1 2.12 3.01 
 Jarque-Bera 45  4  .06 2.02 8.08 .31 3.97 
 Probability 0 0.36 0.02 0.12 0.14 
 
 
B ive S cs of est Ra fors):
 
  eforgovts eforpubs eforprivs eforpers eforothers 
2: Descript tatisti Inter tes (E   
 Mean 6.91 6.07 6.44 4.62 5.23 
 Median 6.84 5.94 6.45 4.15 5.06 
 Maximum 12.28 9.84 10 10.44 11.61 
 Minimum -1.88 -1.6 -1.99 -2.66 -2.53 
 Std. Dev. 2.12 2.1 2.16 2.59 2.65 
 Skewness -0.66 -0.55 -0.84 0.12 0.03 
 Kurtosis 5.79 3.99 4  .78 3.5 3.58 
 Jarque-Bera 32.85 7.54 20.84 1.05 1.19 
 Probability 0 0  .02 0 0.59 0.55 
 
efo  efo  ef efo s efo    rtrusts rsumb orfgs rtbill rcash
 Mean 6.23 3.25 3.42 3.79  -4.63
 Median 6  .04 3.23 3.35 3.73  -5.55
 Maximum 11 1 8. 7..3 89 85 10.58 -0.56 
 Minimum -2.31 -2.4 -1.75 -2.41 -9.82 
 Std. Dev. 2.52 2.37 2.37 2.78 2.16 
 Skewness -0.23 -0.33 0.01 -0.12 0.27 
 Kurtosis 3.62 3 2.72 2.81 2.21 
 Jarque-Bera 2.08 1.49 0.28 0.32 3.21 





CONCLUSION AND COMPARISION BETWEEN EXPECTED UTILITY AND 
SAFETY FIRST MODELS 
 
In chapter four, the expected utility has empirically described the asset structure 
adjustment behaviour of commercial banks in Pakistan in the context of a model that 
explicitly allows for cross effects among instruments. The empirical results provides 
support for the hypothesis that the structure of interest rates is an important determinant 
of the composition of the assets’ holdings of the commercial banks in Pakistan but it 
looks that the availability of funds is more important in determining the structure of these 
portfolios. The result of expected utility model lend to empirical support to the general 
stock adjustment formulation. It seems that portfolio decision do take account of liquidity 
and to a lesser extent of profitability attributes of the various assets.  
 
We have included dummy in our expected utility model so as to see the structural break 
due to the effect of Islamisation process of the financial system in Pakistan that was 
started in 1979 when the specialized credit institutions in the public sector reoriented 
their financial activities towards non-interest bearing operations. We found dummies are 
significant in five out of nine system equations. On January 1st, 1981, all domestic 
commercial banks were permitted to accept deposits on the basis of profit and loss 
sharing (PLS), and during the transition phase most banks were allowed to practice 
traditional banking alongside the Islamic system. Separated interest-free counters started 
operating in all domestic commercial banks, and one foreign bank (Bank of Oman) began 
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to mobilize deposits on a profit and loss sharing basis. By July 1st, 1985, all commercial 
banking transaction in rupees were made interest-free and since then no bank in Pakistan, 
including foreign banks, has been allowed to accept any interest bearing deposits and all 
existing deposits in a bank have been treated on the basis of PLS. Deposits in current 
accounts continue to be accepted but no interest or share in profit or loss is allowed. In 
addition, all finance provided by banks to the government, public or private sectors, joint 
stock companies is only on basis of the specified Islamic modes of financing. 
 
We wanted to include Non-performing Loans (NPL) and Growth rate as variables to 
capture explicitly aspects of risk for each type of assets in our model and these have to be 
treated as exogenous variables, under our theoretical framework. We could not include 
NPL as a variable in our estimation due to non-availability of data; the only data is 
available from 2002 to 2004. On the other hand we also employed growth rate in our 
portfolio model to get the impact of systematic risk or economic risk on the portfolio. In 
line with impact effects, we would expect the effects of Growth rate to be negative on 
their corresponding assets holding. We found that the growth rate was significant in only 
one equation which is lending to the Public sector out of nine equations of the system. 
The total effects of Growth rate are correct (negative) for Federal Bonds, Treasury Bills, 
Cash and lending to the Personal, Trust and Private sectors; while in short-run (impact 
effect) show correct (negative) effect for Treasury Bills, Cash and lending to the 
Personal, Trust and Private sectors. These results indicate that Growth rate is more 
effective in affecting bank behaviour in long-run period by having 60% (6 out of 10 
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possible negative signs) correct signs than for short-run period by having 50% (5 out of 
10 possible positive signs) correct signs.   
 
Despite the fact that the results shown in expected utility chapter indicate that a number 
of coefficients have inappropriate signs and the assumption of non-negativity of the 
diagonal elements of the rates of return matrix has been violated. Though these results 
may seem disappointing, they are typical of reported econometric models of banks 
behaviour (see i.e, Aigner(1973), Humphery(1981), Spindt and Tarhan (1980) and Thistle 
et al (1989)1. On the other hand, the empirical tests of the restrictions to date are not 
conclusive. The results of testing restrictions implied by the mean variance approach or 
implied by the balance sheet condition show the rejection of both symmetry and 
homogeniety. The rejection of these restrictions is common in the literature; it could be 
mentioned that the power of testing may be reduced since the observation period is rather 
short (see Keuzenkamp and Barten(1995)). 
 
The level of capital considered one of the key measures of stability of financial system. 
Higher base capital not only enhances the confidence of the stakeholders but also reduces 
the moral hazards problem and boosts the competition in the market. For the stability of 
the banking system, the State Bank of Pakistan has adopted two strategies for 
strengthening the capital base. On one hand, SBP focuses on the increase in the capital 
base by enhancing the minimum capital requirement from time to time. On the other hand 
it enforces risk-base capital requirement in the form of adoption of International standard 
of capital-Basel 1, initially and setting minimum standard of capital adequacy ratio 
                                                          
1 See Ford (1994, 2001) 
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during late 90s. The State Bank of Pakistan has developed a uniform bank rating system 
in conformity with international standards/benchmarks. Now each bank is appraised 
under the CAMELS Rating System.  
 
The SBP has to give commercial banks of Pakistan so-called CAMELS rating, which is 
based on six areas assessed: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. With above information, SBP can enforce 
regulations by taking such formal actions as cease and desist orders to alter the bank’s 
behaviour or may close a bank if its CAMELS rating are very low. These actions are 
taken to mitigate moral hazard by imposing restrictions to the banks from taking on too 
much risk. It does also help reducing adverse selection problem because with less 
opportunity for risk taking, risk-loving entrepreneur will be less likely to be attracted to 
the banking industry. Additionally, The Banking Companies Ordinance had been 
amended in 1997, which empowers the State Bank to prescribe capital requirements for 
banks. In exercise of these powers the State Bank has laid down Minimum Capital 
Requirements for banks based on Basle capital structure. The banks have to maintain a 
Capital Adequacy Ratio in a way that their capital and unencumbered general reserves 
are, at the minimum, 8% of their risk weighted assets, and effective from 1st January, 
2003 banks are required to maintain a minimum paid up capital level of Rs.1 Billion. 
Now implementation of Basel II would also rationales the risk exposures vis –a viz. 
capital2. 
 
                                                          
2 see- the State Bank of Pakistan web site,Frederic S Mishkin(2003) and Saunders and Cornett(2006) 
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 In continuation, both of these approaches has benefited the financial system in terms of 
improved stability and resilience, operating efficiencies and also attracted foreign 
investments in this area. Growing asset base, largely financed by the steady deposit flows 
signifies the increasing confidence of the depositors on the stability of the banking 
system. Improved asset quality talks about the improved risk management, credit 
appraisal and monitoring standards3. In the light of above restrictions under Basel 1, 
Bank has to change its portfolio behaviour according to the Basel 1 accord (minimum 
capital requirement and risk base capital requirement). 
 
Our expected utility model attempt to reflect the institutional framework of the banking 
sector of Pakistan, it does not incorporate certain aspects of the system i.e, the effects of 
changes in reserve requirements, interest rates limits on deposits, and compensatory 
deposits balances are not considered.  
 
Although interest rates and yields appeared relatively insignificant in expected utility 
model when compared to other variables such as the availability of funds, they can not be 
discounted in policies relating to the portfolio of banks in Pakistan. Therefore, according 
to Ford, Kagigi and Cadle (1999) the role of interest rates in the determination of bank 
portfolio behaviour in developing countries is unsettled and demands further 
investigation. 
 
                                                          
3 See –State Bank of Pakistan web site. 
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For further investigation of bank portfolio behaviour of Pakistan, we have estimated the 
best safety first with symmetry restrictions model in chapter five. In terms of emphasis, 
safety first model has derived quite similar to those of expected utility maximisation. In 
both models, the only source of portfolio diversification is the interest rate uncertainty. 
Symmetry condition does hold in safety first model but not in expected utility model 
model. Although, there are some similarities in both model, but safety first model is 
different from expected utility model in many important ways. 
 
The bank demand for the choice asset depends on their expected rates of return with 
keeping assumption that the rates of return on the choice items are un-correlated. The 
banks’ demand equations are highly non-linear in the expected rates of return. The 
demand for one choice asset will depend on its own expected rate of return as well as the 
expected rates of return on all other choice assets, even though the rates of return on the 
choice items are not correlated with each other. Due to high degree of nonlinearity in the 
Safety First model, some estimation problems have to face i.e, not only do estimations 
take longer converge but parameter estimates are also more sensitive to small changes in 
the data. 
 
Like expected utility, we have included dummy in our safety first model so as to see the 
structural break due to the effect of Islamisation process of the financial system in 
Pakistan that was started in 1979 when the specialized credit institutions in the public 
sector reoriented their financial activities towards non-interest bearing operations. We 
have found dummies are not significant in our system of equations. 
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Unlike expected utility model where we have to take the assumption of normal 
distribution, the safety first model does not depend on any specific assumption about the 
exact distribution of the actual return on a portfolio or the form of the utility function. 
Therefore, the safety first models estimated in this chapter are consistent with a wide 
range of distributions of the rate of return on the portfolio. It is also argued that the safety 
first models are distribution-free. 
 
The forecasting statistics of both models show that the forecasting behaviour of both 
models are more or less similar and perform well.  
 
Overall, the safety first dynamic model marginally performs better than expected utility 
model in terms of co-efficents’ significance of interest rates and general stock 
adjustments. It can be said that the safety first model does explains better the portfolio 
behaviour of Pakistani Banks. Further search in this area is obviously required.  
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